`
`OtdGINAL
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`Wniteb $tates QCourt of jf eberal QCiaims
`FILED
`No. 17-1785 C
`Filed: November 21, 20 17
`NOV 2 1 2017
`U.S. COURT OF
`FEDERAL CLAIMS
`
`WILLIAM LEE GRANT, II,
`
`Pro Se; Sua Sponte Dismissal; Lack of
`Subject Matter of Jurisdiction; In Forma
`Pauperis Application
`
`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`THE UNITED ST ATES,
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`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
`)
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`Defendant.
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`~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-)
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`SMITH, Senior Judge
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`OPINION AND ORDER
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`On November 13, 2017, plaintiff, proceedingpro se, filed a complaint in this Comt and
`concunently filed an in forma pauperis application seeking leave to proceed without paying the
`Court filing fee. Plaintiffs Complaint alleges, inter alia, that the government failed to
`investigate and prosecute wrongdoing on the part of state and federal officials in connection with
`various alleged conspiracies. Plaintiff is seeking a review of a federal district court case and $30
`trillion in damages.
`
`Upon sua sponte review, this Court finds plaintiffs allegations do not give rise to any
`cause of action over which this Court has subject-matter jurisdiction. The Court has no authority
`to decide plaintiffs case, and therefore must dismiss the Complaint pursuant to Rule 12(h)(3) of
`the Rules of the United States Court of Federal Claims ("RCFC").
`
`I.
`
`Background
`
`Plaintiff, Mr. Grant, has filed numerous, nearly identical complaints in federal courts
`across the country over the last several years, including a previous filing in this Court. See Grant
`v. Kabaker, 17-CV-3257 (C.D. Ill., Nov. 7, 2017) (denying plaintiffs informa pauperis motion
`and dismissing his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Grant v. Schmidt, 17-CV-3215
`(C.D. Ill., Oct. 2, 2017) (denying plaintiffs informa pauperis motion and dismissing his
`complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Grantv. US. Department of Justice, 17-CV-1434
`(D. C., Aug. 4, 2017) (granting plaintiffs in for ma pauper is motion and dismissing with
`prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Grant v. United States, 16-CV-1621 (Fed. Cl., Jan.
`17, 2017); Grant v. Kabaker et al., No. 16-CV-3245 (C.D. Ill., Oct. 12, 2016) (granting
`defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim); Grant v.
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`7017 14 50 ODDO 1346 0799
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`Case 1:17-cv-01785-LAS Document 5 Filed 11/21/17 Page 2 of 4
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`Kabaker et al., No. 16-CV-3239 (C.D. Ill., Sept. 6, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs claims as
`frivolous and denying plaintiffs motion to proceed informa pauperis); Grant v. Kabaker et al.,
`No. l 6-CV-3132 (C.D. Ill., June 20, 2016) (dismissing plaintiffs claims as frivolous and
`denying plaintiff's motion to proceed informa pauperis).
`
`In Grant v. United States, this Court dismissed plaintiff's Complaint as frivolous, in
`accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), and for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under
`RCFC 12(h)(3). See Grant v. United States, 16-CV-1621, ECF No. 6. Further, Mr. Grant's in
`forma pauperis application was denied due to his history of duplicative and vexatious litigation.
`Id. at 4.
`
`In this Complaint, Mr. Grant repeats the allegations from his previous filings and
`includes details on the aforementioned dismissals of his many cases. See generally Complaint
`(hereinafter "Comp!."). The repeated allegations include claims of conspiracy against several
`government figures and entities, including former U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney, Illinois
`Gov. Bruce Rauner, Chicago Mayor Rahm Emanuel, fotmer U.S. Secretary of State Hillary
`Clinton, former Cook County District Attorney Anita Alvarez, and former Chicago Mayor
`Richard M. Daley. Comp!. at 1-2. Mr. Grant also states that he was planted in the State of
`Illinois government to become an informant for the U.S. Depatiment of Justice. Id. at 8.
`
`While it is difficult to discern the true nature of Mr. Grant's grievances, he states that he
`has been denied access "to [a]ppeal in the Seventh Circuit of Federal Appeals, and asks this [sic]
`Supreme Court of the United States to review the record of the matter docketed as 16-CV-3245,
`and award Petitioner []requested compensatory and punitive damages in the amount of $30
`[t]rillion." Id. at 15.
`
`II.
`
`Standard of Review
`
`This Comi's jurisdictional grant is primarily defined by the Tucker Act, which provides
`this Court the power "to render any judgment upon any claim against the United States founded
`either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive
`department, or upon any express or implied contract with the United States ... in cases not
`sounding in tort." 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a)(l). Although the Tucker Act expressly waives the
`sovereign immunity of the United States against such claims, it "does not create any substantive
`right enforceable against the United States for money damages." United States v. Testan, 424
`U.S. 392, 398 (1976). Rather, in order to fall within the scope of the Tucker Act, "a plaintiff
`must identify a separate source of substantive law that creates the right to money damages."
`Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167, 1172 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en bane in relevant part).
`
`"Courts have an independent obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction
`exists .... " Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 94 (2010). If the Court lacks jurisdiction, it
`cannot proceed with the action and must dismiss the case. Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500,
`514 (2006). RCFC 12(h)(3) provides: "If the court determines at any time that it lacks subject(cid:173)
`matter jurisdiction, the comi must dismiss the action."
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`Case 1:17-cv-01785-LAS Document 5 Filed 11/21/17 Page 3 of 4
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`In determining whether subject matter jurisdiction exists, the Court will treat factual
`allegations in the complaint as true and will construe them in the light most favorable to the
`plaintiff. Estes Express Lines v. United States, 739 F.3d 689, 692 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (emphasis
`added). Further, pleadings from pro se plaintiffs are held to more lenient standards than
`pleadings drafted by lawyers. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 9 (1980); see also Erickson v.
`Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). This leniency, however, does not extend to saving a complaint
`that lies outside of this Court's jurisdiction. "Despite this permissive standard, a pro se plaintiff
`must still satisfy the comi'sjurisdictional requirements." Trevino v. United States, 113 Fed. Cl.
`204, 208 (2013), ajj'd, 557 F. App'x 995 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (citations omitted). Prose or not, the
`plaintiff still has the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that this Court
`has jurisdiction over its claims. See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375,
`377 (1994).
`
`III. Discussion
`
`A.
`
`Subject-Matter Jurisdiction
`
`Mr. Grant fails to establish any claim over which this Court has jurisdiction. While the
`Complaint includes extreme and outrageous allegations of government cmTuption and
`conspiracy, the plaintiffs only real request for relief appears to be a collateral attack on the
`decision of the district court in Illinois. See Comp!. at 15 ("to review the record of the matter
`docketed as 16-CV-3245, and award Petitioner[] requested compensatory and punitive
`damages").
`
`The Tucker Act does not provide this Court with jurisdiction to entertain collateral
`attacks on decisions of state or federal district courts. 28 U.S.C. § 149l(a); see, e.g., Shinnecock
`Indian Nation v. United States, 782 F.3d 1345, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Binding precedent
`establishes that the Court of Federal Claims has no jurisdiction to review the merits of a decision
`rendered by a federal district court."). Therefore, Mr. Grant's request to review the other court's
`decision is outside of this Court's jurisdiction and must be dismissed.
`
`Dismissal is also required upon a determination that a complaint is frivolous, malicious,
`or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e); Neitzke v.
`Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989) (defining when an action lacks an arguable basis in law or in
`fact). Frivolous complaints are "those in which the factual allegations are so unbelievable that
`there is no need for an evidentiary hearing to determine their veracity." Taylor v. United States,
`568 F. App'x 890, 891 (Fed. Cir. 2014); see Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 327 (frivolous claims include
`those that describe "fantastic or delusional scenarios"). A comi is required to dismiss a frivolous
`complaint from a litigant who is proceeding informa pauperis. 1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). It
`is clear Mr. Grant has a history of filing frivolous complaints, and this case is no exception. In
`
`1 While the Comi of Federal Claims is not generally considered to be a "comi of the
`United States" within the meaning of Title 28 of the United States Code, 28 U.S.C. § 2503(d)
`deems the Court of Federal Claims to be a "court of the United States" for purposes of28 U.S.C.
`§ 1915.
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`Case 1:17-cv-01785-LAS Document 5 Filed 11/21/17 Page 4 of 4
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`the case at bar, the plaintiff again repeats the same unbelievable allegations, in the hopes that this
`Court might believe them.
`
`B.
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`Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis
`
`As noted above, Mr. Grant filed an application to proceed informa pauperis. Pursuant to
`28 U.S.C. § 1915, federal courts are permitted to waive filing fees under ce1iain circumstances.
`See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l); see also Waltner v. United States, 93 Fed. Cl. 139, 141 (2010). The
`statute requires that an applicant be "unable to pay such fees." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(l). To be
`'"unable to pay such fees ' means that paying such fees would constitute a serious hardship on the
`plaintiff." Fiebelkorn v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 59, 62 (2007); see also Moore v. United
`States, 93 Fed. Cl. 411, 414-15 (2010).
`
`Although it is possible that the fees could prove to be a hardship for Mr. Grant, the
`plaintiffs repeated filings of frivolous complaints and his history of vexatious litigation leads the
`Court to find that the plaintiff is not entitled to a waiver of the filing fee.
`
`IV.
`
`Conclusion
`
`For the reasons set forth in this opinion, plaintiff's Complaint is, sua sponte,
`DISMISSED pursuant to RCFC 12(h)(3) for lack of jurisdiction, and plaintiffs informa
`pauperis application is DENIED. The Clerk is hereby directed to enter judgment consistent with
`this opinion.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`«orellASmith, Senior Judge
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