`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`In re: Refrigerant Compressors
`Antitrust Litigation
`
`___________________________/
`
`Case No. 2:09-md-02042
`
`Honorable Sean F. Cox
`United States District Court
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`REGARDING THE COURT’S JUNE 7, 2012 ORDER
`GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART DIRECT PURCHASER
`PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE A SECOND AMENDED
`MASTER AMENDED COMPLAINT
`
`Following this Court’s Opinion & Order on the Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss as
`
`to the Direct Purchaser (“DP”) Plaintiffs’ Master Amended Complaint, DP Plaintiffs filed two
`
`motions for reconsideration, which this Court denied. The matter is now before the Court on DP
`
`Plaintiff’s Motion for Leave to File A Second Amended Master Amended Complaint. (Docket
`
`Entry No. 271). The parties fully briefed the issues and oral argument was heard on June 7,
`
`2012. On that same date, this Court issued an Order (Docket Entry No. 295) that granted the
`
`motion in part and denied it in part. This memorandum opinion sets forth the Court’s reasons for
`
`doing so.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`The background of this action and the claims asserted by the DP Plaintiffs are fully set
`
`forth in this Court’s June 13, 2011 Opinion & Order. (Docket Entry No. 246). The Court
`
`includes here relevant details as to the Opinion & Order itself, and events since that Opinion &
`
`Order was issued.
`
`Defendants filed a “Joint Motion to Dismiss Claims by Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs”
`
`1
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 2 of 9 Pg ID 6760
`
`(Docket Entry No. 164). Following full briefing by the parties and oral argument, the Court
`
`granted that motion in part, denied it in part, and deferred ruling on one issue until after an
`
`amended complaint was filed. More specifically, the Court: 1) ruled that the only persons or
`
`entities that have standing to assert federal antitrust claims in this action are those persons or
`
`entities who directly purchased compressors from a Defendant; 2) denied Defendants’ request to
`
`dismiss claims prior to June 2004, or after December 2006, under Twombly; 3) deferred decision
`
`on Defendants’ challenge based on the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act because the
`
`Court cannot meaningfully address that argument until after an amended complaint is filed; and
`
`4) ruled that Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs have not pleaded fraudulent concealment with the
`
`requisite particularity and, therefore, they cannot recover any damages incurred prior to February
`
`25, 2005.
`
`As to the standing issue, this Court’s June 13, 2011 Opinion & Order states, in pertinent
`
`part:
`
`Here, DP Plaintiffs seek to avoid the direct purchaser rule and the
`Supreme Court’s rejection of an offensive pass-on theory, set forth in the above
`cases, by relying on several cases from outside the Sixth Circuit. The two cases
`DP Plaintiffs rely on most heavily are In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litig., 579
`F.2d 13 (3d Cir. 1978) and In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3d
`Cir. 2002). Notably, however, the Sixth Circuit has not endorsed the approach
`taken in those cases.
`Moreover, as explained below, even if the exception set forth in those
`cases were adopted by the Sixth Circuit, it would not aid the DP Plaintiffs here.
`
`. . . .
`
`At best, these decisions reflect that the Third Circuit has concluded that the direct
`purchaser rule does not apply in situations where a plaintiff purchases a product
`containing a price-fixed component directly from an alleged violator who makes
`both the component and the product containing the component. Again, such a
`rule, even if it were adopted by the Sixth Circuit, would not apply here.
`Accordingly, the Court concludes that the only persons or entities who
`
`2
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 3 of 9 Pg ID 6761
`
`have standing to assert federal antitrust claims in this action are those persons or
`entities who directly purchased compressors from a Defendant. Thus, any named
`DP Plaintiff who did not purchase compressors from a Defendant lacks standing
`and must be dismissed from this action.
`
`(6/13/11 Opinion & Order at 12). Because of the way the MAC was drafted, however, it was
`
`impossible to tell which, if any, of the named DP Plaintiffs purchased compressors directly from
`
`a Defendant. Accordingly, the Court granted “DP Plaintiffs’ request to file an amended
`
`complaint in order to specify which, if any, of the DP Plaintiffs have federal antitrust standing by
`
`virtue of having directly purchased compressors from a Defendant.” (Id. at 18). In doing so, the
`
`Court instructed that the amended complaint was to “specifically identify: 1) each named DP
`
`Plaintiff who directly purchased compressors from a Defendant; 2) the Defendant(s) from whom
`
`that named DP Plaintiff directly purchased compressors; and 3) where and when such purchases
`
`are alleged to have taken place.” (Id. at 18).
`
`As to the alleged fraudulent concealment, the Court ruled that “because DP Plaintiffs
`
`have not pleaded fraudulent concealment with particularity, any claims accruing before February
`
`25, 2005 are time-barred.” (Id. at 29). The Court also denied DP Plaintiffs’ request to file an
`
`amended complaint that would plead fraudulent concealment with more particularity. (Id. n.9).
`
`Following this Court’s June 13, 2011 Opinion & Order, DP Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
`
`Reconsideration (Docket Entry No. 247) on June 27, 2011, and an Amended Motion for
`
`Reconsideration (Docket Entry No. 255) on June 30, 2011. In those motions, DP Plaintiffs asked
`
`“this Court to reconsider its holding that the only persons or entities with standing to assert
`
`federal antitrust claims in this action are those persons or entities who directly purchases
`
`compressors from a Defendant. Specifically, DP Plaintiffs respectfully ask this Court to
`
`reconsider whether director purchasers of condensers (which integrate compressors as a key
`
`3
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 4 of 9 Pg ID 6762
`
`component) have standing to assert claims in this action . . .” (Docket Entry No. 255 at 2).
`
`This Court denied those motions in an order issued on August 2, 2011. In doing so, the
`
`Court explained:
`
`With respect to the standing issue, DP Plaintiffs continue to advance the same or
`similar arguments that were made by them in opposing Defendants’ Joint Motion
`to Dismiss. A motion for reconsideration, however, “is not properly used as a
`vehicle to re-hash old arguments.” Smith v. Mount Pleasant Schools, 298
`F.Supp.2d 636, 637 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (citing Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa
`Indians v. Engler, 146 F.3d 367, 374 (6th Cir. 1998); Hamilton v. Gansheimer,
`536 F.Supp.2d 825, 842 (N.D. Ohio 2008) (Courts should not reconsider prior
`decision where the motion for reconsideration renews arguments already
`considered.); L.R. 7.1(h)(3) (the court will not grant motions for reconsideration
`“that merely present the same issues ruled upon by the court.”).
`
`(8/2/11 Order at 2).
`
`On August 23, 2011, DP Plaintiffs filed their “First Amended Master Amended
`
`Complaint” (“FAMAC”). (Docket Entry No. 267). That FAMAC included amended allegations
`
`to clarify which of the DP Plaintiffs have federal anti-trust standing by virtue of having directly
`
`purchased compressors from a Defendant, and modified the class period to begin no earlier than
`
`February 25, 2005, in accordance with this Court’s June 13, 2011 Opinion & Order.
`
`Shortly after having filed its FAMAC, on September 7, 2011, DP Plaintiffs filed the
`
`instant Motion For Leave To File Second Amended Master Amended Complaint. (Docket Entry
`
`No. 271). In this motion, DP Plaintiffs seek leave to file a Second Amended Master Amended
`
`Complaint in order “to include three additional categories of allegations not explicitly authorized
`
`by the Court’s MTD Opinion & Order: 1) allegations relating to Embraco North America, Inc.’s
`
`and Panasonic Corporation’s criminal plea agreements; 2) allegations that provide a more
`
`complete picture of the price-fixing conspiracy alleged in the FAMAC (these allegations were
`
`formerly included in the MAC in paragraphs regarding fraudulent concealment and were not
`
`4
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 5 of 9 Pg ID 6763
`
`included in the FAMAC consistent with this Court’s MTD Opinion & Order), and 3) allegations
`
`regarding Condensing Units.” (DP Pls.’ Motion at ¶ 10).
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`At this stage of the litigation, DP Plaintiffs may not file an amended complaint without
`
`leave of the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “The court should freely give leave when justice so
`
`requires.” Id.
`
`1.
`
`Allegations Regarding Plea Agreements
`
`DP Plaintiffs contend that they wish to amend their operative complaint in order to
`
`include allegations regarding Embraco North America, Inc. and Panasonic Corporation’s guilty
`
`pleas in criminal cases. Those pleas were entered in November and December of 2010. DP
`
`Plaintiffs assert that because such guilty pleas can be used as prima facie evidence of
`
`Defendants’ price-fixing conspiracy in this action, they would like to include these allegations in
`
`their operative complaint.
`
`In response, Defendants assert that filing an amended complaint to include these
`
`allegations is unnecessary, because that evidence “may be introduced as evidence in accordance
`
`with 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).” (Defs.’ Response Br. at 1 n.1). “Nevertheless, Defendants do not
`
`specifically oppose such amendments if the Court deems them appropriate.” (Id.).
`
`The Court concludes that DP Plaintiff should be granted leave to file an amended
`
`complaint that contains these allegations.
`
`2.
`
`Allegations Regarding Conspiracy
`
`In their motion, DP Plaintiffs assert that “in accordance with the Court’s ruling on
`
`5
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 6 of 9 Pg ID 6764
`
`fraudulent concealment, DP Plaintiffs removed all allegations relating to fraudulent concealment
`
`from the FAMAC, modified the class period to begin no earlier than February 25, 2005, and
`
`modified the Class definition. See MTD Opinion & Order at 29 n.9, 30.” (DP Pls.’ Br. at 1).
`
`As an initial matter, this Court did not order DP Plaintiffs to remove all allegations
`
`relating to fraudulent concealment. This Court merely ruled that “because DP Plaintiffs have not
`
`pleaded fraudulent concealment with particularity, any claims accruing before February 25, 2005
`
`are time-barred.” (6/13/11 Opinion & Order at 29 & 30).
`
`That said, DP Plaintiffs did remove the allegations relating to fraudulent concealment,
`
`under the belief that this Court’s Order required them to do so. DP Plaintiffs would like to add
`
`these factual allegations back into their complaint because, even though the Court ruled against
`
`them on the fraudulent concealment issue, they would like these factual allegations in the
`
`complaint to provide detail as to the alleged conspiracy. They identify the factual allegations
`
`they wish to add on page seven of their brief. DP Plaintiffs assert that they “are requesting leave
`
`to amend to include the aforementioned facts and information for the sole purpose of more
`
`completely describing Defendants’ price-fixing conspiracy that is the basis for DP Plaintiffs’
`
`claims, and are not seeking to re-plead fraudulent concealment.” (DP Pls’ Br. at 7).
`
`While it is not necessary to add these allegations back in to the DP Plaintiffs’ operative
`
`complaint in order to state a price-fixing conspiracy claim, the Court sees no harm in allowing
`
`them to do so, especially given that they will already be amending the complaint to include the
`
`allegations regarding the guilty pleas by two Defendants. DP Plaintiffs made a timely request to
`
`file an amended complaint and the Court fails to see how adding these factual allegations back
`
`into the complaint prejudices Defendants.
`
`6
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 7 of 9 Pg ID 6765
`
`3.
`
`Allegations Regarding Condensing Units
`
`Defendants’ real opposition to this motion concerns DP Plaintiffs’ final request, wherein
`
`they wish to amend the complaint in order to add allegations regarding Condensing Units.
`
`As the Court explained in its June 13, 2011 Opinion & Order, the DP Plaintiffs were
`
`seeking to avoid the direct purchaser rule and the Supreme Court’s rejection of an offensive
`
`pass-on theory by relying on several cases from outside of the Sixth Circuit. The two cases DP
`
`Plaintiffs relied on most heavily are In re Sugar Industry Antitrust Litig., 579 F.2d 13 (3d Cir.
`
`1978) and In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145 (3d Cir. 2002). This Court found DP
`
`Plaintiffs’ reliance on those cases misplaced for two reasons. First, the Court noted that “the
`
`Sixth Circuit has not endorsed the approach taken” in either of those cases. (6/13/11 Opinion &
`
`Order at 12). Second, the Court concluded that “even if the exception set forth in those cases
`
`were adopted by the Sixth Circuit, it would not aid the DP Plaintiffs here.” (Id.). The Court
`
`explained that, at best, the decisions DP Plaintiffs rely on “reflect that the Third Circuit has
`
`concluded that the direct purchaser rule does not apply in situations where a plaintiff purchases a
`
`product containing a price-fixed component directly from an alleged violator who makes both
`
`the component and the product containing the component. Again, such a rule, even if it were
`
`adopted by the Sixth Circuit, would not apply here.” (Id. at 16).
`
`In seeking leave to amend, DP Plaintiffs once again argue that DP Plaintiffs who are
`
`“direct purchasers of Condensing Units from Defendants have standing to assert antitrust claims
`
`regarding such products.” (DP Pls.’ Br. at 13). They assert that in the proposed SAMAC, “DP
`
`Plaintiffs would allege that they purchased Condensing Units containing price-fixed
`
`Compressors directly from a Defendant; and the Condensing Unit was either (1) manufactured
`
`7
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 8 of 9 Pg ID 6766
`
`by a Defendant or one of their affiliated entities, principals, agents, or co-conspirators, or (2) was
`
`manufactured, sold or transferred to the Defendant by a co-conspirator.” (Id.). The Court denied
`
`this request in its June 7, 2012 Order.
`
`First and foremost, the Sixth Circuit has not endorsed the exception created by the Third
`
`Circuit.
`
`Second, while DP Plaintiffs assert that some DP Plaintiffs could have standing under the
`
`Third Circuit’s exception for a plaintiff who purchases a product containing a price-fixed
`
`component directly from an alleged violator who makes both the component and the product
`
`containing the component, their proposed SAMAC would go well beyond that exception in that
`
`it would include allegations as to DP Plaintiffs who brought a Condensing Unit from one
`
`Defendant that contained a compressor made by another defendant.
`
`Defendants ask the Court to sanction DP Plaintiff’s counsel, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
`
`1927 for needlessly increasing the cost of this litigation. Defendants contend that the Court has
`
`already rejected DP Plaintiffs’ standing argument twice (once in connection with the Joint
`
`Motion to Dismiss and once in denying DP Plaintiffs’ motions for reconsideration) and that DP
`
`Plaintiffs’ counsel had no reasonable basis for asking the Court to consider the issue a third time.
`
`While the Court agrees that there was no reasonable basis for this request given the
`
`Court’s prior rulings, the Court declines to sanction counsel. Nevertheless, the Court cautions
`
`counsel that it will not hesitate to impose sanctions under § 1927 in the future if warranted.
`
`DP Plaintiffs shall file their Second Amended Master Amended Complaint, with the
`
`amendments allowed by the Court in this Memorandum Opinion, no later than Wednesday,
`
`June 20, 2012. Barring a very exceptional circumstance, the Court will not allow further
`
`8
`
`
`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 298 Filed 06/08/12 Pg 9 of 9 Pg ID 6767
`
`amendments.
`
`Dated: June 8, 2012
`
`S/Sean F. Cox
`Sean F. Cox
`United States District Judge
`
`I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record on
`June 8, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
`
`S/Jennifer Hernandez
`Case Manager
`
`9