Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 1 of 19
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`Master File No. 14-cv-03264-JD
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`ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS
`AMENDED COMPLAINTS
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`Re: Dkt. Nos. 787, 788, 791, 792, 793, 927
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`IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION.
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`In these consolidated antitrust class actions, plaintiffs are direct and indirect purchasers of
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`capacitors, a ubiquitous component in electronic devices of all types. The gist of the complaints is
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`that the defendant manufacturers have conspired to fix capacitor prices in the global market.
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`The Court granted in part and denied in part defendants’ initial motions to dismiss the
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`direct purchaser plaintiffs’ (“DPPs”) and indirect purchaser plaintiffs’ (“IPPs”) consolidated
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`complaints. Dkt. No. 710. The DPPs and IPPs subsequently amended their complaints in
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`response to the Court’s order, and now before the Court are defendants’ second sets of motions to
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`dismiss the amended complaints. The Court grants the motion to dismiss the IPPs’ non-California
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`state law claims on Article III standing grounds, grants the separate individual motion to dismiss
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`the direct purchaser plaintiffs’ complaint by American Shizuki Corporation, and denies the
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`motions in all other respects.
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`BACKGROUND
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`This order addresses what is new and different in the complaints since the prior motion to
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`dismiss order. Dkt. No. 710. On the DPP side, the case now involves a new direct purchaser
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`plaintiff who is proceeding on an individual basis rather than as a part of the putative class. On
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`June 22, 2015, the Court related to this action Flextronics International USA, Inc. v. NEC Tokin
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`Corporation et al, Case No. 15-cv-02517. Dkt. No. 751. Flextronics’s case has been consolidated
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`into this one and counsel were directed to work together to file a joint complaint. Dkt. No. 774.
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 2 of 19
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`On July 22, 2015, the DPPs and Flextronics filed their “consolidated second amended class
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`action complaint and complaint of Flextronics International USA, Inc.” 1 Dkt. Nos. 799-4, 826.
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`That complaint is the operative complaint for all parties in the direct purchaser action. For the
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`allegations that continue to be made on a class basis, the overall substance is basically the same as
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`the initial complaint, Dkt. No. 401, which the Court largely sustained over defendants’ challenges
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`to it. The four named plaintiffs who wish to act as class representatives remain the same, and they
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`again press one claim for relief on behalf of the putative class, under Section 1 of the Sherman
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`Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. Dkt. No. 799-4. Flextronics, which sues a subset of the defendants named by
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`the original DPPs, joins in the Sherman Act Section 1 claim “for damages only,” and additionally
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`asserts against the defendants it has named a claim for the violation of California’s Cartwright Act,
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`Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 16720, and Unfair Competition Law, Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200.
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`Id.
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`In the amended complaint, the DPPs refined their allegations against the fourteen
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`individual defendants who were dismissed by the Court with leave to amend, and most of the
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`defendants have now answered the amended complaint. See Dkt. Nos. 829-838, 840-848. A few
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`others were voluntarily dismissed or are in settlement talks. Dkt. Nos. 746, 858, 879. The
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`pending motions that are ripe for the Court’s resolution in this order are four separate challenges to
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`the DPPs’ and Flextronics’ allegations. Those motions were brought by AVX Corporation (Dkt.
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`Nos. 787), Holy Stone Enterprise Co., Ltd. and Milestone Global Technology, Inc. (Dkt. Nos. 788,
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`818), Hitachi Chemical Co. America, Ltd. (Dkt. Nos. 792, 817), and Shizuki Electric Co., Inc. and
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`American Shizuki Corporation (Dkt. No. 927). The Court resolves the motions in the second half
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`of this order.
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`On the IPP side, the most important development is that the second consolidated
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`complaint, Dkt. No. 741, reprises claims under a slew of state antitrust and consumer protection
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`statutes that the Court had believed were voluntarily dismissed along with the “consumer indirect
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`1 Unless otherwise noted, the Court refers to the original direct purchaser plaintiffs (i.e., those who
`wish to proceed as a class) as the “DPPs,” and to the DPPs and Flextronics together as “the direct
`purchaser plaintiffs.”
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`purchaser plaintiffs” who were voluntarily dismissed from the case. Dkt. No. 594. Otherwise, the
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`named plaintiffs and key factual and legal allegations remain the same. In addition to a joint
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`motion to dismiss filed by a large group of defendants, there is one pending individual challenge
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`to the IPPs’ complaint filed by Hitachi Chemical Co. America, Ltd. Dkt. Nos. 791, 793.
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`DISCUSSION
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`I. INDIRECT PURCHASER PLAINTIFFS’ COMPLAINT
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`A. The Non-California State Law Claims (Dkt. No. 793)
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`The Court begins with the IPPs’ amended complaint, and defendants’ joint motion to
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`dismiss it. 2 The operative IPP complaint is brought by the five named “first-level” indirect
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`purchaser plaintiffs who are the same as before: two individual “California residents” (Michael
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`Brooks and Steve Wong), two “California companies” (CAE Sound and Toy-Knowlogy Inc., both
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`with their principal places of business in California), and Alfred H. Siegel, the “Liquidating
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`Trustee of the Circuit City Stores, Inc. Liquidating Trust.” Dkt. No. 741 ¶¶ 29-33. Mr. Siegel’s
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`citizenship is not separately alleged, but the Circuit City Stores, Inc. Liquidating Trust was
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`established in connection with the bankruptcy proceedings of Circuit City Stores, Inc., which “was
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`incorporated in Virginia and had its principal place of business in Richmond, Virginia” during the
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`relevant time period. Id. ¶ 34. Both the prior version of the complaint and the current complaint
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`allege claims under California law, but not Virginia law.
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`The version of the IPP complaint that the Court dismissed had antitrust and consumer
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`protection claims under the laws of twenty-one states in addition to California. But that version of
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`the complaint had also included thirty-one “consumer indirect purchaser plaintiffs” who were
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`alleged to be residents of twenty-one states in addition to California. Dkt. No. 400. The consumer
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`indirect purchaser plaintiffs were parties who had purchased products containing capacitors that
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`2 The joint motion is brought by ELNA Co., Ltd., ELNA America, Inc., Hitachi Chemical Co.,
`Ltd., Hitachi Chemical Company America, Ltd., Hitachi AIC Incorporated, Matsuo Electric Co.,
`Ltd., NEC TOKIN Corporation, NEC TOKIN America, Inc., Nichicon Corporation, Nichicon
`(America) Corporation, Nitsuko Electronics Corp., Okaya Electric Industries Co., Ltd., Panasonic
`Corporation, Panasonic Corporation of North America, SANYO Electric Co., Ltd., SANYO North
`America Corp., Rubycon Corporation, Rubycon America Inc., Shinyei Technology Co., Ltd.,
`Shinyei Capacitor Co., Ltd., Soshin Electric Co., Ltd., Taitsu Corporation, United Chemi-Con,
`Inc., and Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation. See Dkt. No. 793 at vii n.1.
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 4 of 19
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`were manufactured by one or more defendants. At the prior motion to dismiss hearing, the Court
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`raised a question about proceeding with claims by downstream buyers who looked to be a long
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`distance away from the alleged conspiracy. The IPPs, on their own motion, voluntarily dismissed
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`all of the consumer plaintiffs without prejudice. Dkt. No. 594. The subsequent motion to dismiss
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`order consequently “deem[ed] all state claims other than those under California law to have been
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`voluntarily dismissed by the indirect purchaser plaintiffs.” Dkt. No. 710 at 4 n.2.
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`That conclusion was the product of the voluntary dismissal rather than a formal finding by
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`the Court, and the IPPs have now repackaged their state law claims in a different format. The IPPs
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`still consist of only the five named first-level indirect purchaser plaintiffs from California and
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`Virginia, but the operative complaint alleges claims under the antitrust and consumer protection
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`laws of thirty-one states in addition to California. Dkt. No. 741 ¶¶ 387-445.
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`The main argument defendants jointly make against the IPPs’ complaint is that the state
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`claims outside California must be dismissed because the named plaintiffs lack Article III standing
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`to bring them. Dkt. No. 793 at 1-5. The IPPs respond that (i) the named plaintiffs have
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`sufficiently alleged Article III standing to proceed with their case as a whole, and that Article III
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`standing is not to be “conflated . . . with ‘statutory standing’”; (ii) Article III standing for their
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`state antitrust and consumer protection claims “are not circumscribed merely to residency or the
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`place-of-purchase,” and standing can and does arise more broadly from the allegations IPPs say
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`they have here, mainly delivery of allegedly price-fixed products to one of the named plaintiffs
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`(Circuit City) in certain states; and (iii) resolution of the standing question should be deferred until
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`class certification in any event. Dkt. No. 854 at 1-8.
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`Taking up the last argument first, the Court declines to defer resolution of this threshold
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`issue until a later time. The Ninth Circuit has made clear that the district courts can -- and usually
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`should -- resolve the issue of Article III standing at the outset of a case. See Easter v. Am. W. Fin.,
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`381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The district court correctly addressed the issue of standing
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`before it addressed the issue of class certification”) (quoting statement in Ortiz v. Fibreboard
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`Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999), that a “court must be sure of its own jurisdiction before getting to the
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`Northern District of California
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`United States District Court
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`merits”). This is a sound sequence because the query under Article III of the United States
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`Constitution is a jurisdictional one.
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`Article III provides that federal courts may only hear “cases” and “controversies,” and this
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`limitation is a key part of the separation of powers principles that are fundamental to our republic.
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`See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-60 (1992) (discussing Article III’s conferral
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`of “[t]he judicial Power” and the undefined “Cases” and “Controversies” limitation to federal
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`courts’ jurisdiction, and explaining that “the Constitution’s central mechanism of separation of
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`powers depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are appropriate to
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`legislatures, to executives, and to courts.”). Lujan is a keystone in the federal jurisdiction edifice.
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`In it, the United States Supreme Court held that the “core component of standing is an essential
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`and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” and identified the three
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`elements that make up the “irreducible constitutional minimum of standing.” Id. at 560-61. The
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`plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”; the injury must be “‘fairly . . . trace[able]’ to the
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`challenged action of the defendant”; and it must be “‘likely’ . . . that the injury will be ‘redressed
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`by a favorable decision.’” Id. (internal citations omitted). See also TrafficSchool.com, Inc. v.
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`Edriver Inc., 653 F.3d 820, 824 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Constitutional standing calls for the familiar trio
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`of injury in fact, causation and redressability.”)
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`The Supreme Court has been very clear that Article III standing is a threshold inquiry that
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`must be undertaken at the outset of a case, before the Court proceeds any further. For example, in
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`Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1998), the Court declined to endorse
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`the “hypothetical jurisdiction” approach “because it carries the courts beyond the bounds of
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`authorized judicial action and thus offends fundamental principles of separation of powers.” The
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`Court explained that, “[w]ithout jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause,” and
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`“[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ‘spring[s] from the nature
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`and limits of the judicial power of the United States’ and is ‘inflexible and without exception.’”
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`Id. (internal citations omitted).
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`Although some district courts have on occasion deferred this inquiry until class
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`certification, that approach stands out as the exception to the rule, and the IPPs offer no good
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`reason to put off the issue here. In the employment class action case that IPPs rely on most
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`heavily, Judge Spero expressly noted that there was at least one named plaintiff who could assert a
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`claim under each of the state laws invoked by plaintiffs. See Senne v. Kansas City Royals
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`Baseball Corp., Case No. 14-cv-00608-JCS, 2015 WL 4240716, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 13, 2015)
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`(“plaintiffs do not seek to assert any claims under laws of states where no named plaintiff resides.
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`Rather, there is a named plaintiff with standing to assert a claim under the laws of every state
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`whose laws are invoked in this action”). Judge Spero also expressly found that “there is at least
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`one named plaintiff who is alleged to have been employed in every state whose laws are invoked”
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`and plaintiffs had therefore “made this threshold showing of standing.” Id. That case does not
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`support any argument that this “threshold” jurisdictional inquiry can or should be deferred here,
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`and the Court declines to do so.
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`As a first step in answering the jurisdictional inquiry, IPPs urge the Court to evaluate the
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`named plaintiffs’ Article III standing on a highly general, rather than specific claim by claim,
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`basis. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 854 at 2 (“Here, IPPs have sufficiently alleged Article III, injury-in-fact,
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`standing. The SCC alleges that each named plaintiff paid artificially inflated prices for capacitors
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`as a result of defendants’ price-fixing conspiracy. Plaintiffs have, therefore, suffered monetary
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`harm, which is the classic form of injury for purposes of the constitutional requirement.”). To do
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`otherwise, IPPs say, is to impermissibly “conflate[] Article III standing with ‘statutory standing.’”
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`See id. at 1.
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`But the Court finds that it is IPPs who get the law wrong. The Supreme Court has
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`expressly directed that Article III standing must be measured claim by claim. See
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`DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 352 (2006) (“What we have never done is apply
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`the rationale of Gibbs to permit a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim
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`that does not itself satisfy those elements of the Article III inquiry, such as constitutional standing
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`. . . . [O]ur standing cases confirm that a plaintiff must demonstrate standing for each claim he
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`seeks to press”; and “standing is not dispensed in gross”) (emphases added; internal quotation
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`marks and citations omitted). And when measuring standing claim by claim, it is a named
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`plaintiff who must possess the requisite standing; it is not sufficient that a putative class member
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`may have standing to press one of the claims. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357-58 (1996)
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`(“That a suit may be a class action . . . adds nothing to the question of standing, for even named
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`plaintiffs who represent a class ‘must allege and show that they personally have been injured, not
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`that injury has been suffered by other, unidentified members of the class to which they belong and
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`which they purport to represent.’”) (citations omitted). Consequently, at least one of the five
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`named plaintiffs must have Article III standing for each of the state law antitrust and consumer
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`protection claims alleged in the IPP complaint. Otherwise, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the
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`claim and must dismiss it.
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`The remaining question is what is needed to establish Article III standing for each state
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`antitrust or consumer protection law claim asserted in this case. So-called “statutory standing” is
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`not enough by itself. See, e.g., Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 96-97 (“The latter question [whether a
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`plaintiff ‘came within the “zone of interests” for which the cause of action was available’] is an
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`issue of statutory standing. It has nothing to do with whether there is [a] case or controversy
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`under Article III.”) (emphasis in original).3 To be clear, the holding that statutory standing “has
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`nothing to do with” Article III standing under the current state of the law lends no support to IPPs’
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`argument that Article III standing should not be examined state law claim by state law claim. The
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`Supreme Court clearly said in DaimlerChrysler (which post-dated Steel Co. by eight years) that
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`Article III standing must be examined claim by claim, and that directive is not in conflict with the
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`instruction that Article III standing is separate from, and not to be measured by, statutory standing.
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`Although they criticize defendants for it, IPPs themselves commit the error of focusing on
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`statutory rather than Article III standing. At the hearing, for example, IPPs’ counsel argued that
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`nothing amounting to injury needed to have happened in the states whose laws are being invoked
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`because “[t]he statutes don’t call for it.” Dkt. No. 922 at 11:10-11; see also id. at 15:22-23 (“the
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`statutes don’t require the purchase in those states.”). This position has two significant flaws. As
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`3 The Supreme Court is expected to address the issue of whether Congress may confer Article III
`standing upon a plaintiff who suffers no concrete harm, and who therefore could not otherwise
`invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, by authorizing a private right of action based on a bare
`violation of a federal statute. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 742 F.3d 409 (9th Cir. 2014), cert. granted,
`135 S.Ct. 1892 (Apr. 27, 2015). That is a different question than the state law issues raised here.
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`Northern District of California
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`an initial matter, IPPs have never actually identified any specific state statute that does not require
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`an in-state purchase or other injury. But even assuming such statutes exist, pointing to them
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`undermines IPPs’ argument. As IPPs concede, Article III standing is different from, and not to be
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`measured by, statutory standing. Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83; see also TrafficSchool.com, 653 F.3d at
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`825 (“the district court should have undertaken an independent analysis of Article III standing
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`before determining standing under the Lanham Act.”).
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`This is a key point because the Article III standing requirement is a constitutional
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`limitation that applies to all claims litigated in a federal court whether based on federal or state
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`law. So even when a plaintiff asserts a state claim (under the federal court’s diversity jurisdiction,
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`supplemental jurisdiction, or some other proper basis of exercising federal subject matter
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`jurisdiction over the state claim), the plaintiff has no ability to pursue that claim in federal court
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`until and unless the plaintiff is found to possess Article III standing for the state claim. It is of no
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`moment that a state statute might purport to expressly give the plaintiff a right to sue; a plaintiff
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`who clearly has standing under a state statute but not under the requirements of Article III cannot
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`proceed with that claim in federal court. See Lee v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 260 F.3d 997, 1001-02 (9th
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`Cir. 2001) (“a plaintiff whose cause of action is perfectly viable in state court under state law may
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`nonetheless be foreclosed from litigating the same cause of action in federal court, if he cannot
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`demonstrate the requisite injury”); Fiedler v. Clark, 714 F.2d 77, 80 (9th Cir. 1983) (“The
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`legislative history of article XI, section 9 of the Hawaii Constitution suggests the legislature was
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`attempting to remove barriers to standing to sue, not to enlarge the subject matter jurisdiction of
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`the federal courts. In any event, ‘[in] determining jurisdiction, district courts of the United States
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`must look to the sources of their power, article III of the United States Constitution and
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`Congressional statutory grants of jurisdiction, not to the acts of state legislatures. However
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`extensive their power to create and define substantive rights, the states have no power directly to
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`enlarge or contract federal jurisdiction.’”).
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`Consequently, to say that a state statute does not require actual injury undermines the
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`possibility of Article III standing. The absence of an injury requirement under state law does not,
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`as IPPs suggest, trump the constitutional standing requirements. And whether or not the state
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 9 of 19
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`statutes at issue “call for” an in-state injury or purchase says nothing about whether or not such an
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`injury is required under Article III.
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`As these considerations make clear, the determinant of the IPPs’ Article III standing for the
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`state law claims here is the injury-in-fact requirement. IPPs acknowledge that the strong trend in
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`this district and in other courts is to require an in-state purchase to establish Article III standing for
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`state antitrust and related consumer protection claims like the ones alleged in this case. See, e.g.,
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`In re Ditropan XL Antitrust Litigation, 529 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1107 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (dismissing
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`for failure to demonstrate Article III standing antitrust claims under laws of twenty-four states in
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`which “none of the named plaintiffs reside [] or are alleged to have personally purchased Ditropan
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`XL”); In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litigation, 527 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1026-27 (N.D.
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`Cal. 2007) (dismissing for lack of standing antitrust and consumer claims under laws of states
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`where “there is no named plaintiff from those states who has suffered injury as a result of
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`defendants’ conduct”); Los Gatos Mercantile, Inc. v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., Case
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`No. 13-cv-01180-BLF, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Sep, 22, 2014) (“The trend in the Northern District of
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`California is to consider Article III issues at the pleading stage in antitrust cases and to dismiss
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`claims asserted under the laws of states in which no plaintiff resides or has purchased products.”);
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`see also United Food and Commercial Workers Local 1776 & Participating Employers Health
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`and Welfare Fund v. Teikoku Pharma USA, Inc., 74 F. Supp. 3d 1052 (N.D. Cal. 2014)
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`(“Lidoderm”) (“The question is whether the EPP was harmed in a particular state by either its own
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`purchase of a Lidoderm or generic patch or by its reimbursement of a purchase of a Lidoderm or
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`generic patch in that state.”) (emphasis in original); In re Flonase Antitrust Litigation, 692 F.
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`Supp. 2d 524, 532-33 (E.D. Penn. 2010) (“each named plaintiff has standing to bring a claim
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`under the laws of the states where they are located, and where they purchased Flonase or
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`reimbursed their members for Flonase purchases.”).
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`The Court joins these decisions to find that in-state injury in the form of an in-state
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`purchase of a capacitor at a supra-competitive price is required here to satisfy Article III standing
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 10 of 19
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`for each of the state law claims asserted.4 As IPPs acknowledge, suffering monetary harm “is the
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`classic form of injury for purposes of the constitutional requirement,” and in the context of this
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`case, it makes sense that this monetary harm would take the form of, in the IPPs’ own words,
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`“each named plaintiff pa[ying] artificially inflated prices for capacitors as a result of defendants’
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`price-fixing conspiracy.” Dkt. No. 854 at 2. For each of IPPs’ state law claims, they need a
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`plaintiff who has been injured in-state in that way.
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`Whether other forms of injury or conduct might satisfy Article III is not before the Court.
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`For the sake of completeness in the event IPPs choose to amend one last time, as the Court will
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`permit, residence in a state alone -- without a purchase or any other conduct amounting to “injury”
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`-- cannot be sufficient, or even relevant, for Article III purposes. The constitutional requirement is
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`for an injury in fact to a named plaintiff personally, and it is hard to see how mere residence in a
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`state without any purchase can satisfy that, even if some bad act under the state’s antitrust laws
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`happened there. Merely living in a state, even one where price-fixing conduct occurred, is not a
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`basis for standing if the plaintiff did not actually pay a supra-competitive price there for the
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`accused product. Standing does not arise simply because illegality is in the air. See Lexmark Int’l
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`Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S.Ct. 1377, 1387 n.3 (2014) (generalized grievances
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`“do not present constitutional ‘cases’ or ‘controversies.’”).
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`On a final point, the IPPs say they have some states where defendants shipped allegedly
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`price-fixed capacitors to Circuit City, one of the named plaintiffs. Although they did not specify
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`which states in their complaint, counsel stated at the hearing that he can amend IPPs’ complaint to
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`allege that “Circuit City plaintiff receives deliveries of products in various states in the country.
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`At a minimum, in California, Florida, Hawaii, and Illinois.” Dkt. No. 922 at 11:24-12:3. And
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`IPPs argue that Circuit City should at least be seen as having Article III standing to pursue claims
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`4 Because the antitrust claims and consumer protection claims here are based on the same factual
`allegation of a price-fixing conspiracy, the Court finds that the Article III injury-in-fact needed is
`the same for both types of claims. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 741 ¶ 390 (alleging, for state antitrust
`claims, that “defendants have combined and conspired to raise, fix, maintain or stabilize the prices
`of electrolytic and film capacitors sold in the United States.”); ¶ 422 (alleging, for state consumer
`protection and unfair competition law claims, that defendants engaged in conduct “in violation of
`these states’ consumer protection and unfair competition laws by engaging in a conspiracy to fix
`and stabilize the price of electrolytic and film capacitors as described above.”).
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`United States District Court
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`

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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1003 Filed 12/30/15 Page 11 of 19
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`under the laws of those states in which deliveries were received, while at the same time admitting
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`that the purchases themselves were made in Virginia. But this does not comport with the Court’s
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`application of Article III. Just receiving deliveries of price-fixed goods that were purchased
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`elsewhere does not constitute an Article III injury-in-fact under the antitrust or consumer
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`protection laws. The IPPs’ complaint itself alleges the injury in this case as the purchase, not the
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`received shipment of purchased goods. See, e.g., Dkt. No. 741 ¶ 370 (“Plaintiffs and all members
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`of the Classes are similarly affected by defendants’ wrongful conduct in that they paid artificially
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`inflated prices for electrolytic and film capacitors purchased indirectly from defendants.”). That is
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`what comports with this Court’s understanding of what Article III requires for an injury in fact in
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`this case, and the Court denies IPPs’ request to broaden the requirement to encompass those states
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`in which Circuit City only received deliveries.5
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`In sum, to have standing under Article III to bring a state-law antitrust or related consumer
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`protection claim in a price-fixing class action, a named plaintiff must have purchased the price-
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`fixed product in the state under whose law he or she seeks to bring a claim. The IPPs admit that
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`they do not have such plaintiffs for any of the thirty-one states whose laws are asserted other than
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`California. Consequently, the Court dismisses the non-California state law claims for lack of
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`Article III standing. IPPs will have one last opportunity to renew claims under those laws if they
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`are able to locate a named plaintiff who can assert an Article III injury-in-fact consistent with this
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`order. If IPPs want to pursue that option, they need to amend by January 27, 2016.
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`B. Hitachi Chemical Co. America, Ltd. (Dkt. No. 791)
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`In its prior dismissal order, the Court dismissed the IPPs’ complaint with leave to
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`amend for five U.S. subsidiaries, because the complaint failed to sufficiently allege that those
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`subsidiaries had “joined the conspiracy and played some role in it.” Dkt. No. 710 at 26. Hitachi
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`5 The IPPs’ main case, In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litigation, Case No. C-07-5944-
`SC, 2013 WL 4505701 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2013), is inapposite. It is mainly a discussion of due
`process (and to a lesser extent, prudential standing), which is a question the Court has no occasion
`to reach in this case because of the lack of Article III standing, and the CRT court also did not
`elaborate at all on the actual factual allegations in the underlying complaints that drove its ultimate
`conclusion. Though IPPs make arguments from the underlying complaints themselves from those
`cases’ dockets, those complaints are not before the Court.
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`United States District Court
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`

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`Chemical Co. America, Ltd. (“HCA”) was one of those five, and it is now the only defendant
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`(U.S. subsidiary or not) that has filed an individual motion to dismiss the IPPs’ complaint. Dkt.
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`No. 791.
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`HCA argues that “[d]espite receiving a second chance to amend their allegations, IPPs still
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`fail to allege that HCA consciously participated in the alleged conspiracies.” Dkt. No. 791 at 2.
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`But a central premise of this argument is that the IPPs have “added only