Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 1 of 10
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`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
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`IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION
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`THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
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`ALL DIRECT PURCHASER ACTIONS
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
`COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR
`ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`This matter is before the Court on Direct Purchaser Class Counsel’s application for Attorneys’
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`Fees and Reimbursement of Expenses (“Motion”) (Dkt. 1458) made in connection with DPPs’ Motion
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`for Final Approval of Settlements with Fujitsu Limited, NEC TOKIN Corporation, NEC TOKIN
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`America, Inc., Nitsuko Electronics Corporation, Okaya Electric Industries Co., Ltd. and Okaya Electric
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`America, Inc., ROHM Co., Ltd., and ROHM Semiconductor U.S.A., LLC (the “Settling Defendants”)
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`(Dkt. 1461). On March 30, 2017, Direct Purchaser Class Counsel filed a Supplemental Report renewing
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`the Motion (Dkt. 1586). On April 6, 2017, the Court held a hearing on the Motion.
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`The Settlements total $32,600,000 in cash and secure agreements by each of the five Settling
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`Defendants to cooperate in DPPs’ continued prosecution of their claims against the non-settling
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`Defendants. The Settlements are the first in this litigation since its filing over two and a half years ago.
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`Direct Purchaser Class Counsel submit this Motion for attorneys’ fees seeking an award in the
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`amounts of $8,150,000 for fees accrued as of September 30, 2016, and $3,000,000 for costs advanced
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 2 of 10
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`on behalf of the Class during the same period. As reflected in Counsel’s submission, their cumulative
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`lodestar and costs as of September 30, 2016 greatly exceed the compensation they seek in this Motion.
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`Upon consideration of Direct Purchaser Plaintiff Counsel’s Motion, Lead Class Counsel’s
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`supporting declaration concurrently filed therewith, all other papers in the Court’s files, and the
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`argument at the March 2, 2017 hearing, the Court finds the following and grants Direct Purchaser
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`Plaintiff Counsel’s Motion.
`I.
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`LEGAL STANDARD
`A.
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`Attorneys’ Fees
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`Attorneys may recover reasonable attorneys’ fees from a common fund settlement they secure
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`on behalf of a class. The Supreme Court has explained that “a lawyer who recovers a common fund for
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`the benefit of persons other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable attorney’s fee from the
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`fund as a whole.” Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980); see also Mills v. Elec. Auto-Lite Co.,
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`396 U.S. 375, 393 (1970); Central R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116, 123 (1885) (“where one or
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`more of many parties having a common interest in a trust fund takes, at his own expense, proper
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`proceedings to save it from destruction and to restore it to the purposes of the trust, he is entitled to
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`reimbursement either out of the fund itself or by a proportional contribution from those who accept the
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`benefit of his efforts”). “The rationale behind awarding a percentage of the fund to counsel in common
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`fund cases is the same that justifies permitting contingency fee arrangements in general. . . . The
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`underlying premise is the existence of risk—the contingent risk of non-payment.” In re Quantum Health
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`Resources, Inc. Sec. Litig., 962 F. Supp. 1254, 1257 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (emphasis in original). In addition,
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`attorneys’ fees are awarded as a means of ensuring the beneficiaries of a common fund share with those
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`whose labors created the fund. See In re Washington Pub. Power Supply Sys. Sec. Litig., 19 F.3d 1291, 1300
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`(9th Cir. 1994) (“WPPSS”) (“those who benefit from the creation of the fund should share the wealth
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`with the lawyers whose skill and effort helped create it.”).
`B.
`Costs Reimbursement
`Counsel may also obtain reimbursement for costs from a common fund settlement. In re Media
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`Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“Reasonable costs and expenses
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`incurred by an attorney who creates or preserves a common fund are reimbursed proportionately by
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 3 of 10
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`those class members who benefit by the settlement.”) (citing, inter alia, Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co.,
`396 U.S. 375, 391-92 (1970)); see also Wolph v. Acer Am. Corp., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151180, at
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`*18 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2013) (“Counsel are entitled to reimbursement of their reasonable out-of-
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`pocket expenses.”). “The prevailing view is that expenses are awarded in addition to the fee
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`percentage.” Williams v. SuperShuttle Int’l, Inc., No. 12-CV-06493-WHO, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19341,
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`at *6 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2015) (citations omitted).
`II.
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`THE COURT AWARDS DPPS’ COUNSEL $8,150,000—25 PERCENT OF THE
`FUND—AS PARTIAL PAYMENT OF THEIR FEES ACCRUED AS OF SEPTEMBER
`30, 2016
`A.
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`The Percentage-of-the-Fund Method for Calculating Fees Is Appropriate Here
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`District courts in the Ninth Circuit use either the “percentage-of-the-fund” or the “lodestar”
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`method in calculating fees in common fund settlements. Fischel v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc’y, 307 F.3d
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`997, 1006 (9th Cir. 2002) (“In a common fund case, the district court has discretion to apply either the
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`lodestar method or the percentage-of-the-fund method in calculating a fee award.”). Using either
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`method, the ultimate inquiry is whether the end result is reasonable. Powers v. Eichen, 229 F.3d 1249,
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`1258 (9th Cir. 2000).
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`The percentage-of-the-fund method is preferred when counsel’s efforts have created a common
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`fund for the benefit of the class. “The use of the percentage-of-the-fund method in common-fund cases
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`is the prevailing practice in the Ninth Circuit for awarding attorneys’fees and permits the Court to focus
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`on a showing that a fund conferring benefits on a class was created through the efforts of plaintiffs'
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`counsel.” In re Korean Air Lines Co., Antitrust Litig., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 186262, at *3 (C.D. Cal.
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`Dec. 23, 2013); see also Bellinghausen v. Tractor Supply Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35266, at *33 (N.D.
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`Cal. Mar. 19, 2015) (“Because this case involves a common settlement fund with an easily quantifiable
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`benefit to the class, the Court will primarily determine attorneys’ fees using the benchmark method but
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`will incorporate a lodestar cross-check to ensure the reasonableness of the award.”) (emphasis added).
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`Where there is an easily quantifiable benefit to the class—namely, the cash recovery achieved
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`through the settlement—the percentage of the fund approach is appropriate. See In re Bluetooth Headset
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`Prods. Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 942 (9th Cir. 2011) (“Because the benefit to the class is easily quantified
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 4 of 10
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`in common-fund settlements, we have allowed courts to award attorneys a percentage of the common
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`fund in lieu of the often more time-consuming task of calculating the lodestar.”).
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`Courts supervising antitrust cases in this District regularly apply the percentage of the fund
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`approach. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1827 (N.D. Cal. January 14,
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`2013); Meijer v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 07-05985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011); Ross v. U.S. Nat’l Ass’n,
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`No. 07-02951, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107857, at *4-5 (N.D. Cal. Sept 29, 2010); In re CV Therapeutics,
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`Inc. Secs. Litig., No. 03-3709, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98244, at *2 (N.D. Cal. April 4, 2007); In re
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`Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M-02-1486, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
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`103027, at *1-2 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16, 2007); In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 98-4886,
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`2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23468, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002); Van Vranken v. ARCO, 901 F. Supp.
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`294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995). The Court will do so as well here.
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`Courts in the Ninth Circuit applying the “percentage of the fund” approach use a twenty-five
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`percent benchmark. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt v. Granulty, 886 F.2d 268, 272 (9th Cir. 1989). See
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`also In re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 934, 949 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Under the percentage-
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`of-recovery method, the attorneys’ fees equal some percentage of the common settlement fund; in this
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`circuit, the benchmark percentage is 25%”).
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`Selection of the benchmark or any other rate, however, must be supported by findings that take
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`into account all of the circumstances of the case. Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048 (9th
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`Cir. 2002). The benchmark is subject to adjustment—upward or downward—based on the Court’s
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`analysis of the factors the Ninth Circuit considered in Vizcaino: (1) the results achieved for the class; (2)
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`the complexity of the case and the risk of and expense to counsel of litigating it; (3) the skill, experience,
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`and performance of counsel on both sides; (4) the contingent nature of the fee; and (5) fees awarded in
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`comparable cases. See id. at 1048-50. See also In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig., No. MDL
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`No. 1917, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102408, at *62-69 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2016) (applying the Vizcaino
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`factors on indirect purchaser class counsel’s fee motion); In re: Cathode Ray Tube (CRT) Antitrust Litig.,
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`No. MDL No. 1917, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5383, at *171-74 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 14, 2016) (same) (direct
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`purchaser class counsel’s fee motion); In re Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig.,
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 5 of 10
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`No. M-02-1486-PJH, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190974, at *116-74 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 30, 2013) (“DRAM”)
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`(same).
`B.
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`The Vizcaino Factors Warrant Granting Counsel’s Fee Request
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`Here, each of the Vizcaino factors weighs in favor of awarding the requested $8,150,000, which
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`is twenty-five percent of the total Settlement Fund ($32,600,000), and equal to the Ninth Circuit’s
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`benchmark. Counsel’s Motion requests the benchmark amount from these Settlements. The Court
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`finds it is appropriate here to award Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs Counsel’s request for an award matching
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`this Circuit’s benchmark.
`1.
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`Counsel Obtained an Exceptional Result for the Direct Purchaser Class
`With The Settlements.
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`The most important factor is the result achieved for the class. In re Cathode Ray Tube (CRT)
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`Antitrust Litig., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102408, at *63 (citing In re Omnivision Techs., Inc., 559 F. Supp.
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`2d 1036, 1046 (N.D. Cal. 2008). These five Settlements—the first ones in the consolidated Direct
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`Purchaser Action—provide the Class with valuable monetary and non-monetary benefits.
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`The Settling Defendants’ all-cash payments for the benefit of the Class together will total
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`$32,600,000. This is a large amount of money relative to the Settling Defendants’ comparatively
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`minimal individual and collective capacitor sales to U.S. purchasers between 2002 and 2014. DPPs
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`estimate that all Defendants together sold more than $7 billion in capacitors to U.S. purchasers during
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`that same period. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 85. The Settling Defendants are responsible for roughly $70
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`million—less than one percent—of the cartel’s United States sales. The Settlement Fund here
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`represents a significant percentage of each Settling Defendant’s total U.S. sales during that period:
` Fujitsu Limited agreed to pay DPPs $2,000,000. The parties estimate
`that the company’s dissolved former subsidiary, Fujitsu Media Device
`(“FMD”), sold less than $200,000 of capacitors to U.S. purchasers
`between 2002 and its 2009 dissolution. The settlement consideration
`here is more than ten times FMD’s entire relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt.
`1458-1 at ¶ 86.
` NEC TOKIN agreed to pay DPPs $24,000,000. For purposes of its guilty
`plea and sentencing on federal criminal price fixing charges, NEC
`TOKIN estimated its U.S. capacitors sales from 2002 to 2014 totaled
`$51,100,000. The settlement consideration here is 46.9% of NEC
`TOKIN’s estimated relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 87.
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 6 of 10
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` Nitsuko agreed to pay DPPs $1,100,000. The parties have estimated that
`the company sold less than $100,000 of capacitors to U.S. purchasers
`between 2002 and 2014. The settlement consideration here is roughly 11
`times Nitsuko’s entire relevant U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 88.
` The Okaya Defendants agreed to pay DPPs $3,650,000. The Okaya
`Defendants have represented that their sales to U.S. purchasers between
`2002 to 2014 totaled close to $11,000,000. The settlement consideration
`here is approximately 33% of the Okaya Defendants’ relevant U.S. sales.
`See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 89.
` ROHM agreed to pay DPPs $1,850,000. DPPs estimate that ROHM had
`approximately $7,000,000 in sales to U.S. purchasers between 2004 and
`2014. The settlement consideration here is 26.4% of ROHM’s relevant
`U.S. sales. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 90.
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`The Settlements’ monetary component—all cash—greatly benefits the Direct Purchaser Class
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`by providing and, in fact, accelerating the Class’ chances for monetary recovery in this case through the
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`claims administration process that will soon commence. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 91. Here, a substantial
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`amount of money stands to be distributed to a relatively small Direct Purchaser Class. See id. at ¶ 83.
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`There is a real value to Class members of receiving a cash distribution from the Settlements in the near
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`term. In addition, given the number of Defendants in this action and the risk of treble damages at trial,
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`these Settlements likely will encourage additional favorable settlements. See id. at ¶ 92.
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`In addition to the monetary component, each of the Settling Defendants has agreed to provide
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`substantial assistance to the class. The Settling Defendants each have agreed to cooperate with DPPs in
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`their continued prosecution of the Class’ claims against the Non-Settling Defendants. See Dkt. 1458-1 at
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`¶¶ 59-68. They agree to provide assistance such as giving attorney proffers regarding facts developed in
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`their internal investigations, making key witnesses available for deposition or trial, and submitting
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`declarations on key issues such as liability, impact, damages, and class certification. See Dkts. 1298-2 to
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`3, 1298-8 to 10.
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`The assistance the Settling Defendants have agreed to provide is a substantial class benefit
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`because it will assist DPPs to maximize their monetary recovery against the Non-Settling Defendants.
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`See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶ 93. See DRAM, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 190974, at *143 (cooperation “was valuable
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`in maximizing the monetary recovery against the other Defendants.”).
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 7 of 10
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`2.
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`Counsel Took Significant Risks Prosecuting This Litigation.
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`Counsel assumed a significant risk in undertaking this litigation. See Dkt. 1458-1 at ¶¶ 79-82. All
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`understood the risk of contingency litigation and the fact that recovery is never guaranteed. They
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`committed their time, money and energy to the prosecution of a multi-year, international price-fixing
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`cartel case against 22 sprawling Defendant corporate families based almost entirely in Japan. See id. at
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`¶ 80. This cartel case is complex, and complex antitrust cases like this one often take years to resolve
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`through settlement, trial, or appeal. See id. As the case has advanced, Counsel have committed their
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`time, money, and energy to this litigation while aware that certain Defendants have claimed poor
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`financial health that could ultimately impede or diminish recovery for the Class. See id. at ¶¶ 79-80. As
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`is set forth in Lead Class Counsel’s declaration, Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Counsel have expended
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`millions of dollars of their time and incurred millions of dollars in expenses, all on a purely contingent
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`basis. Counsel have stated that they had to turn away case opportunities over the last two years to
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`ensure that they could keep dedicated to this case the resources needed to prosecute the Class’ claims.
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`This entails substantial risk. See id. at ¶ 82.
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`Counsel also incurred risk associated with having a parallel criminal proceeding, addressing the
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`impact of the FTAIA, and evaluating massive amounts of electronic transactional data necessary to
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`prove their case. Each of these risks weigh in favor of granting Counsel the requested fee award.
`3.
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`Advancing the Litigation to this Point and Obtaining the Settlements Has
`Required Professional Skill.
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`The docket and the procedural history in this this case demonstrate Counsel’s expertise and the
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`Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ successes to date. See Dkt. 1458-1. ¶¶ 18-78. Counsel have done much to
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`effectively prosecute the Class’ claims, and to do so efficiently. Counsel have not come by their
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`successes in this litigation easily. Defendants—including the Settling Defendants—have hired the best
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`antitrust counsel money can buy to defend them against the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Sherman Act
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`claims. See Barbosa v. Cargill Meat Solutions Corp., 297 F.R.D. 431, 449 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (“The quality
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`of opposing counsel is important in evaluating the quality of Class Counsel’s work.”). Indeed, despite
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`guilty pleas, the Non-Settling Defendants maintain their innocence and contest liability.
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 8 of 10
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`4.
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`Awards in Similar Complex Antitrust Cases Demonstrate That Class
`Counsel Seek a Reasonable Fee Award.
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`The requested award of $8,150,000 matches and is in keeping with the Ninth Circuit
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`benchmark. See Paul, Johnson, Alston & Hunt, 886 F.2d at 272. Class Counsel’s request is modest when
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`compared to percentages awarded plaintiffs’ counsel in other, arguably less complex and challenging
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`antitrust cases in this District. See, e.g., In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., No. 07-1827 (N.D.
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`Cal. Jan. 14, 2013) (30%); Meijer v. Abbott Laboratories, No. 07-05985 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 11, 2011) (33
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`1/3%). It is also consistent with the awards in many other comparable cases. See In re Dynamic Random
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`Access Memory (DRAM) Antitrust Litig., No. M-02-1486, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103027, at *1-2 (N.D.
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`Cal. Aug. 16, 2007) (25%); In re Sorbates Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., No. 98-4886, 2002 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 23468, at *9-10 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 15, 2002) (25%); Van Vranken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp.
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`294, 298 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (25%). As these precedents demonstrate, twenty-five percent is easily
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`consistent with recognized “market rates,” i.e., rates typically awarded in similar contingency fee cases
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`in this District. See Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050 (“market rates” are a question of “lawyers’ reasonable
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`expectations [for recovery of contingent fees], which are based on the circumstances of the case and the
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`range of fee awards out of common funds of comparable size.”).
`5.
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`Counsel Undertook a Significant Financial and Resource Burden in
`Prosecuting the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Claims.
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`Counsel have invested significant amounts of time, money, and resources in this case for well
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`over two years, as shown in their time and expense records. The Court is well aware of the quality of
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`legal work done by Counsel on behalf of the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs. Under the active supervision of
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`Lead Class Counsel, the firms have working closely together as an efficient team. See Dkt. 1458-1 at
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`¶¶ 12-16, 38-52. Class Counsel have set forth for the Court the details regarding their contributions to
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`this litigation in their declarations attached to Lead Class Counsel’s Declaration. See Dkt. 1458-1, Exs. 3-
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`17 at ¶ 3 in each declaration.
`6.
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`A Lodestar Cross-Check Confirms That the Fees Sought by Class Counsel
`Are Reasonable.
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`A lodestar cross-check may be used to ensure that class counsel has done the work necessary to
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`justify the fee sought. Vizcaino, 290 F.3d at 1050; see also In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 396 F.3d 294,
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 9 of 10
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`306-07 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[T]he lodestar cross-check calculation need entail neither mathematical
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`precision nor bean-counting. The district courts may rely on summaries submitted by the attorneys and
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`need not review actual billing records.”) (citation omitted).
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`Counsel’s cumulative lodestar as of September 30, 2016 is $44,444,689.40. See Dkt. 1458-1,
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`¶¶ 8, 94-119 and Exs. 1-17. Using the lodestar cross-check, the fees sought here amount to less than one-
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`fifth (approximately 18.4%) the lodestar submitted by Counsel. In the Ninth Circuit, a lodestar multiplier
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`of around 4 times has frequently been awarded in common fund cases such as this. See Vizcaino, 290
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`F.3d at 1051 (multiplier of 3.65 held “ within the range of multipliers applied in common fund cases”);
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`see also Atlantic Richfield Co., 901 F. Supp. at 298 (“Multipliers in the 3-4 range are common in lodestar
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`awards for lengthy and complex class action litigation.”) (citations omitted). The fee amount Counsel
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`request in this Motion is significantly less that the cumulative lodestar in this case as one would expect
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`in the event of the initial settlements. The lodestar cross-check thus confirms that Counsel’s
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`$8,150,000 fee request is reasonable and should be awarded as requested.
`III. THE COURT AWARDS DPPS’ COUNSEL $3,000,000 AS PARTIAL
`REIMBURSEMENT FOR THEIR COSTS ADVANCED THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,
`2016
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`The Court grants Counsel their request for a reimbursement of expenses they have incurred as
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`of September 30, 2016, in the amount of $3,000,000. This amount is to be paid from the Settlement
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`Fund. This amount is a fraction of the amounts incurred to date. It is appropriate to reimburse attorneys
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`prosecuting class claims on a contingent basis for “reasonable expenses that would typically be billed to
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`paying clients in non-contingency matters,” i.e., costs “incidental and necessary to the effective
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`representation of the Class.” See Harris v. Marhoefer, 24 F.3d 16, 19 (9th Cir. 1994); In re Omnivision
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`Techs., 559 F. Supp. 2d at 1048. Reasonable reimbursable litigation expenses include: those for document
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`production, experts and consultants, depositions, translation services, travel, mail and postage costs. See
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`In re Media Vision Tech. Sec. Litig., 913 F. Supp. 1362, 1366 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (court fees,
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`experts/consultants, service of process, court reporters, transcripts, deposition costs, computer
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`research, photocopies, postage, telephone/fax); Thornberry v. Delta Air Lines, 676 F.2d 1240, 1244 (9th
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`Cir. 1982) (travel, meals and lodging), remanded on other grounds, 461 U.S. 952(1983). Under the
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`common fund doctrine, plaintiffs’ counsel should receive reimbursement of all reasonable out-of-pocket
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`9
`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 1714 Filed 06/27/17 Page 10 of 10
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`expenses and costs in prosecution of the claims and in obtaining a settlement. Vincent v. Hughes Air
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`West, Inc., 557 F.2d 759 (9th Cir. 1977). The Court finds that the advanced expenses set forth in the
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`Motion and Lead Counsel’s Declaration were reasonable and necessarily incurred in connection with
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`the Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs’ prosecution of this action to date.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`Dated:
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`HON. JAMES DONATO
`United States District Judge
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`Master File No. 3:14-cv-0324-JD
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`[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ATTORNEYS’ FEES AND
`REIMBURSEMENT OF EXPENSES
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`June 27, 2017
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`S D ISTRICT
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