Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 1 of 8 PageID #: 576
`Case 1:11—cv—OO797—RGA Document 94-6
`Filed 12/19/11 Page 1 of 8 Page|D #: 576
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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 2 of 8 PageID #: 577
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.
`
`United States District Court,
`D. Minnesota.
`MULTI–TECH SYSTEMS, INC., Plaintiff,
`v.
`NET2PHONE, INC., a Delaware corporation, Vocal-
`tec Communications, Inc., a Delaware corporation,
`Vocaltec Communications, Ltd., an Israeli corpora-
`tion, Dialpad.com, Inc., a California corporation,
`MediaRing.com, Inc., a California corporation,
`Phonefree.com, Inc., a Delaware corporation, Zero-
`plus.com, Inc., a Delaware corporation, E–Net, Inc., a
`Delaware corporation, Really Easy Internet, Inc., a
`Texas corporation, Defendants.
`
`No. Civ.00–346 ADM/RLE.
`June 26, 2000.
`
`Kevin D. Conneely, Jodene Jensen, and Misti Nelc,
`Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, Minneapolis, Min-
`nesota, for and on behalf of Plaintiff Multi–Tech Sys-
`tems, Inc.
`
`David S. Miller, Bowman & Brooke, Minneapolis,
`Minnesota; Allan J. Sternstein, Brinks, Hofer, Gilson
`& Lione, Chicago, Illinois, for and on behalf of De-
`fendant Vocaltec Communications, Inc.
`
`Jay William Schlosser, Briggs & Morgan, Minneapo-
`lis, Minnesota; Bryan K. Anderson, Skjerven,
`Morrill, MacPherson, Franklin & Friel, San Jose,
`California, for and on behalf of Defendant Dial-
`pad.com, Inc.
`
`Jill Hutchinson Bollettieri, Leonard, Street, and
`Deinard, Minneapolis, Minnesota; Darryl M. Woo,
`Fenwick & West, Palo Alto, California, for and on
`behalf of Defendant MediaRing.com, Inc.
`
`Julie Knox Chosy, Faegre & Benson, Minneapolis,
`Minnesota, for and on behalf of Defendant Zero-
`plus.com, Inc.
`
`Page 1
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
`MONTGOMERY, J.
`I. INTRODUCTION
`*1 Plaintiff asserts patent infringement claims
`against Defendants. On June 15, 2000, the under-
`signed United States District Judge heard: (1) Defen-
`dant Zeroplus.com, Inc.'s motion to sever, or in the
`alternative, for a protective order [Doc. No. 57]; (2)
`Defendant MediaRing.com, Inc.'s motion to dismiss
`for lack of personal jurisdiction, or to sever and trans-
`fer [Doc. No. 61]; (3) Defendant Dialpad.com, Inc.'s
`motion to dismiss, or to sever and transfer [Doc. No.
`73]; and (4) Defendant Vocaltec Communications,
`Inc.'s motion to dismiss or to sever [Doc. No. 79].
`For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motions
`are granted in part and denied in part.
`
`II. BACKGROUND
`Plaintiff Multi–Tech Systems, Inc. (“Plaintiff”)
`alleges each Defendant in the above-titled action in-
`fringed one or more claims of four patents owned by
`Plaintiff. These patents relate to computer-based
`communications systems, including the use of com-
`puters to transfer data, voice and/or video in packet
`form over a communications line. See Compl. at 1–2.
`While the patents all relate to computer-based com-
`munications, the products, systems, and methods
`utilized by each Defendant differ. Plaintiff does not
`allege that Defendants have contracted or have oth-
`erwise been associated with each other in the design
`or development of the respective technologies.
`
`III. DISCUSSION
`A. Personal Jurisdiction: Defendant MediaRing
`Plaintiff asserts that Defendants, including Me-
`diaRing.com, Inc. (“MediaRing”), have “directly,
`indirectly, contributorily, and/or by inducement” in-
`fringed one or more claims of Plaintiff's patents. See
`Compl. ¶¶ 23, 29, 35, 41. MediaRing is a California
`corporation created in 1998. It has no officers, em-
`ployees, or agents, including agents for service of
`process, in Minnesota; it does not maintain any prop-
`erty or any bank accounts in Minnesota.
`
`MediaRing is in the data communication tech-
`nology business. Plaintiff alleges that MediaRing
`“makes, uses, offers for sale, or sells a product that
`uses simultaneous voice and data in engaging in tele-
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 3 of 8 PageID #: 578
`Page 2
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`phone calls over telephone lines using Internet Proto-
`col (“IP”).” Compl. ¶ 19. Users can make PC–to–PC
`calls by downloading MediaRing Talk™ software
`from MediaRing's website. MediaRing claims not to
`derive any revenue from PC–to–PC calls. See Ng
`Decl. at 6–7.
`
`PC–to–Phone calls are also made by download-
`ing MediaRing Talk™, but only in conjunction with
`registering as a ValueFone™ user. MediaRing al-
`leges (1) ValueFone™ is a link to a website provided
`by another company, DeltaThree, located in Israel,
`(2) DeltaThree accepts prepayments from the PC user
`for the voice communication, and (3) DeltaThree
`reimburses MediaRing for expenses, typically the
`amount charged by the user's telephone company.
`Less than 1% of users incurring a charge for Value-
`Fone™ services have Minnesota telephone numbers.
`MediaRing maintains that both its PC–to–PC and
`PC–to–Phone programs are provided for free or at
`cost to attract consumers to view MediaRing-posted
`advertisements, MediaRing's primary revenue source.
`
`*2 On June 2, 1999, MediaRing representatives
`traveled to Minnesota, met with Plaintiff, and pro-
`posed two business plans in which Plaintiff would
`bundle MediaRing's allegedly infringing software
`with Plaintiff's modems. See Sharma Decl. ¶¶ 6–10.
`
`MediaRing argues that this Court may not prop-
`erly exercise personal jurisdiction over MediaRing.
`In response, Plaintiff need only submit evidence that,
`when viewed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
`establishes a prima facie case of personal jurisdiction.
`See Aero Sys. Eng'g, Inc. v. Opron, Inc., 21
`F.Supp.2d 990, 995 (D.Minn.1998). Plaintiff asserts
`that this Court has specific, as opposed to general,
`jurisdiction over MediaRing. Specific jurisdiction is
`conferred “when a controversy is related to or arises
`out of a defendant's contacts with the forum, and
`there is a relationship among the defendant, the fo-
`rum, and the litigation .” Minnesota Mining & Mfg.
`Co. v. Nippon Carbide Indus, Co., Inc., 63 F.3d 694,
`697 (8th Cir.1995).
`
`Generally, two independent inquiries inform an
`assessment of personal jurisdiction: (1) whether the
`applicable state
`long-arm statute, Minn.Stat. §
`543.19, is satisfied, and (2) whether this Court's exer-
`cise of jurisdiction is consistent with the requisites of
`due process. See 3D Sys., Inc. v. Aarotech Labs., Inc.,
`
`160 F.3d 1373, 1376–77 (Fed.Cir.1998). The Eighth
`Circuit has recognized, however, that Minnesota has
`interpreted its long-arm statute to be coextensive with
`the limits of due process. See Minnesota Mining, 63
`F.3d at 697. Accordingly, the present analysis col-
`lapses the two inquiries, focusing solely on whether
`exercising personal
`jurisdiction over MediaRing
`comports with federal due process. See id.; see also
`3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1376–77.
`
`The Federal Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction
`over appeals from district courts whose jurisdiction is
`based on a claim arising under the patent laws of the
`United States. 3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1377. “Fed-
`eral Circuit law, rather than regional circuit law, ap-
`plies” when assessing the due process component of
`personal jurisdiction in the instant case because the
`claims arise under patent law. Id. The Federal Circuit
`considers three factors in determining whether spe-
`cific personal jurisdiction exists:
`
`(1) whether the defendant purposefully directed its
`activities at residents of the forum, (2) whether the
`claim arises out of or relates to those activities, and
`(3) whether assertion of personal jurisdiction is
`reasonable and fair.
`
`Id. at 1378. Plaintiff argues personal jurisdiction
`should be exercised because “(1) McdiaRing has of-
`fered to sell, sold, and encouraged the use of its in-
`fringing products to Minnesota users through its web-
`site; (2) over 12,000 users that registered on MediaR-
`ing's web site are Minnesota residents;” (3) MediaR-
`ing generated approximately $1,100 in revenue from
`126 Minnesotans who made PC–to–Phone calls; “(4)
`MediaRing traveled to Minnesota, met with Multi–
`Tech, and proposed two business deals in which
`Multi–Tech would bundle MediaRing's infringing
`software with Multi–Tech modems; and (5) MediaR-
`ing bundles its infringing software with 3Com mo-
`dems, which are offered for sale and are sold to Min-
`nesota residents in Minnesota.” Pl.'s Mem. Opp. to
`MediaRing Mot. at 2.
`
`*3 The Federal Circuit has not yet addressed per-
`sonal jurisdiction in the Internet context.FN1 The Dis-
`trict of Columbia's Court of Appeals, however, re-
`cently articulated the danger of basing personal juris-
`diction on the mere accessibility of a defendant's
`website:
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
`
`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 4 of 8 PageID #: 579
`Page 3
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`FN1. Circuits addressing the issue include
`GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth
`Corp., 199 F.3d 1343, (D.C.Cir.2000); Mink
`v.. AAAA Development LLC, 190 F.3d 333
`(5th Cir.1999); Cybersell, Inc. v. Cybersell,
`Inc., 130 F.3d 414 (9th Cir.1997); Benusan
`Restaurant Corp. v. King, 937 F.Supp. 295
`(S.D.N .Y.1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25 (2nd
`Cir.1997); and CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter-
`son, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996).
`
`This theory [of accessibility] simply cannot hold
`water. Indeed, under this view, personal jurisdic-
`tion in Internet-related cases would almost always
`be found in any forum in the country. We do not
`believe that the advent of advanced technology,
`say, as with the Internet, should vitiate long-held
`and inviolate principles of federal court jurisdic-
`tion. The Due Process Clause exists, in part, to give
`“a degree of predictability to the legal system that
`allows potential defendants to structure their pri-
`mary conduct with some minimum assurance as to
`where that conduct will and will not render them
`liable to suit.” In the context of the Internet, [the
`defendant]'s expansive theory of personal jurisdic-
`tion would shred these constitutional assurances
`out of practical existence. Our sister circuits have
`not accepted such an approach, and neither shall
`we. [Emphasis added].
`GTE New Media Servs. Inc. v. BellSouth Corp.,
`199 F.3d 1343, 1350 (D.C.Cir.2000) (citing
`World–Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
`U.S. 286, 297 (1980)). Plaintiff may not simply
`rely on the fact that “over 12,000 users that regis-
`tered on MediaRing's website are Minnesota resi-
`dents.” In determining whether personal jurisdic-
`tion may be constitutionally exercised over Medi-
`aRing, the Court must assess the “nature and qual-
`ity of commercial activity that an entity conducts
`over the Internet.” Mink v. AAAA Development
`LLC, 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir.1999) (quoting
`Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952
`F.Supp. 1119, 1124 (W.D.Pa.1997)). In other
`words, the nature and quality of the commercial ac-
`tivity conducted on the Internet determine whether
`defendants purposely availed themselves of the
`benefits and protections of Minnesota law.
`
`In determining the nature and quality of Internet
`commercial activity, courts have found it helpful to
`assess the particular type of Internet use involved.
`
`Internet use falls into “a spectrum of three areas.”
`Mink, 190 F.3d at 336. At one end of the spectrum, “a
`defendant clearly does business over the Internet by
`entering
`into contracts with residents of other
`states....” Id. Activities conducted at this end of the
`spectrum generally support exercise of personal ju-
`risdiction. See id. (citing CompuServe, Inc. v. Patter-
`son, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir.1996)).
`
`At the other end of the spectrum, a defendant
`“merely establishes a passive website that does noth-
`ing more than advertise on the Internet” Id. Activities
`conducted at the “passive” end of the spectrum gen-
`erally do not support exercise of personal jurisdic-
`tion. Id. (citing Benusan Restaurant Corp. v. King,
`937 F.Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y.1996), aff'd, 126 F.3d 25
`(2nd Cir.1997)).
`
`*4 In the middle of the spectrum, a defendant's
`website “allows a user to exchange information with
`a host computer.” Id. Activities conducted “mid-
`spectrum” are assessed to determine “the level of
`interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange
`of information that occurs” on the web page. Id.
`
`Assessed in the light most favorable to Plaintiff,
`the contact between Plaintiff and MediaRing appears
`to fall at the “Internet business” end of the spectrum.
`In the seminal case of Zippo, the court reasoned that
`“[i]f the defendant enters into contracts with residents
`of a foreign jurisdiction that involve the knowing and
`repeated transmission of computer files over the
`Internet computer network, personal jurisdiction over
`defendant is proper.” Zippo, 952 F.Supp. at 1124.
`The relationship between the ValueFone™ web link
`and MediaRing is unclear at this juncture. Nonethe-
`less, users must pay for PC–to–Phone calls with a
`credit card, essentially entering into contracts with
`MediaRing. Both the free and paid transactions ema-
`nating from MediaRing's website require the trans-
`mission of computer files over the Internet.
`
`By providing PC–to–PC and PC–to–Phone pro-
`grams for free or at cost to attract consumers to
`posted advertisements on its website, MediaRing
`recognizes that these programs are vital to its market-
`ing strategy and revenue generation. The nature and
`quality of MediaRing's Internet commercial activity
`indicate sufficient minimum contacts with Minne-
`sota. Sufficient minimum contacts are also estab-
`lished “mid-spectrum” given the substantial level of
`
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 5 of 8 PageID #: 580
`Page 4
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`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`interactivity and the commercial nature of the ex-
`change of information that occurs on the website.
`
`corporating the accused technology.
`
`Additionally, MediaRing representatives tele-
`phoned, and later met with, Plaintiff in Minnesota to
`discuss two business proposals allegedly relating to
`the patent technology at issue. See Sharma, Decl. ¶¶
`6–10; Harleman Decl. ¶¶ 7–9, 11–13. As follow-up to
`the meetings, MediaRing sent several e-mails to
`Plaintiff. See Harleman Decl. ¶¶ 15–18, Ex. C, D, E.
`These actions by MediaRing, coupled with the com-
`mercial nature of its website, were purposefully di-
`rected at Minnesota, satisfying the requirements of
`the first factor of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
`
`The second factor to be considered is whether
`the cause of action arises out of or relates to those
`activities. Patent infringement occurs when someone
`“without authority makes, uses, offers to sell or sells
`any patented invention.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (1994).
`For the purposes of the present motion only, the
`Court assumes it is the use of the interactive technol-
`ogy itself that allegedly infringes Plaintiff's patents.
`The relationship between infringing interactive tech-
`nology and the “wrong” alleged is aptly addressed by
`one district court:
`
`[T]his case is unusual because the use of interac-
`tive technology itself allegedly infringes the plain-
`tiff's patent. Specific personal jurisdiction depends
`on the nature and quality of the defendant's con-
`tacts with the forum, so obviously a case in which
`the contact itself is the wrong is a stronger case for
`jurisdiction than one in which the contact merely
`relates to the wrong.
`
`*5 CoolSavings.com., Inc. v. IO.Commerce
`Corp., 53 F.Supp.2d 1000, 1003 n. 3 (N.D.Ill.1999).
`MediaRing's forum-related conduct of making its
`interactive technology available for use by Minnesota
`residents forms the basis of the alleged infringement.
`Because contact between the user and MediaRing's
`software is the “wrong,” its presents an enhanced
`case for asserting jurisdiction. Similarly, in general
`terms, MediaRing's offer to sell its allegedly infring-
`ing software to Plaintiff as part of MediaRing's busi-
`ness proposals is sufficient to meet the second factor.
`See 3D Systems, 160 F.3d at 1378;
`see also
`CoolSavings, 53 F.Supp.2d at 1003. Plaintiff's claims
`of infringement arise out of consumers' use of the
`interactive technology itself and business plans in-
`
`The third factor of the analysis places the burden
`on MediaRing to “prove that jurisdiction would be
`constitutionally unreasonable.” 3D Systems, 160 F.3d
`at 1380. Constitutional unreasonableness is assessed
`under:
`
`a multi-factored balancing test that weighs any
`burdens on the defendant against various counter-
`vailing considerations, including the plaintiff's in-
`terest in the convenient forum and the forum state's
`interest in resolving controversies flowing from in-
`state events.... Put succinctly, “such defeats of oth-
`erwise constitutional personal jurisdiction ‘are lim-
`ited to the rare situation in which the plaintiff's in-
`terest and the state's interest in adjudicating the
`dispute in the forum are so attenuated that they are
`clearly outweighed by the burden of subjecting the
`defendant to litigation within the forum.” ’
`
`Viam Corp., 84 F.3d at 429 (quoting Akro Corp.
`v. Luker, 45 F.3d 1541, 1549 (Fed.Cir.1995) (internal
`citations omitted) (emphasis added). MediaRing has
`not met its high burden of proving that the interests
`of Plaintiff and Minnesota in adjudicating the dispute
`in this forum are so attenuated as to be inherently
`unfair. Instead, MediaRing argues against (1) estab-
`lishing “nationwide jurisdiction” through the Internet,
`(2) basing personal jurisdiction on its passive adver-
`tising, (3) crippling MediaRing with a substantial
`financial burden, and (4) maintaining this action in
`Minnesota, a state without “a particular interest in
`this suit [that is] based upon federal patent law.” Me-
`diaRing's Mem. Supp. Mot. Dismiss at 14.
`
`Contrary to MediaRing's first two points, Medi-
`aRing's website is not the sole basis for this Court's
`exercise of personal jurisdiction; MediaRing's repre-
`sentatives entered Minnesota and discussed business
`proposals incorporating the allegedly infringing tech-
`nology. As noted by the court in CoolSavings:
`
`[i]t may seem unfair to subject [defendant] to per-
`sonal jurisdiction almost anywhere in the country,
`but to us it seems even more unfair to allow [de-
`fendant] to introduce its program to the entire
`country while remaining subject to personal juris-
`diction only in its home state and thus requiring
`patentees from all over the country to go to [defen-
`dant's state] in order to litigate their infringement
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
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`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 6 of 8 PageID #: 581
`Page 5
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`claims.
`
`*6 53 F.Supp.2d at 1003. Moreover, the David
`and Goliath analogy implicitly drawn by MediaRing
`is insufficient to show constitutional unreasonable-
`ness. Finally, Minnesota has a legitimate interest in
`protecting the patents of its residents.
`
`Plaintiff has carried its burden in presenting a
`prima facie case sufficient to satisfy the first two
`components of the personal jurisdiction analysis.
`MediaRing has not met its heavy burden in rebutting
`this jurisdiction by establishing the third analytical
`component. Asserting specific personal jurisdiction
`under the present facts comports with federal due
`process.
`
`B. Severance
`Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a) addresses the permissive
`joinder of defendants and provides that:
`
`[a]ll persons ... may be joined in one action as de-
`fendants if there is asserted against them jointly,
`severally, or in the alternative, any right to relief in
`respect of or arising out of the same transactions,
`occurrences, or series of transactions or occur-
`rences and if any question of law or fact common
`to all defendants will arise in the action.
`
`(Emphasis added). In short, Plaintiff must show
`(1) its right to relief arises out of the same transaction
`or occurrence and (2) a common question of law or
`fact common to all defendants. “The purpose of the
`rule is to promote trial convenience and expedite the
`final determination of disputes, thereby preventing
`multiple lawsuits.” Mosley v. General Motors Corp.,
`497 F.2d 1330, 1332 (8th Cir.1974) citing 7 C.
`Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure, § 1652 at 265
`(1972).
`
`Rule 20 requires “an allegation of joint action.”
`Movie Systems, Inc. v. Abel. et al., 99 F.R.D. 129,
`130 (D.Minn.1983). Joinder is inappropriate, how-
`ever, when “the operative facts of each transaction
`are distinct and unrelated to any other....” Id . Conse-
`quently, where patent
`infringement claims are
`brought against multiple, unrelated defendants, courts
`have held joinder to be inappropriate pursuant to
`Rule 20. See, e.g., Androphy v. Smith & Nephew,
`Inc., 31 F.Supp.2d 620, 623 (N.D.Ill.1998) citing
`Magnavox Co. v. APF Elec., 496 F.Supp. 29
`
`(N.D.Ill.1980) and New Jersey Mach., Inc. v. Alford
`Indus., Inc., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 2033, (D.N.J.1991).
`
`In the patent infringement context, courts sever
`defendants that are “separate companies that inde-
`pendently design, manufacture and sell different
`products in competition with each other.” Androphy,
`31 F.Supp.2d at 623. Competition between defen-
`dants is often sufficient to undermine the “common
`transaction or occurrence” component of Rule 20.
`For example, the court in Magnavox reasoned:
`
`Plaintiffs argue that the similarity of products sold
`... is sufficient to satisfy the same transaction or
`occurrence test of Rule 20(a).
`
`The complaint, however, is devoid of allegations
`concerning any connection between the television
`games ..., except that they are all alleged to infringe
`plaintiffs' patents. [T]here is no indication on this
`record that the development, marketing or sales ef-
`fort involving the different products are related in
`any way. Therefore, plaintiffs are not asserting
`“any right to relief ... arising out of the same trans-
`action, occurrences or series of transactions or oc-
`currences” against all defendants.
`
`*7 Magnavox, 496 F.Supp. at 34 (emphasis
`added). Similarly, the district court in New Jersey
`Machine held that “infringement of the same patent
`by different machines and parties does not constitute
`the same transaction or occurrence” where:
`[f]irst, the parties are unrelated, and in fact, com-
`pete in the same marketplace. Additionally, mar-
`keting and sales efforts concerning the allegedly in-
`fringing machines are not common between the
`parties. More significantly, however, the plaintiff
`fails to adequately allege or support any connection
`or substantial similarity between the machines of
`[each defendant].
`
`New Jersey Machine, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 2034–35
`(footnotes omitted).
`
`In the present case, Plaintiff asserts infringement
`claims against unrelated defendants who primarily
`compete in the same marketplace and provide inde-
`pendent products and services.FN2 The only common
`thread running through the Complaint is Plaintiff's
`contention that each Defendant infringed one or more
`of the four patents. Each accused device, however,
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
`
`

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`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 7 of 8 PageID #: 582
`Page 6
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`will have to be considered separately, and the deter-
`mination of facts and the scope of testimony with
`respect to one defendant will have little relevance to
`issues raised by another defendant. Additionally,
`Plaintiff has failed to make any showing that joinder
`is necessary to further principles of fundamental fair-
`ness, to promote trial convenience, or to expedite the
`final determination of the instant dispute.
`
`FN2. In addition to the above-titled action,
`Plaintiff has filed three separate suits against
`three other defendants. All three cases have
`been assigned to this Court. See Multi–Tech
`Sys., Inc. v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 00–CV–
`295 (D.Minn., Feb. 8, 2000); Multi–Tech
`Sys., Inc. v. Dell Computer Corp., 00–CV–
`296 (D. Minn ., Feb. 8, 2000); Multi–Tech
`Sys., Inc. v. Compaq, Corp., 00–CV–297
`(D.Minn., Feb. 8, 2000).
`
`Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 21(a), the claims
`against Defendants Zeroplus.com, Inc., MediaR-
`ing.com, Inc., Dialpad.com, Inc ., and Vocaltec
`Communications, Inc. are severed and will proceed
`separately.
`
`C. Transfer
`Defendants MediaRing and Dialpad.com, Inc.
`(“Dialpad”) move to transfer this case to the Northern
`District of California pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)
`which provides that “[f]or the convenience of the
`parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a dis-
`trict court may transfer any civil action to any other
`district or division where
`it might have been
`brought.” In this case, there is no dispute that Plain-
`tiff could have properly commenced this action in the
`Northern District of California.
`
`The Court must consider: (1) the convenience of
`the parties, (2) the convenience of nonparty wit-
`nesses, and (3) the interests of justice. See Radisson
`Hotels Int'l Inc. v. Westin Hotel Co., 931 F.Supp.
`638, 641 (D.Minn.1996). While the plaintiff's choice
`of forum is an important factor, it may be overcome
`by a showing that the balance of the factors favors
`transfer. See Skyline Displays, Inc. v. Sweeney, 634
`F.Supp. 746, 748 (D.Minn.1986).
`
`MediaRing and Dialpad maintain that the loca-
`tion of the operative facts and the ease of access to
`relevant evidence favors the Northern District of
`
`California, site of their principal place of businesses,
`servers, and accused technology. In addition, they
`argue that the majority of their pertinent witnesses
`are located in Northern California. In response, Plain-
`tiff argues that its documents as well as pertinent
`witnesses are located primarily in Minnesota.
`
`*8 The convenience of the parties and witnesses
`are equally balanced, or, at best, weigh only slightly
`in favor of transfer. Accordingly, MediaRing and
`Dialpad have failed “to show that the balance of the
`factors ‘strongly’ favors the movant.” Graff v. Qwest
`Communications, Corp., 33 F.Supp.2d 1117, 1121
`(D.Minn.1999).
`
`Though a court may consider many factors, the
`interests of justice is afforded more weight. See, e.g.,
`Graff, 33 F.Supp.2d at 1122; Radisson Hotels, 931
`F.Supp. at 641. Plaintiff has brought suit against nine
`defendants in the above-titled action, and against
`three defendants in three separate cases. Plaintiff has
`also been named as a defendant in a recently filed
`case to be assigned to this Court.FN3
`
`FN3. Microsoft Corp. v. Multi–Tech Sys.,
`Inc., 00–CV–1412 (D. Minn., June 9, 2000).
`
`Maintaining this case in Minnesota is more effi-
`cient and convenient for the parties because this
`Court has been assigned other cases pertaining to the
`same patents at issue in the instant action. The Court
`will be well-positioned to construe patent claims,
`determine validity, and identify prior art in a consis-
`tent manner. Moreover, resolving the claims pertain-
`ing to the same patents in this forum will eliminate
`duplicative discovery as well as the possibility of
`conflicting claim constructions.
`
`judicial re-
`transfer will conserve
`Denying
`sources. Therefore, this Court finds that the balance
`of factors weigh against transfer.
`
`IV. CONCLUSION
`Based upon the foregoing, and all of the files, re-
`cords and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY OR-
`DERED that:
`
`1. Defendants' Motions to Sever [Doc. Nos. 57, 61,
`73 and 79] are GRANTED and all motions to dis-
`miss are DENIED. Accordingly, the claims be-
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.
`
`

`
`Case 1:11-cv-00797-RGA Document 94-6 Filed 12/19/11 Page 8 of 8 PageID #: 583
`Page 7
`
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.)
`(Cite as: 2000 WL 34494824 (D.Minn.))
`
`tween Plaintiff and Defendants Zeroplus.com, Inc.,
`MediaRing.com, Inc., Dialpad.com, Inc., and Vo-
`caltec Communications, Inc. are hereby severed.
`The Clerk shall open new files for each of the sev-
`ered Defendants by use of spaces on the patent case
`assignment list, thus assigning new case numbers.
`These cases shall be assigned to Judge Ann D.
`Montgomery. The Clerk of the Court shall not col-
`lect any additional filing fees for these actions.
`
`2. Defendant MediaRing.com, Inc.'s motion to
`dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, or in the
`alternative to transfer [Doc. No. 61] is DENIED;
`and
`
`3. Defendant Dialpad.com, Inc.'s motion to transfer
`[Doc. No. 73] is DENIED.
`
`D.Minn.,2000.
`Multi-Tech Systems, Inc. v. Net2Phone, Inc.
`Not Reported in F.Supp.2d, 2000 WL 34494824
`(D.Minn.)
`
`END OF DOCUMENT
`
`© 2011 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.