`
`
`
`Joseph R. Saveri (State Bar No. 130064)
`Steven N. Williams (State Bar No. 175489)
`James G. Dallal (State Bar No. 277826)
`Kyle P. Quackenbush (State Bar No. 322401)
`Anupama K. Reddy (State Bar No. 324873)
`JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
`601 California Street, Suite 1000
`San Francisco, California 94108
`Telephone: (415) 500-6800
`Facsimile:
`(415) 395-9940
`Email:
`jsaveri@saverilawfirm.com
`
`swilliams@saverilawfirm.com
`jdallal@saverilawfirm.com
`kquackbush@saverilawfim.com
`areddy@saverilawfirm.com
`
`Lead Counsel for Direct Purchaser Class
`
`
`
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST LITIGATION
`
`THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO THE DIRECT
`PURCHASER CLASS ACTION
`
`
`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`
`
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DIRECT
`PURCHASER CLASS’S MOTION TO
`PARTIALLY EXCLUDE PROPOSED
`EXPERT TESTIMONY OF JANUSZ A.
`ORDOVER
`
`Date: TBD
`Time: TBD
`Courtroom: 11, 19th Floor
`Judge: Hon. James Donato
`
`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS’S MOTION TO PARTIALLY EXCLUDE PROPOSED EXPERT
`TESTIMONY OF JANUSZ A. ORDOVER
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2419 Filed 08/15/19 Page 2 of 10
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`
`
`I.
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`II.
`
`III.
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
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`Page(s)
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`INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 1
`
`ARGUMENT .......................................................................................................................... 2
`
`A.
`
`B.
`
`C.
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`Defendants Cannot Repudiate Facts Admitted In NCC’s Guilty Plea ......................... 2
`
`Defendants’ Assumed Facts Are Not The Type Of Evidence On Which
`Economists Ordinarily Rely ......................................................................................... 4
`
`The Risk of Misleading The Jury Outweighs Any Probative Value Of The
`Challenged Opinion ..................................................................................................... 6
`
`CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................................... 6
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`
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2419 Filed 08/15/19 Page 3 of 10
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`
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`
`
`Page(s)
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`Cases
`
`Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avid Budget Group, Inc., 738 F.3d 960 (9th Cir. 2013) ................................ 5
`
`Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) .................................................................... 1
`
`Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d 998 (9th Cir. 2004) .......................................... 5
`
`In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1050 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ........................ 5
`
`In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717 (3d Cir. 1994) ............................................................. 4, 5
`
`Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 15-cv-04543-YGR, 2017 WL 1957063 (N.D.
`Cal. May 11, 2017) ......................................................................................................................... 5
`
`In re TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1055 (N.D. Cal. 2011) ........................... 6
`
`Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. C 04-02123 WHA, 2008 WL 2323856
`(N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008) ......................................................................................................... 1, 4
`
`United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333 (9th Cir. 1993) ..................................................................... 3
`
`United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391 (9th Cir. 1990) .......................................................................... 4
`
`Rules
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) ............................................................................................................................ 4
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 403 ................................................................................................................................. 5
`
`Fed. R. Evid. 703 ................................................................................................................................. 4
`
`
`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2419 Filed 08/15/19 Page 4 of 10
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`I.
`
`
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Defendants Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation (“NCC”) and United Chemi-Con, Inc. (“UCC”)
`
`(jointly, “Defendants”) devote several pages of their opposition brief to repeating the opinions
`
`proffered by Dr. Janusz A. Ordover (Opp. at pp. 2-4) and the general standards governing expert
`
`testimony (Opp. at pp. 4-6). But they give limited attention to the very specific dispute raised by the
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`Direct Purchaser Class (“DPC”). The problem with Dr. Ordover’s challenged opinion is not that he
`
`relied on assumptions or hypothetical information, which would be permissible if that reliance were
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`reasonable.1 The issue is that the challenged opinion is based on a false assumption that is contrary to
`established facts. That is not permitted under Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993)
`
`or the Federal Rules of Evidence.
`
`
`
`In this case, some unnamed attorney for Defendants instructed Dr. Ordover to assume facts that
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`the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and this Court rejected in agreeing to accept NCC’s guilty plea
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`and sentencing NCC. Despite this, and for reasons unrelated to this motion, NCC still received a
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`windfall in having its guilty plea accepted by the Court. Seeking to be the embodiment of the expression
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`“don’t look a gift horse in the mouth,” Defendants now contradict the facts that NCC admitted before
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`this Court claiming that NCC did not participate in a single conspiracy that lasted for at least eleven
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`years (as it pled guilty to), but rather a few limited, sporadic instances of anticompetitive conduct. Dr.
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`Ordover was asked to use that faulty premise in forming the challenged opinion that “[t]he episodes of
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`price fixing to which NCC has pled guilty are unlikely to have had broad impacts given features of the
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`marketplace.” (Ordover Report, Section V, at pp. 20-27.) Economists ordinarily would not rely on
`
`untrue facts manufactured by counsel, presumably to advance a litigation objective. See, e.g., Therasense,
`
`Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., No. C 04-02123 WHA, 2008 WL 2323856 (N.D. Cal. May 22, 2008),
`
`at *1 (“One of the worst abuses in civil litigation is the attempted spoon-feeding of client-prepared and
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`lawyer-orchestrated ‘facts’ to a hired expert who then ‘relies’ on the information to express an
`
`
`1 The DPC seeks exclusion of one opinion of Dr. Ordover, specifically his opinion that “[t]he episodes
`of price fixing to which NCC has pled guilty are unlikely to have had broad impacts given features of
`the marketplace.” (Ordover Report, Section V, at pp. 20-27.)
`
`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
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`opinion.”). Accordingly, the challenged opinion lacks foundation and the DPC’s motion to exclude
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`should be granted.
`II.
`
`ARGUMENT
`A.
`
`Defendants Cannot Repudiate Facts Admitted In NCC’s Guilty Plea
`
`
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`Defendants’ attempt to characterize NCC’s guilty plea as relating “only to narrow episodes of
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`price fixing” (Opp. at p. 1:8-9) is not plausible. The only reasonable interpretation of the plea
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`agreement is that NCC acknowledged participating in a continuous, long-running cartel impacting
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`more than “a narrow set of products or customers.”
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`
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`NCC is one of eight co-conspirator Defendants that have entered guilty pleas in the United
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`States. See Declaration of Anupama K. Reddy in Support of Direct Purchaser Class’s Motion to
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`Partially Exclude Proposed Expert Testimony of Janusz A. Ordover (“Reddy Decl.”), Dkt. No. 669, at
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`Exhibit B. In addition, four NCC executives — Takuro Isawa, Takeshi Matsuzaka, Yasutoshi Ohno,
`
`and Kaname Takahashi — remain under indictment and currently are international fugitives. RJN Nos.
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`1, 18, Dkt No. 813-1 (Indictments).2 NCC’s participation in the cartel was extensive and particularly
`reprehensible. It served as the enforcer for the conspiracy, going so far as threatening bodily harm to
`
`those who considered reneging on their agreement to participate. (See Reddy Decl., Ex. C, at 5:3-6:2.)
`
`As this Court recognized at NCC’s sentencing hearing:
`
`I have accepted and am persuaded that of all the defendants that I have
`seen so far -- and I believe this will hold true through the end of the case --
`Nippon Chemi-Con has been by far the most sizable defendant both in
`terms of the dollar value of the products involved, as well as in its role as
`we've heard about this morning in the papers that have been filed. Its role
`as the enforcer policing the conspiracy, driving it to fruition, and keeping
`its members in line to make sure that the conspiracy is a success from the
`co-conspirators' point of view. I have no questions about any of those facts
`and they weigh heavily in my mind with respect to the possible sentence
`here.
`(Id. at 31:11-22.) NCC was sentenced to pay a $60 million criminal fine, sentenced to five years of
`
`probation, and required to implement a compliance program. (Id. at 33:8-9, 33:17-20.)
`
`
`2 All “RJN No. __” references are to the Exhibits to the Request For Judicial Notice In Support Of
`Direct Purchaser Class’s Oppositions to Defendant’s Motions For Summary Judgement and Daubert
`Motions, Dkt. No. 813.
`
`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`When the Court accepted NCC’s plea agreement, NCC acknowledged that it engaged in price
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`fixing from “at least as early as November, 2001, until in or about January 2014.” RJN No. 63, Dkt. No.
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`813-5 (Transcript of Proceedings, May 30, 2018) at 52:23-25. NCC’s representative, Mr. Takashi
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`Nakamura, confirmed that the company understood the factual basis underlying the plea agreement:
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`THE COURT: All right. Mr. Nakamura, you have heard the charge
`against Nippon Chemi-Con, and the facts that the United States believes
`supports that charge.
`
`Did you understand all of that?
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`MR. NAKAMURA: Yes, I did.
`
`* * *
`
`THE COURT: Are you fully satisfied that you had enough time to read?
`review, and think about the plea agreement before you signed it?
`
`MR. NAKAKURA: Yes. I'm satisfied.
`
`THE COURT: Do you believe that you understood all of the terms of
`the plea agreement before you signed it?
`
`MR. NAKAKURA: Yes. I believe so.
`
`THE COURT: Did your lawyers answer all of your questions about the
`plea agreement to your full satisfaction before you signed it?
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`MR. NAKAMURA: Yes, that's right.
`
`(Id. at 54:15-55:14.)
`
`
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`At no point during the plea allocution did NCC suggest that those facts were wrong, and that its
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`plea extended only to “episodes” of price fixing. Nor did NCC suggest that its conduct was limited to
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`“a narrow set of products or customers.” The only fair reading of the guilty plea is to understand it as
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`reflecting a conspiracy that lasted from “at least as early as November, 2001, until in or about January
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`2014” and that it applied to more than “a narrow set of products or customers.”3
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`When interpreting a plea agreement, “the court must determine what the defendant reasonably
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`understood to be the terms of the agreement when he pleaded guilty.” United States v. De la Fuente, 8
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`3 NCC’s Rule 30(b)(6) witness regarding the scope of the guilty plea, Tomohiro Inoue, was deposed by
`the DPCs. When asked specific questions about NCC’s understanding of the plea agreement, Mr.
`Inoue avoided any meaningful response or was not sure of the answers.
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`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`F.3d 1333, 1337 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v. Keller, 902 F.2d 1391, 1393 (9th Cir. 1990)
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`(contract standards apply to plea agreements).4 An assumption that NCC’s plea agreement “related
`only to narrow episodes of price fixing” (Opp. at p. 1:8-9) is completely at odds with reality. It does not
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`provide an appropriate foundation for Dr. Ordover to proffer the challenged opinion. Accordingly, the
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`challenged opinion should be excluded.
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`B.
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`Defendants’ Assumed Facts Are Not The Type Of Evidence On Which Economists
`Ordinarily Rely
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`
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`It is undisputed that “[a]n expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert
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`has been made aware of or personally observed.” (See Opp. at p. 7:8-9, quoting Fed. R. Evid. 703.)
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`However, an expert does not have free rein to use demonstrably false facts or the wishful thinking of
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`counsel as the foundation for an opinion. Rule 703 requires that opinions be based on the kinds of facts
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`or data on which experts in the field would reasonably rely. Fed. R. Evid. 703. “Facts” created by
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`counsel are not the type of evidence on which economists would ordinarily rely. See, e.g., Therasense,
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`2008 WL 2323856, at *1-2.
`
`
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`Defendants’ attempt to distinguish In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 748 (3d Cir.
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`1994) is puzzling. Defendants claim Paoli is “inapposite,” citing an eight-page portion of the case which
`
`
`4 Defendants argue that statements made by the prosecution during NCC’s sentencing hearing are
`inadmissible hearsay for purposes of this motion. (Opp. at pp. 11:20-12:2.) They are incorrect. In
`deciding preliminary questions about whether an expert is qualified, the analysis is not limited to
`admissible evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 104(a) (“The court must decide any preliminary question about
`whether a witness is qualified . . . In so doing, the court is not bound by evidence rules[.]”) At the
`sentencing hearing, the DOJ opposed – and this Court rejected – a sentence based on the theory that
`NCC only engaged in isolated, sporadic conduct. RJN No. 69, Dkt. No. 813-5, Dkt. 73 (United States
`Reply Sentencing Memorandum) at 1:9-11 (“NCC’s proposal that its VOC be limited to a small
`number of episodes, resulting in a VOC of $83 million, vastly understates the harm caused by the
`conspiracy to which NCC pled guilty, as well as NCC’s extensive participation in that conspiracy.”); id.
`at p. 2:13-15 (“For each of the seven corporate defendants, the government has used one consistent
`[VOC] methodology: sales of all standalone capacitors to the United States.”); Reddy Decl., Ex. C, at
`p. 33:2-7 (Court noting that NCC’s $60,000,000 fine is “harmonious with the prior sentences that I’ve
`imposed for other co-conspirators…”).
`
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`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`supposedly provides “the full context.” (Opp. at p. 8:3-8.) But they fail to address the relevant part of
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`the discussion, in which the court explains:
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`We now make clear that it is the judge who makes the determination of
`reasonable reliance, and that for the judge to make the factual
`determination under Rule 104(a) that an expert is basing his or her
`opinion on a type of data reasonably relied upon by experts, the judge
`must conduct an independent evaluation into reasonableness.
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`Paoli, 35 F.3d at 748; see also, Stathakos v. Columbia Sportswear Co., No. 15-cv-04543-YGR, 2017 WL
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`1957063 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2017), at *3 (“The trial judge has discretion to determine reasonable
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`measures of reliability.”). As applied here, whether Dr. Ordover reasonably relied on counsel’s
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`representations about the scope of the criminal plea is appropriately decided by the Court at this time.
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`It is part of the Court’s function as a gatekeeper, not an issue for which the jury can or should weigh
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`competing versions of the facts.
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`
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`Defendants’ reliance on In re NJOY, Inc. Consumer Class Action Litig., 120 F. Supp. 3d 1050
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`(C.D. Cal. 2015) is misplaced because the assumed fact was not inconsistent with the established facts.
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`The plaintiffs sued an electronic cigarette manufacturer alleging that the company engaged in false
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`advertising and labeling omissions regarding the safety of its products. The “fact” at issue concerned
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`the period during which the company spread the alleged misinformation and the scope of its
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`advertising efforts. Recognizing that the parties had competing – and unresolved – versions of the facts,
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`the court permitted an expert to proffer an opinion based on the plaintiffs’ version of the facts. That is
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`not the situation here. NCC has already pled guilty to participating in a criminal conspiracy from at
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`least November 2001 through January 2014.5
`
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`5 Other cases cited by Defendants are distinguishable because there were sufficient indicia of reliability
`for the assumed or hypothetical facts. See Alaska Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Avid Budget Group, Inc., 738 F.3d
`960, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2013) (hypothetical facts did not lack a reasonable basis and, therefore, provided a
`sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion); Hangarter v. Provident Life and Acc. Ins. Co., 373 F.3d
`998, 1017 n.14-1018 (9th Cir. 2004) (expert’s “experience, training, and education” that provided a
`sufficient foundation of reliability for his testimony).
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`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`C.
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`The Risk of Misleading The Jury Outweighs Any Probative Value Of The
`Challenged Opinion
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`An additional reason for excluding the challenged opinion is to avoid confusing or misleading
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`the jury. Fed. R. Evid. 403. Defendants argue that the challenged opinion may (somehow) help jurors,
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`contending that “If Plaintiffs fail in demonstrating the scope of the alleged conspiracy and the jury
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`accepts that the NCC Plea related only to narrow episodes of price fixing, Dr. Ordover’s testimony
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`regarding the impact if such narrow episodes would be relevant and helpful to the trier of fact…” (Opp.
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`at p. 10 n.10.) However, the opposite is true. “It is well-established that once a defendant joins a
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`conspiracy it is jointly and severally liable for any actions taken in furtherance of the conspiracy.” In re
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`TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litig., 820 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (N.D. Cal. 2011). Allowing the
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`challenged opinion would suggest to jurors that they should parse evidence, rather than considering it
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`holistically. If an expert is allowed to selectively consider evidence – and outright disregard clearly
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`contrary facts – the jury would likely be confused or misled to believe it can or should do the same.
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`Here, Dr. Ordover has no basis for the challenged opinion other than statements spoon-fed by counsel
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`to manufacture their desired opinion.
`III. CONCLUSION
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`For all of the foregoing reasons, DPC’s motion to partially exclude the opinion of Dr. Ordover
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`should be granted.
`
`//
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`
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`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2419 Filed 08/15/19 Page 10 of 10
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`Respectfully Submitted,
`
`JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
`
`
`By:
`
`/s/ Steven N. Williams
`Steven N. Williams
`
`
`
`Joseph R. Saveri (State Bar No. 130064)
`Steven N. Williams (State Bar No. 175489
`James G. Dallal (State Bar No. 277826)
`Kyle P. Quackenbush (State Bar No. 322401)
`Anupama K. Reddy (State Bar No. 324873)
`JOSEPH SAVERI LAW FIRM, INC.
`601 California Street, Suite 1000
`San Francisco, California 94108
`Telephone: (415) 500-6800
`Facsimile: (415) 395-9940
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`Lead Counsel for Direct Purchaser Class
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`Dated: August 15, 2019
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`Master File No. 3:17-md-02801-JD
`7
`Civil Action No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`REPLY IN SUPPORT OF DIRECT PURCHASER CLASS’S MOTION TO PARTIALLY EXCLUDE PROPOSED EXPERT
`TESTIMONY OF JANUSZ A. ORDOVER
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