Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 1 of 21 PageID #: 492
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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
`
`C. A. No. 11-797 (RGA)
`
`JURY TRIAL DEMANDED
`
`:::::::::::
`
`FASTVDO LLC,
`
`Plaintiff,
`
`v.
`
`APPLE INC., et al.,
`
`Defendants.
`
`OPENING BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF EASTMAN KODAK COMPANY’S
`MOTION TO DISMISS OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,
`TO SEVER AND TRANSFER
`
`Dated: December 19, 2011
`
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`
` /s/ Denise S. Kraft
`Denise S. Kraft (I.D. No. 2778)
`Aleine Porterfield (I.D. No. 5053)
`919 N. Market Street
`Suite 1500
`Wilmington, DE 19801
`Phone: 302-468-5700
`Fax:
`302-394-2341
`denise.kraft@dlapiper.com
`aleine.porterfield@dlapiper.com
`
`Attorneys for Defendant Eastman Kodak
`Company
`
`OF COUNSEL:
`
`Sean C. Cunningham (admitted pro hac)
`John D. Kinton (admitted pro hac)
`David R. Knudson (admitted pro hac)
`DLA PIPER LLP (US)
`401 B Street, Suite 1700
`San Diego, CA 92101-4297
`Phone: (619) 699-2900
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 2 of 21 PageID #: 493
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`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS...................................................................1
`
`III.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT...........................................................................................2
`
`IV.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS..................................................................................................2
`
`V.
`
`ARGUMENT .....................................................................................................................4
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Dismiss or Sever FastVDO’s Claims Against
`Kodak for Improper Joinder. ...................................................................................4
`
`1.
`
`FastVDO Does Not Allege Any Common Transaction
`or Occurrence Among the Unrelated Defendants and
`Their Unrelated Accused Products..............................................................4
`
`2. Misjoinder Requires Dismissal or, at a Minimum,
`Severance.....................................................................................................6
`
`3.
`
`The Burden on the Court and Kodak in Litigating the
`Misjoined Claims Far Outweighs Any Potential
`Prejudice to FastVDO..................................................................................7
`
`B.
`
`If Severed, the Claims Against Kodak Should Be Transferred
`to the Western District of New York.......................................................................8
`
`1.
`
`2.
`
`3.
`
`Venue is Proper in the Western District of New York................................9
`
`The Private Interest Factors Favor Transfer..............................................10
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`The Public Interest Factors Favor Transfer. ..............................................14
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`VI. CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................15
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`CASES
`
`Affymetrix, Inc. v. Synteni, Inc.,
`28 F. Supp. 2d 192 (D. Del. 1998) ..........................................................................................13
`
`Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc.,
`31 F. Supp. 2d 620 (N.D. Ill. 1998).......................................................................................5, 6
`
`Ballard Med. Prods. v. Concord Labs., Inc.,
`700 F. Supp. 796 (D. Del. 1988) .............................................................................................10
`
`Colt Defense LLC v. Heckler & Koch Defense, Inc.,
`2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22, 2004)...................................................5, 7, 8
`
`DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto,
`467 F.3d 842 (3d Cir. 2006) ..................................................................................................4, 6
`
`Finisar Corp. v. Source Photonics, Inc.,
`No. C-10-0032, slip op. (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010).....................................................................8
`
`Forest Labs Inc. v. Cobalt Labs. Inc.,
`2009 WL 605745 (D. Del. Mar. 9, 2009)..................................................................................9
`
`High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc.
`353 F. Supp. 2d 487 (M.D. Pa. 2005)......................................................................................10
`
`Human Genome Scis., Inc. v. Genentech Inc.,
`2011 WL 2911797 (D. Del. July 18, 2011).................................................................10, 13, 14
`
`In re Acer America Corp.,
`626 F.3d (Fed. Cir. 2010) ........................................................................................................15
`
`In re Genentech, Inc.,
`566 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009) .........................................................................................13, 15
`
`In re Hoffmann-La Roche Inc.,
`587 F.3d 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................15
`
`In re Link_A_Media Devices Corp.,
`2011 WL 6004566 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 2, 2011)............................................................................11
`
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 4 of 21 PageID #: 495
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`In re Nintendo Co., Ltd.,
`589 F.3d 1194 (Fed. Cir. 2009) ...............................................................................................12
`
`In re TS Tech USA Corp.,
`551 F.3d 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2008) ...............................................................................................12
`
`Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co.,
`55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995) ......................................................................................9, 10, 13, 14
`
`Magee v. Essex-Tec Corp.,
`704 F. Supp. 543 (D. Del. 1988) .............................................................................................10
`
`Marvell Int’l Ltd. v. Link_A_Media Devices Corp.
`2011 WL 2293999 (D. Del. June 8, 2011) ..............................................................................11
`
`Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. Net2Phone, Inc.,
`2000 WL 34494824 (D. Minn. June 26, 2006) .....................................................................5, 6
`
`N.J. Mach. Inc. v. Alford Indus. Inc.,
`1991 WL 340196 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) ....................................................................................4
`
`Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
`564 F. Supp. 1358 (D. Del. 1983) .........................................................................................4, 5
`
`Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc.,
`262 F. Supp. 2d 122 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) .......................................................................................5
`
`Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp.,
`220 F.R.D. 415 (D. Del. 2004)..........................................................................................4, 5, 7
`
`Ricoh Co. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
`817 F. Supp. 473 (D.N.J. 1993)...............................................................................................12
`
`Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp.,
`WL 148052 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011).....................................................................................4, 6
`
`Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp.,
`431 F.2d 22 (3d Cir. 1970) ..................................................................................................9, 10
`
`Van Dusen v. Barrack,
`376 U.S. 612 (1964) ..................................................................................................................9
`
`Virgin Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Enters. Ltd.,
`201 F. Supp. 2d 294 (D. Del. 2002) ........................................................................................10
`
`Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Pan Am. Res., Inc.,
`775 F. Supp. 759 (D. Del. 1991) .............................................................................................11
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 5 of 21 PageID #: 496
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`White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp.,
`199 F.3d 140 (3d Cir. 1999) ......................................................................................................8
`
`WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3COM Corp.,
`2010 WL 3895047 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) .........................................................................5, 7
`
`STATUTES
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1400 .............................................................................................................................9
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1404 .............................................................................................................................9
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1406 .............................................................................................................................9
`
`28 U.S.C. § 1631 .............................................................................................................................9
`
`35 U.S.C. § 299 ...........................................................................................................................1, 5
`
`RULES
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 ...................................................................................................................passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 21 ...................................................................................................................passim
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 ............................................................................................................................7
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 6 of 21 PageID #: 497
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`I.
`
`INTRODUCTION
`
`Just one week before the America Invents Act took effect, Plaintiff FastVDO LLC filed
`
`this lawsuit, accusing 17 separate defendants of patent infringement based on nothing more than
`
`the allegation that each defendant separately infringes FastVDO’s patent. FastVDO’s apparent
`
`race to beat the passage of the America Invents Act was a futile gesture, because under already
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`existing federal law, FastVDO’s complaint is a classic case of misjoinder. Federal Rule of Civil
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`Procedure 20(a)(2) permits multiple defendants to be joined in a single action only if the
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`plaintiff’s claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence and there is a question of law or
`
`fact common to all defendants. The majority of district courts—including this one—have long
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`recognized that both elements must be satisfied for proper joinder, and Congress confirmed this
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`when it enacted new Section 299 of the America Invents Act.
`
`FastVDO alleges unrelated patent infringement claims against unrelated defendants, but
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`does not and cannot allege any conspiracy or joint action among the defendants or their accused
`
`products to justify joinder. Federal Rules 20 and 21 therefore require that the claims against
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`Eastman Kodak Company be dismissed, or at the least, severed from the claims against the other
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`defendants. If the Court elects to sever the claims against Kodak rather than dismissing them,
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`Kodak respectfully requests that the Court transfer the severed claims to the Western District of
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`New York, which is Kodak’s domestic center of gravity where the bulk of the allegedly
`
`infringing activities, relevant witnesses and potentially relevant sources of proof are located.
`
`II.
`
`NATURE AND STAGE OF PROCEEDINGS
`
`FastVDO filed this lawsuit on September 9, 2011, alleging that Kodak and 16 other
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`unrelated defendants infringe United States Patent No. RE 40,081 (“the ’081 patent”). (Dkt. 1
`
`¶¶ 2-18.) On October 31, 2011, FastVDO filed a first amended complaint naming two more
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`unrelated defendants, bringing the total number of separate defendants to 19. (Dkt. 34 at ¶¶ 2-
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 7 of 21 PageID #: 498
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`20.) Several defendants have obtained extensions to answer until December 19, 2011. No initial
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`conference has been set and discovery has not yet begun.
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`III.
`
`SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
`
`1.
`
`Kodak was misjoined in this lawsuit. Under Rule 20(a)(2), joinder of multiple
`
`defendants is permitted only if any right to relief is asserted against them jointly or severally, or
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`arises out of the same transaction or occurrence. FastVDO cannot satisfy either requirement.
`
`Kodak is unrelated to the other Defendants and produce their accused product separately.
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`FastVDO’s accusations that their different products infringe a patent do not satisfy the
`
`requirement of a common transaction or occurrence. Joinder is improper, and dismissal or
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`severance of Kodak is required under Rule 21.
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`2.
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`Furthermore, severance would be appropriate even absent misjoinder. If Kodak
`
`remains in this case, there will inevitably be jury confusion, waste of judicial resources, and
`
`unfair prejudice due to complex technical arguments involving multiple, unrelated products and
`
`defendants. A separate case restricted to issues concerning Kodak best avoids these problems.
`
`3.
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`Finally, the claims against Kodak should be transferred to the Western District of
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`New York. FastVDO’s claims against Kodak have no connection to Delaware. Neither
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`FastVDO nor Kodak is incorporated in Delaware, and neither party has a place (much less a
`
`principal place) of business in Delaware. The vast majority of likely witnesses, relevant product
`
`and sales documents, and development and business activities are located in Rochester, New
`
`York, and none are located in Delaware. Accordingly, the single most suitable venue for this
`
`case is the Western District of New York.
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`IV.
`
`STATEMENT OF FACTS
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`Plaintiff FastVDO is incorporated in and has its principle place of business in Florida.
`
`(Dkt. 34 at ¶ 1.) Defendant Kodak is a New Jersey corporation headquartered in Rochester, New
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 8 of 21 PageID #: 499
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`York. (Dkt. 67 at ¶ 7.) Kodak’s regional headquarters, located at 343 State Street in Rochester,
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`is home to more than seven thousand employees, and is the U.S. base for many of Kodak’s
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`activities, including those related to its digital camera business. (See Declaration of Steven B.
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`Decker, filed concurrently herewith (“Decker Decl.” at ¶ 4.) Most, if not all, of the key
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`managers, teams and personnel knowledgeable about the structure, development, function,
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`testing operation, and sales and marketing of the accused products are also concentrated in the
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`Rochester area. (Decker Decl. at ¶ 6.) FastVDO accuses Kodak (and the other defendants) of
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`“making, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing H.264/MPEG-4 Part 10/AVC compliant
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`camcorders and digital cameras.” (Dkt. 34 at ¶ 30.) The Kodak camera products named in the
`
`complaint are generally manufactured outside of the United States, but virtually all of the
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`business decisions related to these products are made in Rochester. (Decker Decl. at ¶ 5.)
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`Rochester is the location from which Kodak performed most of its digital camera development
`
`over the years. (Id.). Kodak’s United States digital camera product sales, service, finance,
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`supply chain, marketing, and licensing activities are also all centered in Rochester. (Id.). All of
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`the Kodak documents that will be relevant to this case, such as product manuals, specifications,
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`marketing materials, and sales and revenue information, are also located at Kodak’s headquarters
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`in Rochester. (Decker Decl. at ¶ 7.)
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`The other defendants named in this lawsuit are many of Kodak’s competitors in the
`
`digital camera market. (Decker Decl. at ¶ 8.) Other than two sets of entities related to each
`
`other,1 FastVDO’s complaint does not allege any connection or relationship among the
`
`defendants, nor does the complaint allege any connection among the alleged acts of
`
`
`1 FastVDO named Nikon America, Inc. and Nikon, Inc., and Sony Corp. of North America, Inc.
`and Sony Electronics, Inc. FastVDO generally treats the related companies as one entity,
`respectively.
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 9 of 21 PageID #: 500
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`infringement. (Dkt. 34 at ¶¶ 2-20.) Rather, the complaint alleges separate infringement claims
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`against each defendant based on each defendant’s own allegedly infringing products. (Dkt. 34 at
`
`¶¶ 25-41.) The complaint does not allege that the defendants’ products bear any relationship to
`
`one another, nor does the complaint allege that the defendants’ purported infringement is part of
`
`a common occurrence or transaction.
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`V.
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`ARGUMENT
`
`A.
`
`The Court Should Dismiss or Sever FastVDO’s Claims Against Kodak for
`Improper Joinder.
`
`1.
`
`FastVDO Does Not Allege Any Common Transaction or Occurrence
`Among the Unrelated Defendants and Their Unrelated Accused
`Products.
`
`Joinder under Rule 20(a)(2) requires both transactional relatedness and a question of law
`
`or fact common to all defendants:
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`Persons…may be joined in one action as defendants if:
`
`(A) any right to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or
`in the alternative with respect to or arising out of the same
`transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences;
`and
`
`(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
`arise in the action.
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2) (emphasis added). This rule requires a common transaction or
`
`occurrence for joinder, in addition to a “question of law or fact common to all defendants.” See,
`
`e.g., Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 564
`
`F. Supp. 1358, 1370 (D. Del. 1983) (“Both tests must be satisfied if joinder is to be permitted.”);
`
`Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 417 (D. Del. 2004) (same); see
`
`also DirecTV, Inc. v. Leto, 467 F.3d 842, 844 (3d Cir. 2006) (same); Rudd v. Lux Prods. Corp.,
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`No. 09-cv-6957, 2011 WL 148052 at *2 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011) (same); N.J. Mach. Inc. v.
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 10 of 21 PageID #: 501
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`Alford Indus. Inc., No 89-cv-1879, 1991 WL 340196 at *1 (D.N.J. Oct. 7, 1991) (citing Paine,
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`564 F. Supp. at 1370), aff’d without op., 983 F.2d 1087 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
`
`In patent suits, this Court has ruled that “[a]llegations of infringement against two
`
`unrelated parties based on different acts do not arise from the same transaction.” Philips, 220
`
`F.R.D. at 417; see also Paine, 564 F. Supp. at 1371 (misjoinder if “no allegation that the acts of
`
`infringement are connected in any manner”). Almost all jurisdictions agree.2 “The
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`overwhelming authority…indicates that allegations against multiple and unrelated defendants for
`
`independent acts of patent, copyright, and/or trademark infringement do not set forth claims
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`arising from the same transaction or occurrence within the meaning of Rule 20(a).” Colt Defense
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`LLC v. Heckler & Koch Defense, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690, *13 (E.D. Va. Oct. 22,
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`2004).
`
`Congress recently endorsed this majority view as the correct reading of Rule 20(a)(2).
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`The America Invents Act, 35 U.S.C. § 299(b) (enacted Sept. 16, 2011), expressly bars joinder of
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`unrelated defendants based on allegations of infringing the same patent, with the legislative
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`history reflecting Congress’s disapproval of “problems occasioned by the joinder of defendants
`
`[with] tenuous connections to the underlying disputes in patent infringement suits,” and
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`confirming its intent to “legislatively abrogate[] the construction of Rule 20(a) adopted in
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`[minority cases,] effectively conforming these courts’ jurisprudence to that followed by a
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`
`2 See, e.g., Philips Elecs. N. Am. Corp. v. Contec Corp., 220 F.R.D. 415, 418 (D. Del. 2004);
`Pergo, Inc. v. Alloc, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 2d 122, 128 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“the fact that two parties
`may manufacture or sell similar products…is not sufficient to join unrelated parties as
`defendants”); Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v. Net2Phone, Inc., 2000 WL 34494824 at *6 (D. Minn. June
`26, 2006) (“where patent infringement claims are brought against multiple, unrelated defendants,
`courts have held joinder to be inappropriate”); Androphy v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 31 F. Supp.
`2d 620, 623 (N.D. Ill. 1998); WiAV Networks, LLC v. 3COM Corp., 2010 WL 3895047 at *2-*3
`(N.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2010) (joinder inappropriate as to “unrelated and competing defendants for
`their own independent acts of patent infringement.”). Congress recently noted that the Eastern
`District of Texas holds the exception to the majority view.
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 11 of 21 PageID #: 502
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`majority of jurisdictions.” See H.R. Rep. No. 112-98, at 54-55 & n.61 (2011) (citing Rudd with
`
`approval). The America Invents Act thus confirms the great weight of preexisting precedent that
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`has long held that unrelated patent infringement defendants may not be joined in one suit.
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`Here, FastVDO’s complaint does not even attempt to satisfy the first prong of the joinder
`
`rule—the requirement that joined claims arise from the “same transaction, occurrence, or series
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`of transactions or occurrences.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). As courts have recognized, joinder
`
`is inappropriate where the “operative facts of each transaction”—here, the offer and sale of
`
`accused products—are “distinct and unrelated to any other.” See, e.g., Multi-Tech Sys., Inc. v.
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`Net2Phone, Inc., 2000 WL 34494824, at *6. And joinder is inappropriate where the defendants
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`“are separate companies that independently design, manufacture and sell different products in
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`competition with each other.” Androphy, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 623. In this case, Kodak and the
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`other defendants are separate companies that independently market and sell different products,
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`and each company’s sales of those products are distinct and unrelated to one another. The fact
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`that all of the accused products are alleged to infringe the same patent does not create the
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`necessary “common transaction or occurrence” among the defendants. FastVDO’s complaint
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`fails the joinder requirement on the first prong of the joinder test.
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`2.
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`Misjoinder Requires Dismissal or, at a Minimum, Severance.
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`In the event of misjoinder, the Federal Rules direct courts to either drop the misjoined
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`parties or sever the claims against them. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21; See also DirecTV, 467 F.3d at 845
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`(“To remedy misjoinder...the court has two remedial options.”). As set forth above, misjoinder
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`exists here because the only thing Kodak has in common with the other defendants is that Kodak
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`is accused of infringing the same patent. Dismissal of the claims against Kodak is therefore the
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`appropriate remedy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. FastVDO’s tactic of filing its complaint just before the
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`effective date of the America Invents Act also warrants dismissal of the claims against Kodak.
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`If the Court decides not to dismiss FastVDO’s claims against Kodak, those claims should
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`be severed from the claims against the other defendants pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 21. The
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`possibility the Court might later consolidate cases against unrelated defendants before trial under
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`Rule 42(a) does not change this result. See Philips, 220 F.R.D. at 418; see also Colt, 2004 U.S.
`
`Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *16 (“[T]o the extent that considerations of judicial economy can factor
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`into the court’s decision whether to sever..., they do so only after the plaintiff has first satisfied
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`the requirements of Rule 20(a).”).
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`3.
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`The Burden on the Court and Kodak in Litigating the Misjoined
`Claims Far Outweighs Any Potential Prejudice to FastVDOs.
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`If the misjoined claims are allowed to stand, it is the Court and Kodak who will face a
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`significant litigation burden, not FastVDO. Preserving the misjoined claims in a single suit will
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`force Kodak to participate in many aspects of the case that have no relevance to Kodak. For
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`instance, Kodak will be required to review numerous pleadings, motions and discovery, and to
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`attend depositions, hearings and conferences that would have little or no bearing on issues
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`directly impacting Kodak. See WiAV Networks, 2010 WL 3895047 at *3 (“[W]hatever common
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`issues may exist from device to device will be overwhelmed by the individual issues of claim
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`construction, damages, willfulness, and discovery supervision.”). Furthermore, Kodak faces a
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`substantial risk of jury confusion resulting from evidence and arguments directed at the other
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`defendants’ accused products and from the jury’s views about alleged infringement by the other
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`defendants. Colt Defense, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 28690, at *15 (misjoined claims create
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`“possibility of jury confusion over the evidence required to prove these claims”); Philips, 220
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`F.R.D. at 418 (finding substantial risk of prejudice to Defendant A if jury believes that
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`Defendant A is linked to Defendant B). Moreover, joinder increases the risk of improper
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`disclosure of highly confidential information between competing Defendants. Severance and
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 13 of 21 PageID #: 504
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`transfer will also best utilize judicial resources and resolve Plaintiff’s claims efficiently. See
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`White v. ABCO Eng’g Corp., 199 F.3d 140, 145 (3d Cir. 1999). Absent severance, a jury would
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`have to parse Kodak’s evidence over 18 other defendants and their products, as well as numerous
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`potentially conflicting arguments. Severance, by contrast, permits Kodak to present its own
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`defenses without unnecessary confusion.
`
`No doubt FastVDO will argue that judicial economy and efficiency warrant preserving
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`the misjoined claims in a single lawsuit. Courts have repeatedly rejected this argument, See, e.g.,
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`Colt Defense, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS, at *16 (“[T]o the extent that considerations of judicial
`
`economy can factor into the court’s decision whether to sever the claims against [defendant],
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`they do so only after the plaintiff has first satisfied the requirements of Rule 20(a).”), and so has
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`Congress. Concerns for judicial economy do not warrant preserving FastVDO’s misjoined
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`claims in any event. This case is in its infancy. No discovery has been served, no depositions
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`have been taken, and several defendants have yet to file their Answer. Any delay stemming from
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`dismissal of the claims against Kodak is FastVDO’s own fault for violating Rule 20(a)(2), and
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`dismissal of Kodak will not delay Kodak’s case against the other defendants in any event. On
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`the other hand, the burden on the Court from managing a single lawsuit involving 19 separate
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`defendants and all of the different accused products will be enormous. See Finisar Corp. v.
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`Source Photonics, Inc., No. C-10-0032, slip op. at 1 (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2010) (“The burden
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`[plaintiff’s] maneuver would place on a single judge—who would get credit for only one civil
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`action under our assignment system—would be erroneous.”).
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`B.
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`If Severed, the Claims Against Kodak Should Be Transferred to the
`Western District of New York.
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`If the Court elects to sever the claims against Kodak from those against the other
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`defendants, Kodak respectfully requests that those claims be transferred to the Western District
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`WEST\226665808.1
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`8
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 14 of 21 PageID #: 505
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`of New York for the convenience of the parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. A
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`district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it may have
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`been brought “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice.” 28
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`U.S.C. § 1404(a). The goal of § 1404 “is to prevent waste of time, energy, and money and to
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`protect litigants, witnesses, and the public against unnecessary inconvenience and expense.” Van
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`Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 616 (1964).
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`Transfer under § 1404(a) is considered under a framework of public and private interest
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`factors. Jumara v. State Farm Ins. Co., 55 F.3d 873, 883 (3d Cir. 1995). While the Third Circuit
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`has stated that transfer should not be granted unless the “balance of convenience” weighs
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`“strongly” in favor of transfer, Shutte v. Armco Steel Corp., 431 F.2d 22, 25 (3d Cir. 1970), the
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`transfer inquiry is broad and requires examination of “all relevant factors,” Jumara, 55 F.3d at
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`879. This Court has noted the similarities in the transfer analyses under §§ 1631, 1406(a), and
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`1404(a), see Forest Labs Inc. v. Cobalt Labs. Inc., No. 08-cv-21, 2009 WL 605745 at *6 n.5 (D.
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`Del. Mar. 9, 2009), and the factors below confirm transfer is in the interests of justice. Most or
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`all relevant factors favor transfer, because neither FastVDO nor Kodak is located, incorporated,
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`or transacts pertinent business in Delaware, and the nucleus of known evidence, people, and
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`activities pertinent to the claims lies in Rochester, New York.
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`1.
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`Venue is Proper in the Western District of New York.
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`A district court may transfer a case to a district where the case could have been brought.
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`See §§ 1404(a), 1406(a). Under § 1400(b), a patent infringement suit “may be brought in the
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`judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of
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`infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” Here, Kodak’s principle place
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`of business is in the Western District of New York (Rochester), and sells and/or offers for sale
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`WEST\226665808.1
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`9
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 15 of 21 PageID #: 506
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`the accused products there (alleged acts of infringement). (Dkt. 34 at ¶ 7; Dkt. 67 at ¶ 7).
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`Accordingly, FastVDO could have brought suit in the Western District of New York.
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`2.
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`The Private Interest Factors Favor Transfer.
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`Private interests considered for transfer include “plaintiff’s forum preference as
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`manifested in the original choice...; the defendant’s preference...; whether the claim arose
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`elsewhere...; the convenience of the parties as indicated by their relative physical and financial
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`condition...; the convenience of the witnesses—but only to the extent [they] may actually be
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`unavailable for trial in one of the fora...; and the location of books and records....” Jumara, 55
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`F.3d at 879; Human Genome Scis., Inc. v. Genentech Inc., Nos. 11-cv-82, -156, -328, 2011 WL
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`2911797 at *6 (D. Del. July 18, 2011). All relevant factors favor transfer.
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`The parties’ forum preferences favor transfer. While “‘a plaintiff’s choice of a proper
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`forum…should not be lightly disturbed,’” Shutte, 431 F.2d at 25 (citation omitted), it is well
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`established that “if the plaintiff chooses a forum which has ‘no connection to himself or the
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`subject matter of the suit, and is thus not his “home turf,” the burden on the defendant is reduced
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`and it is easier for the defendant to show that the balance of convenience favors transfer.’”
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`Ballard Med. Prods. v. Concord Labs., Inc., 700 F. Supp. 796, 800 (D. Del. 1988) (citation
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`omitted); see also High River Ltd. P’ship v. Mylan Labs., Inc. 353 F. Supp. 2d 487, 498-99
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`(M.D. Pa. 2005) (“[T]he plaintiff’s choice is entitled to less weight where the plaintiff chooses a
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`forum which is neither his home nor the situs of the occurrence upon which the suit is based.”);
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`Virgin Wireless, Inc. v. Virgin Enters. Ltd., 201 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (D. Del. 2002) (granting
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`transfer); Magee v. Essex-Tec Corp., 704 F. Supp. 543, 547 (D. Del. 1988) (same). This is
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`precisely the situation here: FastVDO is not incorporated or located in Delaware, but rather is
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`incorporated in and has its principle place of business in Florida. (Dkt. 34 at ¶ 1.) In its
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`amended complaint, FastVDO identifies no local facilities, offices, employees, or activities in
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`WEST\226665808.1
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`10
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 92 Filed 12/19/11 Page 16 of 21 PageID #: 507
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`Delaware, other than this lawsuit, that could possibly establish Delaware as FastVDO’s “home
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`turf.” Nor is this District even “near the plaintiff’s principal place of business” (in Florida) or
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`“consistent with the plaintiff’s legitimate concerns,” such as the subject matter of the case. Cf.
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`Waste Distillation Tech., Inc. v. Pan Am. Res., Inc., 775 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Del. 199