Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 108 Filed 01/13/12 Page 1 of 26 PageID #: 669
`Case 1:11—cv-00797-RGA Document 108
`Filed 01/13/12 Page 1 of 26 Page|D #: 669
`
`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`FastVDO LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`C.A. No. 11-797-RGA
`
`V.
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`Apple Inc., et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`PLAINTIFF FASTVDO LLC’S ANSWERING BRIEF TO
`EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY’S MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE
`ALTERNATIVE. TO SEVER AND TRANSFER
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`FARNAN LLP
`
`-
`
`_
`Marc A. Fenster
`fi1e€V7E:f11§1e]T3Er-1I(3e- G123
`RUSS, AUGUST & KABAT
`12424 Wilshire Boulevard, 12th Floor
`Los Angeles, CA 90025-1031
`(310) 826-7474
`mfenster@rak1aw.com
`agiza@raklaw.com
`kbLL1'ke@:'a1<law.com
`
`Date: January 13, 2012
`
`Joseph J. Farnan, Jr. (Bar No. 100245)
`Brian E. Farnan (Bar No. 40t§9)1
`Wilmifgton agE°t19t§f)e1t
`302 777 0500
`(
`J
`'
`farnan@farnan1aw.com
`bfarnan@farnanlaw.corn
`
`, 12 F
`
`W
`
`919 N h M k
`
`S
`
`Attorneys for Plaintiff,
`FastVDO LLC.
`
`

`
`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 108 Filed 01/13/12 Page 2 of 26 PageID #: 670
`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 108
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`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`11.
`
`III.
`
`IV.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS ................ ..1
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ......................................................................................... ..1
`
`CASE BACKGROUND ................................................................................................... ..3
`
`ARGUMENT .................................................................................................................... .. 5
`
`A.
`
`Kodak’s Motion to Sever Must Be Denied ........................................................... .. 5
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Delaware Authorities Demonstrate That Kodak Has Been Properly
`Joined In This Action ................................................................................ .. 5
`
`The AIA is Inapplicable and Kodak’s Authorities Represent Only
`One-Half of the Pre-AIA Judicial Divide on Joinder ............................... .. 8
`
`Kodak’s Claims to Prejudice are Unfounded and Speculative ................ .. 10
`
`Kodak’s Motion to Dismiss Must Be Denied ...................................................... .. 11
`
`Kodak’s Motion to Transfer Must Be Denied ..................................................... .. 11
`
`B
`
`C.
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`Kodak Has Not Established That the Private Interest Factors Weigh
`Srongly in Favor of Transfer ................................................................... .. 12
`
`The Public Interest Factors Strongly Weigh Against Transfer ................ .. 19
`
`V.
`
`CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................... .. 20
`
`

`
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`
`CASES
`
`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Adrain v. Genetec Inc.,
`2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86855 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 22, 2009) ................................................ ..9
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc.,
`28 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Del. Nov 18, 1998) ............................................................... ..17, 18
`
`Aircraft‘ Co. v. Reyno,
`454 U.S. 235 (U.S. 1981) ............................................................................................... .. 12
`
`Alford Safety Servs., Inc. v. Hot-Hed, Inc.,
`2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 98152 (E.D. La. Aug. 23, 2010) ................................................. ..9
`
`Carnegie Mellon Univ. v. Marvell Tech. Group, Ltd,
`2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 85976 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21,2009) ............................................... .. 15
`
`Cypress Semiconductor Corp. v. Integrated Circuit Sys., Inc.,
`2001 WL 1617186 (D. Del. Nov. 28, 2001) .............................................................. ..12, 18
`
`Dougherty v. Mieczkowski,
`661 F. Supp. 267 (D. Del. 1987) ...................................................................................... ..5
`
`Eastman Kodak Company v. Shutterfly, Inc. ,
`Civ. No. 10-cv-1079 SLR (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2010) ..................................................... ..3, 14
`
`Eolas Techs, Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc.,
`2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104125 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 28, 2010) .............................................. ..9
`
`Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
`620 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ............................................................................... ..2, 7, 10
`
`Helicos Biosciences Corp. v. Pacific Biosciences of California, et al.,
`Civ. No. 10-735-SLR (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2011) .................................................... ..1, 5-8, 11
`
`In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, L.P.,
`816 F. Supp. 973 (D. Del. 1993) .................................................................................... .. 13
`
`In re TC W/Camil Holding L.L.C.,
`No. 03-10717 et a1., 2004 WL 1043193 (D. Del. Apr. 30, 2004) .................................. .. 16
`
`Intel Corp. v. Broadcom Corp.
`167 F. Supp. 2d 692 (D. Del. 2001) ............................................................................... .. 16
`
`Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
`55 F.3d 873 (1995) ....................................................................................... ..l2,16,17,19
`
`

`
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`
`Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. E—Z—Em, Inc.,
`670 F.Supp.2d 349 (D. Del. 2009) .................................................................................. .. 13
`
`Mannatech, Inc. v. Country Life, LLC,
`2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75353 (N.D. Tex. July 26, 2010) ................................................ ..9
`
`Marvell Int ’l Ltd. v. Link_A_Media Devices Corp.,
`--F.3d--, 2011 WL 6004566 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2011) .................................................... .. 14
`
`Microsoft Corp. v. Geotag, Inc.,
`11-cv-175-RGA (D. Del. January 13, 2012) ................................................................... ..15
`
`Microunity Sys. Eng’g v. Acer Inc.,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112564 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2011) ............................................ .. 10
`
`Molins PLC v. Cincinnati Milacron, Inc.,
`C.A. No. 87—163—JJF (D. Del. March 22, 1988) ............................................................ .. 13
`
`Pennwalt Corp. v. Purex Indus, Inc.,
`659 F. Supp. 287 (D. Del. 1986) ..................................................................................... .. 13
`
`Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Apple Inc.,
`Civ. N0. 10-cv-867 (GMS) (D. Del., Jan. 5, 2012) .................................................... ..3, 14
`
`Mymail, Ltd. v. America Online, Inc.,
`223 F.R.D. 455 (E.D. Tex. 2004) ...................................................................................... ..9
`
`North Am. Phillips Corp. v. American Vending Sales,
`35 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1994) ......................................................................................... ..20
`
`Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
`564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) ..................................................................................... ..8
`
`Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp.,
`220 F.R.D. 415 (D. Del. 2004) .......................................................................................... ..8
`
`Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp.,
`431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970) .............................................................................................. ..11
`
`Simms v. Thomson Reuters Tax and Accounting, Inc.,
`2011WL 4501225 (D. Del. 2011) .................................................................................. .. 12
`
`Softview LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112476 (D. Del. Sep. 30,2011) .................................... ..2, 7, 9, 11
`
`SoftView LLC v. Apple Inc.,
`2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140540 (D. Del. Dec. 7,2011)
`
`.................................................. ..9
`
`Sprint Communs. C0,, L.P. v. Theglobecom, Inc.,
`233 F.R.D. 615 (D. Kan. 2006) ......................................................................................... ..9
`
`2
`
`

`
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`
`SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems,
`2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6797 (D. Del. 2005) ........................................................... ..7, 8, 10
`
`Sands Defibrator, Inc. v. Durametal Corp.,
`1997 WL 74660 (D. Del. Jan. 31, 1997) ......................................................................... .. 17
`
`United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs,
`383 U.S. 715 (1966) .......................................................................................................... ..5
`
`Wacoh Company v. Kionix, Inc., et al.,
`Civ. No. 10-617-RGA (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2012) .............................................. ..2, 7, 11, 15, 16
`
`STATUTES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 ........................................................................................................................... ..5
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(b) ..................................................................................................................... ..2
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 ......................................................................................................................... ..11
`
`

`
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`I.
`
`STATEMENT OF THE NATURE AND STAGE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
`
`Plaintiff FastVDO LLC (“FastVDO”) filed its original complaint on September 9, 2011.
`
`D.I. 1. Before any responses to the original complaint were filed, FastVDO filed a First
`
`Amended Complaint on October 31, 2011. D.l. 34. Eastman Kodak Company (“Kodak”) filed
`
`its motion to dismiss or, in the alternative, to sever and transfer on December 19, 2011. D.I. 91
`
`(“Motion”). FastVDO and Kodak stipulated to extending the deadline for FastVDO to respond
`
`to Kodak’s Motion to January 13, 2012 (D.I. 100) and the Court granted this extension on
`
`December 28, 2011.
`
`II.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`1.
`
`FastVDO asserted U.S. Patent No. RE 40,081 (the “FastVDO patent”) against all
`
`of the defendants in this case because all of the defendants’ accused products share fundamental
`
`elements in common——compliance with the H.264 video compression standard. The case law
`
`authority in this District demonstrates that this satisfies the requirements for permissive joinder.
`
`See, e. g., Helicos Biosciences Corp. v. Pacific Biosciences ofCalifornia, et al., Civ. No. 10-735-
`
`SLR (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2011) (“Helicos”) (finding “that there are common transactions or
`
`occurrences, and questions of fact or law that warrant joinder” because the accused products
`
`“share[] fundamental elements in common”). In addition, the same series of occurrences that
`
`forms the basis for liability in this case are the identical admissions of defendants’ advertising
`
`that their products comply with the H.264 standard, which includes FastVDO’s technology, and
`
`therefor the primary infringement question in this case is whether FastVDO’s patent covers the
`
`H.264 standard.
`
`2.
`
`Kodak’s contention that it will be prejudiced if it remains in the case due to “jury
`
`confusion” must be rejected because Kodak has made no colorable argument as to how its
`
`accused products are different from the accused products of the other defendants for
`
`1
`
`

`
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`infringement purposes. In any event, Kodak’s argument is premature, as any potential risk of
`
`“jury confusion” can be addressed later by a motion for separate trials. See Softview LLC v.
`
`Apple Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112476, *2-3 (D. Del. Sep. 30, 2011) (“[l]t would be
`
`premature for the Court to decide the issue of separate trials at this time. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
`
`20(b), 42(b). Any party is free to present a request for separate trials at any time up to the date
`
`of the final pre—trial conference”).
`
`3.
`
`The Federal Circuit has found that “[i]f a district court construes the claims [of a
`
`patent] and finds that the reach of the claims includes any device that practices a standard, then
`
`this can be sufficient for a finding of infringement.” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321,
`
`1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010). It would be an inefficient use ofjudicial resources to sever Kodak from
`
`this action and determine in a separate proceeding whether the claims of the FastVDO patent
`
`include any device that practices the H.264 standard. Id. at 1327 (“If a court determines that all
`
`implementations of a standard infringe the claims of a patent, then it would be a waste ofjudicial
`
`resources to separately analyze every accused product that undisputedly practices the standard.”).
`
`Moreover, severing Kodak from this action and transferring FastVDO’s claims against it to the
`
`Western District of New York would increase the risk of conflicting rulings on common
`
`questions of fact and law.
`
`4.
`
`Kodak’s motion to dismiss must be denied because the proper remedy for
`
`misjoinder is severance. See Wacoh Company v. Kionix, Inc., et al., Civ. No. 10-617-RGA (D.
`
`Del. Jan. 9, 2012) at 4.
`
`5.
`
`Kodak’s motion to transfer must be denied because:
`
`(1) the public and private
`
`interest factors that the Third Circuit applies in evaluating a motion to transfer favor keeping this
`
`case in Delaware; and (2) Kodak is currently pursuing its own patent infringement claims in
`
`Delaware. Given Kodak’s choice of Delaware as the forum for its own litigation, Kodak’s
`
`

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`arbitrary determination of when it is convenient for it to litigate in this district, and when it is not,
`
`is offensive to “the interests ofjustice.” See Eastman Kodak Company v. Shutterfly, Inc., Civ.
`
`No. 10-cv-1079 SLR (D. Del. Dec. 10, 2010); Motorola Mobility, Inc. v. Apple Inc., Civ. No. 10-
`
`cv-867 (GMS) (D. Del., Jan. 5, 2012) at 2 fn 2 (“Apple’s argument that this case should not be
`
`tried in Delaware for reasons of forum non conveniens fails to persuade the court and, in fact,
`
`strikes it as disingenuous. Specifically, as Apple, the plaintiff, and the court are well aware,
`
`Apple has filed patent infringement actions in Delaware... the court urges Apple and other
`
`parties to refrain from extending their advocacy to arguments that, as was the case here, appear
`
`less than forthright”). In addition to the case it filed and this case, Kodak is currently litigating
`
`four other cases (three of which are patent infringement actions) in this District and has not
`
`moved to transfer any of the other actions.
`
`III.
`
`CASE BACKGROUND
`
`FastVDO was founded by Dr. Pankaj Topiwala in 1998. See Declaration of Pankaj
`
`Topiwala in Support of FastVDO’s Answering Brief (“Topiwala Decl.”) 11 3. Dr. Topiwala
`
`earned his Ph.D. in mathematics in 1985 and worked in the U.S. defense industry for over a
`
`decade on applied mathematical concepts and video compression related technologies before
`
`starting his own business. Id. Dr. Topiwala and Dr. Trac Tran, FastVDO’s first employee and
`
`now a professor at Johns Hopkins University, developed the technology claimed in the FastVDO
`
`patent during the summer of 1998. Id. {I 4; Declaration of Alexander C.D. Giza in Support of
`
`FastVDO’s Answering Brief (“Giza Decl.”), Ex. 1.
`
`Dr. Topiwala’s and Dr. Tran’s work focused on a structural design approach to video
`
`encoder construction. FastVDO’s video encoder uses preprocessing, scaling and transforms to
`
`compress and decompress the data signals for digital images. The basic building blocks of
`
`FastVDO’s transform are butterfly steps, lifting steps, and scaling factors. See Complaint, Ex. A
`
`

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`at claim 12. The parameters for these building blocks can be optimized to meet predetermined
`
`performance goals.
`
`In April 2001, FastVDO presented its novel approach to the H.264 standard setting
`
`committee. Topiwala Decl. 116, Ex. 1. At this meeting, FastVDO demonstrated that
`
`computationally efficient 16 bit encoding could be performed on 4x4 coding blocks based on the
`
`methods claimed in the FastVDO patent. Id. This performance was far superior to the 32 bit
`
`encoding of other standards, including MPEG-1, 2, 4, H.261, H.263 (standards that operate on
`
`8x8 coding blocks), and JPEG2000 (a wavelet based transform). FastVDO’s technology was
`
`incorporated into others’ proposals, including one from Microsoft and Nokia, and into the H.264
`
`standard that was published in May of 2003.
`
`FastVDO’s technology is fundamental to the H.264 standard. This can be seen, for
`
`example, by comparing claim 23 of the FastVDO patent with the H.264 standard. Dependent
`
`claim 23 is a method for coding and decoding blocks of digital images that further specifies that
`
`the invertible linear transform in the transform coder is an approximation of the 4 point discrete
`
`cosine transform (“DCT”) that can be the matrix shown below:
`
`1
`
`2
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1
`
`l
`
`1
`
`-1 -2
`
`-1 -1
`
`1
`
`-2 2
`
`-1
`
`See Complaint, Ex. A at claim 23. The residual luma transform in the H.264 standard (the first
`
`4x4 matrix in equation 8-423) also uses this approximation of the 4 point DCT:
`
`The variable p is transformed producing transform coeficients c” ancormng to;
`
`1
`
`1
`
`1 Pm 9...
`
`Pm Pm 1
`
`1
`
`2
`
`1
`
`c”=
`
`1 *1 '2 Pu:
`
`-1 *1
`
`1 P20
`
`Pu
`
`P2:
`
`1 _ 3
`
`2
`
`"1 Pm P1”
`
`I
`
`-1 "
`
`(8423)
`
`PI:
`
`P2:
`
`P32
`
`PI)
`
`P23
`
`P33
`
`E
`
`3
`
`E
`
`

`
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`Giza Decl., Ex. 2 (ITU-T Rec.H.264 (11/2007) at 189. The remainder of claim elements can
`
`similarly be found in the H.264 standard.
`
`FastVDO’s complaint alleges that products that comply with the H.264 standard perform
`
`“digital image compression by coding and decoding blocks of digital image intensities with a
`
`block coder and with a transform coder that includes an invertible linear transform, which is
`
`representable as a cascade using at least one +/-1 butterfly step, at least one lifting step, and at
`
`least one scaling factor.” Complaint 1124. FastVDO is only accusing products that comply with
`
`the H.264 standard of infringement in this case. See Complaint W 25-41. Kodak advertises that
`
`some if its products, which are accused in this case, are H.264 compliant. Giza Decl., Ex. 3.
`
`IV.
`
`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`Kodak’s Motion to Sever Must Be Denied.
`
`1.
`
`Delaware Authorities Demonstrate That Kodak Has Been Properly
`Joined In This Action.
`
`The primary purpose of permissive joinder is “to promote trial convenience and expedite
`
`the final determination of disputes, thereby preventing multiple lawsuits.” See Dougherty v.
`
`Mieczkowski, 661 F. Supp. 267, 277 (D. Del. 1987). The Supreme Court has emphasized that the
`
`standard for joinder is liberal and that the rules should be applied “toward entertaining the
`
`broadest possible scope ofaction consistent with fairness to the parties; joinder ofclaims,
`
`parties, and remedies is strongly encouraged.” United Mine Workers ofAm. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S.
`
`715, 724 (1966) (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 20) (emphasis added).
`
`Kodak contends that it should be severed from this case because FastVDO’s claims of
`
`infringement against it does not arise out of the same “series of transactions or occurrences” as
`
`the claims that FastVDO has asserted against the other defendants because “Kodak is unrelated
`
`to the other Defendants.” D.I. 92 at 7. However, the recent decision in Helicos Biosciences
`
`Corp. v. Pacific Biosciences of California, et al., Civ. No. 10-73 5-SLR (D. Del. Dec. 22, 2011)
`
`5
`
`

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`(“Helicos”) demonstrates that Kodak had been properly joined in this action because all of the
`
`accused products share “fundamental elements in common” and have been accused of infringing
`
`the same patent. In addition, the same series of occurrences that forms the basis for liability in
`
`this case are the identical admissions of defendants’ advertising that their products comply with
`
`the H.264 standard, which includes FastVDO’s technology, and therefor the primary
`
`infringement question in this case is whether FastVDO’s patent covers the H.264 standard.
`
`In Helicos, the plaintiff alleged that three separate and unrelated defendants infringed
`
`different subsets of five of its asserted patents. See Civ. No. 10-73 5-SLR (D.I. 81 at 9). One of
`
`the defendants filed a motion to sever and argued that it was improperly joined because the
`
`“common transaction” requirement of Rule 20(a) had not been satisfied. See Civ. No. 10-73 5-
`
`SLR (D.I. 74 at 7-9). Judge Robinson rejected this argument and, crediting the plaintiff’s
`
`undisputed allegations that the accused technologies “share[] fundamental elements in common,”
`
`found “that there are common transactions or occurrences, and questions of fact or law that
`
`warrant joinder.” Helicos at 4 (reasoning that defendants’ different accused technologies and
`
`products either commonly rely on “detecting labeled nucleotides as a polymerase, the use of four
`
`nucleotides with distinct fluorescent labels and optical detection zones limited to the immediate
`
`vicinity of the polymerase” or “perform single molecule sequencing using optical detection of
`
`nucleic sequencing using optical detection of nucleic sequencing”).
`
`The facts supporting joinder in this case are even stronger than in Helicos. Kodak does
`
`not dispute that all of the accused products in this case share fundamental elements in common—
`
`compliance with the H.264 standard. The Federal Circuit has held that: “a district court may
`
`rely on an industry standard in analyzing infringement. If a district court construes the claims
`
`and finds that the reach of the claims includes any device that practices a standard, then this can
`
`be sufficient for a finding of infringement.
`
`[I]f an accused product operates in accordance
`
`

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`with a standard, then comparing the claims to that standard is the same as comparing the claims
`
`to the accused product.” Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc., 620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010). It
`
`would be an inefficient use ofjudicial resources to sever Kodak from this action and determine
`
`in a separate proceeding whether the claims of the FastVDO patent includes any device that
`
`practices the H.264 standard. Id. at 1327 (“If a court determines that all implementations of a
`
`standard infringe the claims of a patent, then it would be a waste ofjudicial resources to
`
`separately analyze every accused product that undisputedly practices the standard”). Kodak has
`
`elected to use the H.264 standard, just like all the other defendants in this case, and thus the
`
`promulgation of the H.264 standard with FastVDO’s technology satisfies the common
`
`occurrence requirement for joinder.
`
`Kodak and the other defendants in this action have all taken steps to conform their
`
`products to the H.264 standard and the accused products all share common “fundamental
`
`elements” for infringement purposes. See Helicos at 4; Softview LLC v. Apple Inc., 2011 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 112476, *1-3 (D. Del. Sep. 30, 2011) (“Softview”) (finding “the requirements for
`
`permissive joinder are satisfied” and granting the plaintiff leave to amend its complaint to accuse
`
`additional defendants of infringing the asserted patents over defendants’ objection that there
`
`would be jury confusion); SRI International, Inc. v. Internet Security Systems, 2005 U.S. Dist.
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`LEXIS 6797, *1 1-12 (D. Del. 2005) (“SR1”) (finding that there “are common transactions or
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`occurrences, and questions of law that warrant joinder” and denying the motions to sever filed by
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`two unrelated defendants). This is not a case where different patents are alleged to have been
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`infringed by different means by different defendants. See Wacoh Company v. Kionix, Inc., et al.,
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`Civ. No. 10-617-RGA (D. Del. Jan. 9, 2012) at 3. Instead, this case involves defendant A
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`infringing patent B by product C’s compliance with standard D, and other defendants infringing
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`the same patent B by other products compliant with the same standard D. All defendants
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`infringe the same patent by making, using, or selling products that use the same H.264 standard.
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`Indeed, Kodak’s and the other defendants’ advertising and marketing materials admit that their
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`accused products complies with the H.264 standard. This same series of occurrences simplifies
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`the infringement analysis in the case to require primarily a showing that the FastVDO patent
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`covers the H.264 standard.
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`The Delaware authorities relied on by Kodak were decided prior to SRI, Softview, and
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`Helicos, and are not controlling because they involved unique factual circumstances that are not
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`present in this case. In Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415 (D. Del.
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`2004), one of the defendants was severed “in the interests ofjustice” because the other defendant
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`had chosen not to mount a defense. Id. at 418 (“Because Hango is accused of patent
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`infringement and will stand defenseless at trial, there is the real prospect that the jury will
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`assume that CMT is liable for patent infringement by association with Hango”). Paine, Webber,
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`Jackson & Curtis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983),
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`was a declaratory judgment action for non-infringement and invalidity, and the court refused to
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`allow the defendant to convert the action into a multi-party infringement suit with a third party
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`complaint. Id. at 1369-72. The unique factual circumstances of these cases—which do not exist
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`here—do not justify severing Kodak from this suit.
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`2.
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`The AIA is Inapplicable and Kodak’s Cited Cases Are Factually
`Distinct.
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`Kodak admits that FastVDO filed its complaint before the America Invents Act (“AIA”)
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`took effect. D.l. 92 at 1. Nevertheless, Kodak invites the Court to apply the new joinder
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`provision in these proceedings by arguing that the AIA simply “confirmed” the “great weight of
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`preexisting precedent that long held that unrelated patent infringement defendants may not be
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`joined in one suit.” Id. at 5. This is not accurate. The fact that Congress added a new joinder
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`provision to the statute underscores that, before the new section 299 of the AIA, joinder in patent
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`8
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`cases allowed for multi-defendant actions where similar products were accused of infringement.
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`See S0ftVz'ew LLC v. Apple Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 140540, *5-6 (D. Del. Dec. 7, 2011)
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`(denying motion for reconsideration of order granting Softview leave to amend its complaint)
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`(“Section 299 provides that ‘accused infringers may not be joined in one action as defendants or
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`counterclaim defendants, or have their actions consolidated for trial, based solely on allegations
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`that they each have infringed the patent or patents in suit.’ However, as Defendants concede,
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`‘this new section 299 applies to civil actions ‘commenced on or after the date of the enactment of
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`this Act.’”). Kodak’s mistaken understanding of this provision would render it superfluous and
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`thus fails to support its argument.
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`Kodak relies on six cases from outside of this District to support its contention of
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`improper joinder in this patent case and claims that “almost all jurisdictions agree” that the
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`requirements for joinder have not been satisfied by FastVDO’s complaint. This is simply
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`incorrect} but more importantly Kodak’s overbroad argument is divorced from the proper fact-
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`based analysis. To the extent that these out-of-district cases are instructive, they must be
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`' See, e.g.. Alford .S‘qfe.*.y Ser'vs.. Inc. v. Hot'—Het:r', 1':-:c'., 2010 U.S. Dist. LI£XIS 98152, at *2? (ED.
`La. Aug. 23, 2010) (“[T'_|he majority [of courts] hold the view that joinder is proper in patent
`infringement suits"); Eofos Tec'h.s'., Inc.
`12. Adobe Sys..
`l'm'., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104125, at
`*l5-16 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 28, 2010) (_“[T]he record before the CoLI1't does not show that
`the
`products or methods at issue are so dil'ferent that determining infringement in one case is less
`proper or efficient
`than determining infringement
`in multiple cases”); Mctrmarech,
`Inc.
`v.
`C.‘oun.tr_v Life, LLC, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 75353 (ND. Tex. July 26, 2010) (“All of the
`defendants’ allegedly infringing products are dietary supplement products that allegedly embody
`the invention disclosed and claimed in the 80'? patent. Therefore, the Court finds that Roex’s and
`the other defendants’ alleged infringement arise out of the same transaction or occurrence,
`satisfying the first requirement of Rule 20(a)(2)"); Actrron 1:. Generee Inc. 2009 U.S. Dist.
`LEXIS 86855 (13.1). Tex. Sep. 22, 2009) (“|'_1*l]ach of the defendants sells a license plate
`recognition system that allegedly infringes claims 1 and 7 of the ‘669 patent. The similarity of
`the defendants’ products is sufficient
`to satisfy the nucleus of fact or
`law test“); Sprint
`(fommtms. Co.. LP. v. Theglobe.c*om, Ema, 233 F.R.D. 615, 61? (D. Kan. 2006); 11/Iyrttcrif. Ltd.
`1:.
`America Online, Inc., 223 F.R.D. 455, 457 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (“Defendants urge the Court to
`adopt the rule that
`infringement by different defendants does not satisfy Rule 20’s same
`transaction requirement, but the Court finds that this interpretation of Rule 20 is a hypertcchnical
`one that perhaps fails to recognize the realities of complex, and particularly patent, litigation").
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`

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`factually similar. See, e. g., Microunity Sys. Eng'g v. Acer Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 112564,
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`at * 16-17 (E.D. Tex. Sep. 30, 2011) (finding the common “series of transactions or occurrences”
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`prong of Rule 20(a) was satisfied “because infringement for all products and services will
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`involve to some extent their implementation and use of an ARM architecture and instruction
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`set.”) (emphasis added).
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`In short, FastVDO filed its complaint before the AIA became effective and Kodak should
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`not be severed from this action because FastVDO’s infringement allegations against all of the
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`accused products in this case demonstrate that the fundamental elements that these products have
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`in common arise from the same occurrence of the promulgation of the H.264 standard with
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`FastVDO’s technology and the same series of occurrences—the defendants’ admissions that
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`their products are H.264 compliant.
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`3.
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`K0dak’s Claims to Prejudice are Unfounded and Speculative.
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`Kodak contends that if it remains in this case “there will inevitably be jury confusion,
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`waste ofjudicial resources, and unfair prejudice due to complex technical arguments involving
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`multiple, unrelated products and defendants.” D.I. 92 at 2. Yet, Kodak ignores the fact that
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`FastVDO’s infringement allegations are based on the H.264 standard and makes no attempt to
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`explain how its accused products are different for infringement purposes then the accused
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`products of the other defendants. It would be an inefficient use ofjudicial resources to sever
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`Kodak from this action and determine in a separate proceeding whether the claims of the
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`FastVDO patent cover any device that practices the H.264 standard. Fujitsu Ltd. v. Netgear Inc.,
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`620 F.3d 1321, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“If a court determines that all implementations of a
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`standard infringe the claims of a patent, then it would be a waste ofjudicial resources to
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`separately analyze every accused product that undisputedly practices the standard”); see also
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`SR] at *1l-12 (holding multiple claim construction hearings and determining defendants’
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`10
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