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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 1 of 14
`
`Johan E. Tatoy (admitted pro hac vice)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`1285 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, NY 10019
`Telephone: (212) 373-3830
`Facsimile: (212) 757-3990
`jtatoy@paulweiss.com
`
`Counsel for Defendants Nippon Chemi-Con
`Corp. and United Chemi-Con, Inc.
`
`
`Charles F. Rule (admitted pro hac vice)
`Joseph J. Bial (admitted pro hac vice)
`Eric R. Sega (admitted pro hac vice)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`2001 K Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`Telephone: (202) 223-7300
`Facsimile: (202) 223-7420
`rrule@paulweiss.com
`jbial@paulweiss.com
`esega@paulweiss.com
`
`Steven Kaufhold (SBN 157195)
`KAUFHOLD GASKIN LLP
`388 Market Street, Suite 1300
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Telephone: (415) 445-4621
`Facsimile: (415) 874-1071
`skaufhold@kaufholdgaskin.com
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`SAN FRANCISCO DIVISION
`
`IN RE CAPACITORS ANTITRUST
`LITIGATION
`
`All Direct Purchaser Actions,
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`
`All Indirect Purchaser Actions,
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`
`The AASI Beneficiaries’ Trust, by and Through
`Kenneth A. Welt, Liquidating Trustee v. AVX
`Corp. et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-03472-JD
`
`Avnet, Inc. v. Hitachi Chemical Co., Ltd., et al.,
`Case No. 3:17-cv-07046-JD
`
`Benchmark Electronics, Inc. et al. v. AVX Corp.
`et al., Case No. 3:17-cv-07047-JD
`
`Arrow Electronics, Inc. v. ELNA Co., Ltd. et al.,
`Case No. 3:18-cv-02657-JD
`
`Flextronics International USA, Inc.’s Individual
`Action, Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`
`Case Nos. 3:14-cv-03264-JD
`
`
`3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`CERTAIN DEFENDANTS’ JOINT REPLY
`BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF JOINT MOTION
`TO EXCLUDE TESTIMONY OF DR. HAL
`J. SINGER
`
`Master Docket No.: 3:17-md-2801-JD
`
`Date:
`Time:
`Judge:
`
`
`
`
`UNREDACTED VERSION OF
`DOCUMENT SOUGHT TO BE SEALED
`
`
`TBD
`TBD
`Honorable James Donato
`Courtroom 11–19th Floor
`
`
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 2 of 14
`
`The undersigned Defendants submit this reply memorandum in further support of their
`Motion to Exclude Testimony of Dr. Hal J. Singer (ECF No. 647) (“Mot.”).1
`PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
`Defendants showed in their opening brief that Dr. Singer’s analyses were neither reliable
`nor relevant to satisfy the Daubert standard. As discussed in Defendants’ Motion and below,
`Dr. Singer rendered legal opinions outside of his role as an expert, basing his analysis on how the
`Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) would apply certain
`factors to the evidence in this case. Now, in a plain attempt to save his opinions from exclusion,
`Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Singer’s opinions arise from an “economic perspective.” The fact is, the
`content of Dr. Singer’s report cannot simply be deferred to a jury. Dr. Singer provides answers
`to questions for which he lacks expertise and provides conclusions on issues on which the jury
`must decide. As such, the statements in his report are not relevant, reliable, or admissible here.
`They must be excluded.
`Similarly, for the reasons set forth in Defendants’ Motion to Exclude the Proposed Expert
`Testimony of Dr. James T. McClave (ECF No. 658), Dr. Singer’s econometric analyses should
`be excluded.
`
`I.
`
`ARGUMENT
`Dr. Singer’s Evaluation of the Qualitative Evidence Amounts to Legal Conclusions
`That Are Inadmissible and Should Be Excluded.
`Dr. Singer’s “qualitative” analysis
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`. See Ex. 1, Expert Report of Hal J. Singer, Ph.D., ECF No. 647-2
`(“Singer Rep.”), at p. 17. Plaintiffs’ attempts to recharacterize Dr. Singer’s “qualitative”
`analyses as “economic” fail.
`
`
`1 Defendants adopt all abbreviations in its Motion. “Ex. __” shall refer to exhibits attached to
`the Declaration of Johan E. Tatoy, dated June 14, 2019, ECF No. 647-1, unless otherwise
`defined. “Opp’n __” shall refer to Direct Purchaser Class’s Opposition to Defendants’ Motions
`to Exclude Testimony of Drs. Singer and McClave, ECF No. 810.
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`Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Singer does not, in fact, provide legal conclusions because he
`does not state that there is an illegal agreement or a violation of law. Opp’n at 26. But those
`precise words are not required to render legal opinions. Courts have held that stating an opinion
`as to legal standards and applying law to the facts qualifies as a legal conclusion. See AFMS
`LLC v. United Parcel Serv. Co., No. CV105830JGBAJWX, 2014 WL 12515335, at *8 (C.D.
`Cal. Feb. 5, 2014); see also Nationwide Transp. Fin. v. Cass Info. Sys., Inc., 523 F.3d 1051, 1058
`(9th Cir. 2008); Union Carbide Corp. v. Montell N.V., 28 F. Supp. 2d 833, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
`In AFMS, the Court found an economics expert’s testimony unreliable not only because he was
`testifying on certain topics in which he had no economic expertise, but also because he was
`“functioning as an expert in antitrust law” by interpreting legal standards. AFMS LLC, 2014 WL
`12515335, at *8. Analyzing whether certain behavior violates antitrust laws answers questions
`of law. Thus, Dr. Singer’s conclusions about what establishes an antitrust violation and how the
`evidence supports his findings does not constitute expert testimony. Instead, these questions
`should be questions reserved for the factfinder. See Huawei Technologies v. Samsung Elecs.
`Co., 340 F. Supp. 3d 934, 965 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (excluding portions of an expert report because
`the expert’s statements offered opinions on legal conclusions focused on antitrust violations).
`Dr. Singer
`
`
`
`
`
` Singer Rep. ¶ 9.
`
`
`
` Singer Rep. ¶ 12. These are precisely the types of opinions that courts have
`barred as improper expert opinions. See, e.g., AFMS LLC, 2014 WL 12515335, at *8;
`Nationwide Transp. Fin., 523 F.3d at 1058.
`Equally unavailing are Plaintiffs’ attempts to argue that Dr. Singer “opines instead from
`an economic perspective that Defendants’ actions were consistent with a conspiracy and
`inconsistent with independent, competitive action.” Opp’n at 26. Plaintiffs argue that “[a]n
`economist does not act improperly when she ‘appli[es] [her] expertise to the facts of the case,
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`and draw[s] conclusions from those facts.’” Id. at 24 (quoting U.S. Info. Sys., Inc. v. Int’l Bhd. of
`Elec. Workers Local Union No. 3, AFL-CIO, 313 F. Supp. 2d 213, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). But,
`again, that is not what Dr. Singer does. The blanket statements cited above prove otherwise.
`Dr. Singer does not describe the conduct or exchanges as consistent with or indicative of
`anticompetitive behavior; he concludes that Defendants’ conduct and exchanges are
`anticompetitive.2 Nor do the other cases upon which Plaintiffs rely support their position.
`Plaintiffs cite to In re Processed Egg Products Antitrust Litigation, where the court describes
`permissible expert testimony, a standard Dr. Singer fails to meet. 81 F. Supp. 3d 412, 421 (E.D.
`Pa. 2015). The court in Processed Egg discussed several approaches undertaken by other courts
`and explains that all the courts seem to agree that, while an economist is capable of testifying to
`whether an industry’s market structure is susceptible to collusion, an economist’s testimony is
`not admissible “where he or she simply reads and interprets evidence of collusion as any juror
`might, or where an economist infers intent to collude from mere documentary evidence,
`unrelated to his or her economic expertise.” Id. The latter is precisely what Dr. Singer does in
`his report, as discussed in Defendants’ Motion and below.3
`As Defendants raised in their Motion,
`
`
`. Ex. 4, Deposition of
`
`
`2 Plaintiffs rely on U.S. Information Systems to support their unremarkable position that experts
`are allowed to apply their expertise to the facts of the case and draw conclusions from those
`facts. That same case, however, further explains that identifying contacts and communications
`as “anticompetitive” qualifies as a legal conclusion. See U.S. Info. Sys., Inc., 313 F. Supp. at
`239–40. Courts have explained that, “the determination of purely legal issues is the exclusive
`purview of the court. Thus, expert testimony that merely states a legal conclusion must be
`excluded.” Id.; see also Nationwide Transp. Fin., 523 F.3d at 1058 (noting that experts are
`precluded from opining as to legal conclusions); Farrow v. Contra Costa Cty., No. 12-CV-
`06495-JCS, 2019 WL 78839, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 2, 2019).
`3 See also In re Static Random Access Memory Antitrust Litig., No. 07-MD-01819 CW, 2010
`WL 5141861, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2010) (discussing summary judgment issues but not
`specifically considering whether Dr. Noll was qualified to give opinions as an economic expert
`under Daubert, because no Daubert motion was filed respecting Dr. Noll); see also Aguilar v.
`Int’l Longshoremen’s Union Local No. 10, 966 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting that matters of
`law were inappropriate subjects for expert testimony); Newkirk v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 727 F.
`Supp. 2d 1006 (E.D. Wash. 2010) (noting that expert testimony must assist the trier of fact);
`Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v. Exch. Nat. Bank of Chicago, 877 F.2d 1333 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting an
`expert who provides nothing but a bottom line does not provide value to the judicial process).
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`James T. McClave, dated June 7, 2019, Tr. 199:7–19, ECF No. 647-5. Plaintiffs’ attempt to
`distinguish Dr. Singer’s analysis from Dr. McClave’s criticisms is splitting hairs. First, Plaintiffs
`seek to limit Dr. McClave’s critique to econometricians only, arguing that Dr. Singer was an
`economist. Opp’n at 7. The word play misses the point.
`
`
`
`. Whether “economist” or
`“econometrician,” neither possesses the expertise to form the legal conclusions Dr. Singer draws
`from the documentary evidence. See George J. Stigler, What Does an Economist Know, 33 J.
`Legal Educ. 311 (1983) (“A reasonable man, and often even an economist, would say that the
`documents seemed to present a conclusive proof of collusive behavior. The economist, however,
`would have no professional basis for reaching such a conclusion: he has no special skill in
`reading documents and relating them to actual behavior. In particular his skill in document
`interpretation is on average inferior to that of a lawyer.” (emphasis added)).
`Plaintiffs’ second attempt at distancing Dr. Singer from Dr. McClave’s testimony—
`—ignores that Dr.
`Singer opining about civil antitrust violations would also not constitute an economic practice.
`Indeed, courts have recognized that that type of analysis constitutes drawing a legal conclusion,
`despite Plaintiffs’ best attempts to repackage Dr. Singer’s opinions. See AFMS LLC, 2014 WL
`12515335, at *8. When it comes to applying legal factors to qualitative facts, as Plaintiffs might
`write, Dr. Singer “is an economist. He is not a lawyer. He has never been a judge. He has no
`‘specialized knowledge’ to apply.” DPP Mot. to Partially Exclude Proposed Expert Testimony
`of Janusz A. Ordover at 4, ECF No. 669 (citation omitted).
`Plaintiffs’ contentions regarding the replicability of Dr. Singer’s qualitative analysis also
`suffer from several defects. First, despite Plaintiffs’ incorrect implication, replicability is a
`“primary requirement” to satisfy Daubert’s testability factor. See City of Pomona v. SQMN. Am.
`Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Under Daubert’s testability factor, the primary
`requirement is that someone else using the same data and methods . . . be able to replicate the
`results.”(ellipsis in original)). Plaintiffs quote United States v. Litvak for the proposition that
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`“expert testimony does not have to rest on traditional scientific methods.” Opp’n at 25 (quoting
`808 F.3d 160, 180, n.25 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted)). While generally true, neither Litvak
`nor Davis, upon which Litvak relies, supports Plaintiffs’ position that an expert’s opinion need
`not have a degree of replicability to determine reliability. In Davis, for instance, the court makes
`clear that even though expert testimony need not “rest on traditional scientific methods,” the
`“proponents of expert testimony who rely on [experience testimony] must still reckon with the
`rule that the basic requirements of reliability—as they are now articulated in Rule 702—apply
`across the board to all expert testimony.” Davis v. Carroll, 937 F. Supp. 2d 390, 412 (S.D.N.Y.
`2013). See also Brown v. Burlington N. Santa Fe Ry., 765 F.3d 765, 776 (7th Cir. 2014) (“But
`experience without reliable, testable methodology is not sufficient.” (citing Gen. Elec. Co. v.
`Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997))). The cases Plaintiffs cite are inapposite, consisting of cases
`granting leeway based on the expert’s actual experience in the relevant field4 or when the
`judgment involved was simply ministerial.5 See Opp’n at 25. Dr. Singer has no experience
`working in the DOJ or FTC, much less applying their legal factors, as discussed further below.
`See CFM Commc’ns LLC v. Mitts Telecasting Co., 424 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236–37 (E.D. Cal.
`2005) (finding “utterly unhelpful” testimony regarding how the FCC would likely apply the law
`even from an expert who had experience practicing before the agency).
`Second, despite first arguing that “replicability” is not an essential element of
`admissibility, Plaintiffs nonetheless claim that Dr. Singer’s “criteria are objective and his
`application of them is replicable.” Opp’n at 25. In support of Dr. Singer’s purported “objective
`application,” Plaintiffs offer only that conclusory statement and the fact Dr. Singer was forced to
`adjust his characterizations after Defendants’ economists pointed out serious flaws in his
`
`
`4 Litvak, 808 F.3d at 180–81 (permitting expert testimony regarding how investment managers
`evaluated a security based on the expert’s “extensive experience” from prior employment in
`working with the same securities); United States v. Romano, 794 F.3d 317, 333 (2d Cir. 2015)
`(permitting expert testimony on coin valuation based, in part, on the expert’s “personal
`experience as a coin dealer for several decades”); Peterson v. Scotia Prince Cruises, Ltd., 323 F.
`Supp. 2d 128, 129–30 (D. Me. 2004) (permitting expert with experience in the field to testify as
`to industry standards).
`5 Nitsch v. Dreamworks Animation SKG Inc., 315 F.R.D. 270, 287 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (matching
`job titles with the help of a list and algorithm).
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 7 of 14
`
`categorizations. Id. The former deserves no credit from the Court. The latter only further
`confirms that Dr. Singer’s “methodology” is “simply a subjective, conclusory approach that
`cannot reasonably be assessed for reliability” or “challenged in some objective sense,” deserving
`exclusion. United States v. Williams, No. 13-cr-00764, 2017 WL 3498694, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
`Aug. 15, 2017) (citations omitted). Put simply, any economist—or even any lay person—could
`apply the agency factors to the documentary evidence and reach widely different results. The
`fact Dr. Singer subjectively accepted or rejected certain of the proffered critiques does not prove
`otherwise. See CFM Commc’ns, LLC, 424 F. Supp. 2d at 1237 (“The ultimate disposition of any
`legal proceeding is by nature unpredictable.”).
`II.
`Dr. Singer’s Testimony Based on Two Selected Department of Justice and Federal
`Trade Commission Webpages Should Be Excluded.
`A.
`Dr. Singer Is Unqualified to Offer Such Testimony.
`Dr. Singer’s “qualitative analysis”
`
`
`
`.
`Singer Rep. ¶¶ 20–32. However, Dr. Singer does not have relevant formal education, personal
`knowledge, or practical experience pertaining to the policies or practices of antitrust regulatory
`agencies. Mot. at 11; see also Ex. 5, Deposition of Hal J. Singer, Ph.D., dated May 21, 2019
`(“Singer Dep.”), Tr. 80:2–22 (
`), ECF
`No. 647-6. Therefore, he is not qualified to offer an opinion that relies upon the policies of these
`agencies, and his proffered opinion is “inherently unreliable.” See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab.
`Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 531, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (excluding expert testimony interpreting
`and evaluating defendant’s compliance with FDA standards after finding experts lacked
`expertise on the subject of FDA standards and regulations).
`Plaintiffs argue that Dr. Singer is “not opining about institutional practices,” and that
`instead he is using the FTC and DOJ criteria to inform his economic analysis. Opp’n at 28. But
`again, Plaintiffs’ ex post facto characterization of Dr. Singer’s opinion fails to describe
`accurately what Dr. Singer actually does and concludes. Dr. Singer
`
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`. See Singer Rep. at p. 17 (
`
`
`. Dr. Singer’s opinion is not solely about economics, but also consists of an opinion that,
`
`
`”).6
`The court’s decision in CFM Commc’ns—which was raised in Defendants’ opening brief
`but was, not surprisingly, left unaddressed by Plaintiffs—is particularly instructive here. In
`CFM, the Court excluded expert testimony regarding the factors considered by the FCC when
`deciding control of a broadcast station, how such factors applied to the present case, how the
`FCC would decide any legal issue, and any other application of law to the facts of the case. 424
`F. Supp. 2d at 1237. Such testimony was excluded despite the fact that, in that case, the expert’s
`qualifications were not challenged, and the expert actually had experience practicing before the
`agency about which he was rendering testimony. Id. at 1233, 1237. As was the case in CMF,
`Dr. Singer’s testimony is “utterly unhelpful.” Id. at 1236. Dr. Singer is qualified to offer
`opinions grounded in the methodologies of economics, not government agencies’ application of
`guidelines to facts.
`B.
`Dr. Singer’s Testimony Regarding the FTC and DOJ Sources Is Not
`Reliable.
`The two publications on which Dr. Singer relies are, furthermore, of questionable
`relevance and are misrepresented in his report, further undermining his opinion’s reliability.
`Singer Rep. ¶ 21 & n.43; ¶ 22 & n.47. Both sources consider the reasonableness of information
`exchanges, rather than the per se rule which applies to allegations of price fixing. See Am. Ad
`Mgmt., Inc. v. GTE Corp., 92 F.3d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining that practices such as
`
`6 Plaintiffs cite Primiano v. Cook to support their argument that Dr. Singer’s “shaky but
`admissible evidence” should be attacked by cross-examination rather than be excluded. Opp’n at
`5 (citing 598 F.3d 558, 564 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended (Apr. 27, 2010)). Primiano is
`inapposite. There, an orthopedic surgeon, experienced in performing elbow replacements, was
`permitted to opine on the performance of a certain artificial joint replacement. See id. at 567.
`The point here is that Dr. Singer may be qualified as an economist to opine on economic matters,
`but he exceeds the boundaries of those topics on which an economist can provide expert
`testimony.
`
`
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`group boycotts, tying arrangements, output limitations, and horizontal price fixing, which always
`or almost always restrict competition or reduce output, require application of the per se
`approach). These publications identify specific criteria that, if found, generally preclude
`antitrust agencies from challenging data exchanges.7 The antitrust agencies characterize
`information that fulfills these criteria as falling within a “safety zone.” Singer Rep. ¶ 22.
`
`
`
`
` Id. ¶ 23. This mischaracterization of these criteria set forth in
`DOJ and FTC publications reaffirms that Dr. Singer’s qualitative analysis is unreliable and
`should be excluded.
`Plaintiffs also try to cure Dr. Singer’s defective analysis by asserting that, in addition to
`the DOJ and FTC sources, Dr. Singer “also relies on an extensive academic literature that
`discusses qualitative evidence of anticompetitive information sharing.” Opp’n at 27.
`
`
`
`
`
`Dep. Tr. 72:21–74:12.
`
`8
`
`. See Singer
`
`
`
`7 See Michael Bloom, Information Exchange: Be Reasonable, Federal Trade Comm’n
`(December 2014), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/competition-
`matters/2014/12/information-exchange-be-reasonable (citing Federal Trade Comm’n & Dep’t of
`Justice, Antitrust Guidelines for Collaborations Among Competitors (April 2000)); see also
`Dep’t of Justice & Federal Trade Comm’n, Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
`Care (August 1996) at 50.
`8 See Omnibus Deposition Tr. Authentication Decl. of Joseph R. Saveri in Supp. of DPPs’ Opp’n
`to Defs.’ Mots for Summ. J. and Daubert Mots., dated July 27, 2019, Ex. 21 (excerpts of Singer
`Dep.), Tr. 75:17–79:14, ECF No. 811-1.
`
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 10 of 14
`
`III. Dr. Singer’s Quantitative Econometric Analyses Should Be Excluded.
`Dr. Singer’s econometric model
`. Singer Rep.
`¶ 43 n.128; Singer Dep. Tr. 180:10–25. This requires exclusion of Dr. Singer’s model because
`Dr. McClave’s model is unreliable and should be excluded.9
`CONCLUSION
`For the reasons stated above and in Defendants’ Motion, Defendants respectfully request
`that the Court grant their Motion to Exclude the Testimony of Dr. Hal J. Singer.
`
`Dated: August 15, 2019
`
`
`Respectfully submitted,
`
`
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`
`/s/ Joseph J. Bial
`Charles F. Rule (admitted pro hac vice)
`Joseph J. Bial (admitted pro hac vice)
`Eric R. Sega (admitted pro hac vice)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`2001 K Street, NW
`Washington, DC 20006-1047
`rrule@paulweiss.com
`jbial@paulweiss.com
`esega@paulweiss.com
`Tel: (202) 223-7300
`Fax: (202) 223-7420
`
`Johan E. Tatoy (admitted pro hac vice)
`PAUL, WEISS, RIFKIND, WHARTON &
`GARRISON LLP
`1285 Avenue of the Americas
`New York, New York 10019-6064
`jtatoy@paulweiss.com
`Tel: (212) 373-3830
`Fax: (212) 757-3990
`
`
`
`
`
`9 Defendants hereby incorporate Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude the Proposed Expert Test. of Dr. James
`T. McClave, ECF No. 661, and Reply in Further Supp. of Defs.’ Mot. to Exclude the Proposed
`Expert Test. of Dr. James T. McClave, filed concurrently herewith.
`- 9 -
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD; 3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`

`

`
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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 11 of 14
`
`KAUFHOLD GASKIN LLP
`
`/s/ Steven Kaufhold (SBN 157195)
`skaufhold@kaufholdgaskin.com
`388 Market Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: (415) 445-4621
`Fax: (415) 874-1071
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`Nippon Chemi-Con Corporation
`and United Chemi-Con, Inc.
`
`MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY AND
`POPEO P.C.
`
`/s/ Bruce D. Sokler
`Bruce D. Sokler (admitted pro hac vice)
`Robert G. Kidwell (admitted pro hac vice)
`MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY AND
`POPEO P.C.
`701 Pennsylvania Avenue NW
`Suite 900
`Washington, DC 20004
`bdsokler@mintz.com
`rgkidwell@mintz.com
`Tel: (202) 434-7300
`Fax: (202) 434-7400
`
`Evan S. Nadel (SBN 213230)
`MINTZ LEVIN COHN FERRIS GLOVSKY AND
`POPEO P.C.
`44 Montgomery Street, 36th Floor
`San Francisco, California 94104
`enadel@mintz.com
`Tel: (415) 432-6000
`Fax: (415) 432-6001
`
`Attorneys for Defendant
`AVX CORPORATION
`
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`
`/s/ Jeffrey L. Kesslerr
`Jeffrey L. Kessler (pro hac vice)
`A. Paul Victor (pro hac vice)
`Molly Donovan (pro hac vice)
`Sofia Arguello (pro hac vice)
`- 10 -
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD; 3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 12 of 14
`
`
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`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`200 Park Avenue
`New York, NY 10166-4193
`jkessler@winston.com
`pvictor@winston.com
`mmdonovan@winston.com
`sarguello@winston.com
`Tel: (212) 294-6700
`Fax: (212) 294-4700
`
`Ian L. Papendick (SBN 275648)
`ipapendick@winston.com
`Matthew R. DalSanto (SBN 282458)
`MDalSanto@winston.com
`WINSTON & STRAWN LLP
`101 California Street
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Tel: (415) 591-1000
`Fax: (415) 591-1400
`
`Counsel for Defendants
`Panasonic Corporation
`Panasonic Corporation of North America
`SANYO Electric Co., Ltd.
`SANYO North America Corporation
`
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`
`/s/ Bonnie Lau
`Bonnie Lau
`blau@mofo.com
`MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP
`425 Market Street
`San Francisco, CA 94105-2482
`Tel: (415) 268-7000
`Fax: (415) 268-7522
`
`Counsel for Matsuo Electric Co., Ltd.
`
`
`/s/ Jeffrey A. LeVee
`Jeffrey A. LeVee (State Bar No. 125863)
`Eric P. Enson (State Bar No. 204447)
`Kelly M. Ozurovich (State Bar No. 307563)
`JONES DAY
`555 South Flower Street
`Fiftieth Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90071
`
`- 11 -
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD; 3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`

`

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`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 13 of 14
`
`jlevee@JonesDay.com
`epenson@JonesDay.com
`kozurovich@jonesday.com
`Tel: (213) 489-3939
`Fax: (213) 243-2539
`
`Attorneys for Defendants Holy Stone Enterprise
`Co., Ltd.; Milestone Global Technology, Inc.
`(D/B/A Holystone International); and Vishay
`Polytech Co., Ltd.
`
`
`/s/ Heather S. Nyong’o
`Heather S. Nyong’o (CA SBN 222202)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
`HALE AND DORR LLP
`1 Front Street, Suite 3500
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`heather.nyongo@wilmerhale.com
`Tel: (628) 235-1000
`Fax: (628) 235-1001
`
`Thomas Mueller (pro hac vice)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
`HALE AND DORR LLP
`1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW
`Washington, DC 20006
`thomas.mueller@wilmerhale.com
`Tel: (202) 663-6000
`Fax: (202) 663-6363
`
`Chris Johnstone (CA SBN 242152)
`WILMER CUTLER PICKERING
`HALE AND DORR LLP
`950 Page Mill Road
`Palo Alto, CA 94304
`chris.johnstone@wilmerhale.com
`Tel: (650) 858-6000
`Fax: (650) 858-6100
`
`Counsel for Defendants Elna Co., Ltd. and Elna
`America, Inc.
`
`PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
`
` /s/ Jacob R. Sorensen
`Roxane A. Polidora
`Jacob R. Sorensen
`- 12 -
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD; 3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`

`

`Case 3:14-cv-03264-JD Document 2424 Filed 08/15/19 Page 14 of 14
`
`Laura C. Hurtado
`PILLSBURY WINTHROP SHAW PITTMAN LLP
`Four Embarcadero Center, 22nd Floor
`San Francisco, CA 94111
`Roxane.polidora@pillsburylaw.com
`Jacob.Sorensen@pillbsburylaw.com
`Laura.hurtado@pillsburylaw.com
`Tel: (415) 983-1976
`Fax: (415) 983-1200
`
`Attorneys for Defendants
`KEMET CORPORATION and
`KEMET ELECTRONICS CORPORATION
`
`
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`- 13 -
`CERTAIN DEFS’ JOINT REPLY ISO JOINT MOT. TO EXCLUDE TEST. OF DR. SINGER
`Case No. 3:14-cv-03264-JD; 3:17-md-02801-JD
`
`

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