Case 4:21-cv-01721-YGR Document 35 Filed 10/12/21 Page 1 of 5
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
`
`DEBORAH COONEY,
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`
`MOLLY C. DWYER, et al.,
`Defendants,
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
`
`
`
`Case No. 4:21-cv-01721-YGR
`
`
`ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS
`DEFENDANTS DWYER & SOONG;
`VACATING CASE MANAGEMENT
`CONFERENCE
`Re: Dkt. No. 25
`
`Pro se Plaintiff Deborah Cooney brings this action against over 140 defendants. At issue
`here are Cooney’s claims against defendants Molly C. Dwyer and Susan Y. Soong. Now before
`the Court is a motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint brought by defendants Dwyer and
`Soong. (Dkt. No. 25.) The motion is fully briefed by the parties. Having carefully considered the
`papers and the pleadings in this matter, and for the reasons set forth more fully below, the Court
`HEREBY ORDERS as follows: the motion to dismiss is GRANTED WITH PREJUDICE.
`I. BACKGROUND
`In short, Cooney’s First Amended Complaint identifies over 140 defendants, including
`former governors, businesses, a law firm, public agencies and officials, a city and county, and
`Dwyer and Soong, related to what she alleges is a fraud on the Court.
`The claims against the defendants Dwyer and Soong concern several lawsuits filed by
`plaintiff in this District and the Ninth Circuit. See U.S. Northern District Case Nos. 4:18-cv-
`01860-JSW, 3:13-cv-0067-EMC, and 4:12-cv-06466-CW; Ninth Circuit Case No. 19-16180; see
`also FAC ¶ 20. Plaintiff’s prior cases have been dismissed.
`The First Amended Complaint alleges that “[t]his case arises out of the criminal and
`tortious conduct of rogue clerks, Defendants Dwyer, Soong, and/or Does 1-60 and 301-360, who
`
`

`

`Case 4:21-cv-01721-YGR Document 35 Filed 10/12/21 Page 2 of 5
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`impersonated federal judges, forged the judges’ signatures on orders, and filed the fraudulent and
`unauthorized orders in an Underlying Case.” FAC ¶ 7; see also id. at ¶¶ 8–17. The First
`Amended Complaint invokes 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 42 U.S.C. § 1985-6, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c), Bivens
`v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and the
`Federal Tort Claims Act. Plaintiff also complains that defendant Dwyer improperly dismissed an
`appeal and that defendant Soong did not forward documents to the Article III judge to whom her
`case was assigned.
`II. MOTION TO DISMISS
`Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“FRCP”) 12(b)(6), a district court must dismiss a
`complaint if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. To survive a motion to
`dismiss, the plaintiff must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
`face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). This “facial plausibility” standard
`requires the plaintiff to allege facts that add up to “more than a sheer possibility that a defendant
`has acted unlawfully.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In deciding whether the
`plaintiff has stated a claim, a court must assume that the plaintiff’s allegations are true and draw
`all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor. Usher v. City of L.A., 828 F.2d 556, 561 (9th Cir.
`1987). However, the court is not required to accept as true “allegations that are merely
`conclusory, unwarranted deductions of fact, or unreasonable inferences.” In re Gilead Scis. Sec.
`Litig., 536 F.3d 1049, 1055 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). Leave to amend
`must be granted to a pro se litigant unless it is clear that the complaint’s deficiencies cannot be
`cured by amendment. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995).
`A. Absolute and Quasi-Judicial Immunity
`Generally, “[j]udges are absolutely immune from civil liability for damages for their
`judicial acts.” Mullis v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court for Dist. of Nevada, 828 F.2d 1385, 1388 (9th Cir.
`1987). This has been extended to clerks of the court: “[t]he clerk of the court and the Circuit
`Executive are immune from suit under quasi-judicial immunity when they are engaged in such
`functions as ‘[t]he filing of exhibits and the processing of a request to withdraw an
`appeal[,] . . . tasks that are necessary to the judicial process.’” Adams v. Comm. on Judicial
`2
`
`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 4:21-cv-01721-YGR Document 35 Filed 10/12/21 Page 3 of 5
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Conduct & Disability, 165 F. Supp. 3d 911, 923 (N.D. Cal. 2016) (citation omitted); see also In re
`Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 952-53 (9th Cir. 2002) (extending immunity to clerks and non-judicial
`officers and finding that clerks were immune when conduct concerned giving notice and
`scheduling hearings on the basis that that they are essential parts of the adjudicatory process).
`“The doctrine of absolute and quasi-absolute judicial immunity is expansive. Grave errors or
`malicious act alone, or even an improper conspiracy by judicial officers, do not tear asunder this
`immunity.” Sanai v. Kozinski, No. 4:19-cv-08162-YGR, 2021 WL 1339072, at *9 (N.D. Cal.
`Apr. 9, 2021).
`Here, Cooney’s allegations against defendant Dwyer concern the issuance of orders and
`the circulation of an en banc petition. FAC ¶¶ 8, 9, 11, 22. As to defendant Soong, the allegations
`concern reassignment of cases, issuance of orders, and default procedures. FAC ¶¶ 12–16, 21–22.
`These are plainly tasks within the judicial process. In re Castillo, 297 F.3d at 952–53 (managing
`the docket, scheduling, and noticing proceedings are part of the judicial function). Therefore,
`defendants Dwyer and Soong are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.
`The motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the claims against defendants Dwyer and Soong
`are dismissed with prejudice.
`B. Sufficiency of the Pleadings
`While the case can be disposed of on immunity grounds, the claims are not sufficiently
`plead and the motion to dismiss can be granted on this basis as well.
`The standard for surviving a FRCP 12(b)(6) motion is set out above. While courts do not
`require “heighted fact pleading of specifics,” a plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to “raise a right
`to relief above the speculative level,” 550 U.S. at 555, 570, and the Court does not take
`conclusions, unreasonable inferences, and unwarranted deductions as true.
`Even construing the pro se allegations liberally, there are insufficient factual allegations to
`raise the right to relief above speculation. Cooney has not provided any basis for her assertions
`that defendants “impersonated federal judges, forged the judges’ signatures on orders, and filed
`the fraudulent and unauthorized orders” that she alleges are at issue. FAC ¶ 7. These allegations
`are conclusory assertions without supporting facts. Therefore, the sole assertions against
`3
`
`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 4:21-cv-01721-YGR Document 35 Filed 10/12/21 Page 4 of 5
`
`
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`defendants Dwyer and Soong are not entitled to an assumption of truth. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 685.
`The mere fact that plaintiff inserted a request for a “notarized verification of receipt” (FAC ¶ 9)
`says nothing as courts are not required to respond to personal requests and may merely issue
`orders authorized by law.
`Further, plaintiff is advised that this district court runs electronically. The clerk of the
`court does not “forward” documents as may have been the case in the past. All judges can, and
`do, access filings electronically. Additionally, judges in this court use electronic signatures and
`electronic stamps. That a stamp may have been used by Magistrate Judge Spero does not indicate
`that defendant Soong acted without authorization or independently. To the extent that there was
`an improper action in a particular case, that issue should be addressed by way of motion in the
`case itself.
`The same holds for her assertion that “all of the Defendants are fairly said to be state actors
`because of their close nexus, symbiotic relationships, and joint action with city, county, and state
`employees.” FAC ¶ 19. These are conclusions. She has not stated any sufficient facts concerning
`Dwyer and Cooney to raise her claim beyond speculation. While she tries to use these conclusions
`to impute 1983 liability on defendants Dwyer and Cooney, it is well established that federal
`defendants cannot be liable pursuant to 1983. Morse v. North Coast Opportunities, Inc., 118 F.3d
`1338, 1342 (9th Cir. 1997) (“We take this opportunity to remind the Bar that by its very terms,
`Section 1983 precludes liability in federal government actors.”).
`The Court recognized that, as a general rule, leave to amend should be granted freely to
`pro se plaintiffs. However, the Court concludes that it would be futile to grant plaintiff leave to
`file a second amended complaint given the ruling concerning quasi-judicial immunity.
`III. CASE MANAGEMENT
`The case management conference in this action is VACATED until further notice. Until
`defendants have been served and answered the complaint, the Court need not set a case
`management schedule.
`Having reviewed the First Amended Complaint, plaintiff is advised that the Court does not
`have legal jurisdiction over matters which did not occur in this district, in particular, San Diego is
`4
`
`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
`
`

`

`Case 4:21-cv-01721-YGR Document 35 Filed 10/12/21 Page 5 of 5
`
`
`
`not in this district.
`This Order terminates Dkt. No. 25.1
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`Dated: October 12, 2021
`
`
`
`
`______________________________________
`YVONNE GONZALEZ ROGERS
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
`
`
`1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 78(b) and Civil Local Rule 7-1(b), the Court
`finds that this motion is appropriate for decision without oral argument. Accordingly, the clerk of
`the Court shall VACATE the hearing set for October 26, 2021.
`
`5
`
`1
`2
`3
`4
`5
`6
`7
`8
`9
`10
`11
`12
`13
`14
`15
`16
`17
`18
`19
`20
`21
`22
`23
`24
`25
`26
`27
`28
`
`Northern District of California
`United States District Court
`
`