2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 1 of 14 Pg ID 7373
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`In re: Refrigerant Compressors
`Antitrust Litigation
`
`___________________________/
`
`Case No. 2:09-md-02042
`
`Honorable Sean F. Cox
`United States District Court
`
`MEMORANDUM OPINION
`REGARDING THE COURT’S JULY 10, 2012 ORDER
`
`At a July 10, 2012 hearing, the Court addressed Defendants’ argument that the named
`
`Indirect Purchaser (“IP”) Plaintiffs lack Constitutional standing to bring claims under the laws of
`
`states/territories where no named IP Plaintiff claims to reside or have been injured. This same
`
`issue was raised in the following motions: a) Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss the IP
`
`Plaintiffs’ complaint (D.E. No. 162); b) the Tecumseh Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss the IP
`
`Plaintiffs’ complaint (D.E. No. 166); and c) the motions seeking to dismiss the Gaffet and Strong
`
`Electric IP Plaintiffs’ “Tag-Along” Complaints (D.E. Nos. 239 & 240).
`
`Defendants contend that the named IP Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims under the
`
`laws of states/territories where no named IP Plaintiff claims to reside or have been injured. In
`
`response, IP Plaintiffs contend that the Court should defer any ruling on Constitutional standing
`
`until the class certification stage.
`
`In an order issued on July 10, 2012, this Court noted that the federal courts are split on
`
`this issue, the Sixth Circuit has not ruled on the issue, and district courts within the Eastern
`
`District of Michigan have issued conflicting opinions on the subject. This Court further stated
`
`that it was following the approach taken in In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d
`
`1
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 2 of 14 Pg ID 7374
`
`642, (E.D. Mich. 2011), a recent MDL putative class action in the Eastern District of Michigan
`
`involving antitrust and consumer protection act claims asserted under the laws of many states,
`
`and would address the standing issue now. In addressing the standing issue at this stage of the
`
`litigation, this Court concluded that, based on the allegations in the IP Plaintiffs’ Third
`
`Consolidated Amended Complaint:
`
`1)
`
`2)
`
`there is at least one named IP Plaintiff with Constitutional Standing to assert
`claims under the laws of the following states/territories: Arizona; California;
`District of Columbia; Kansas; New Hampshire; New Mexico; New York; North
`Carolina; Michigan; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Rhode Island; Maine; Nebraska;
`Minnesota; Florida; Tennessee; and Massachusetts; and
`
`the named IP Plaintiffs lack Constitutional standing to bring claims under the
`laws of states/territories where no named IP Plaintiff claims to reside or have
`been injured.
`
`Accordingly, the Court DISMISSED the IP Plaintiffs’ claims asserted under the laws of the
`
`following states/territories: Arkansas; Hawaii; Iowa; Louisiana; Mississippi; Nevada; North
`
`Dakota; Puerto Rico; South Dakota; Utah; and Vermont. This Memorandum Opinion sets forth
`
`the Court’s reasons for that ruling.
`
`BACKGROUND
`
`Beginning in February 2009, Direct Purchaser Plaintiffs and Indirect Purchaser Plaintiffs
`
`filed complaints in various jurisdictions asserting claims against Defendants. Those actions were
`
`consolidated for pretrial proceedings by the United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
`
`Litigation.
`
`On May 26, 2010, the Court issued Case Management Order No. 1, which was agreed to
`
`by counsel for the parties. (D.E. No. 152). It provides that the Direct and Indirect Purchaser
`
`2
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 3 of 14 Pg ID 7375
`
`Plaintiffs shall separately file Master Amended Complaints including each Defendant no later
`
`than June 30, 2012. (Id. at 8). It also provides that Defendants may thereafter file motions to
`
`dismiss the master amended complaints. (Id. at 9-10).
`
`The IP Plaintiffs filed their Consolidated Amended Complaint on June 30, 2010. (D.E.
`
`No. 154).
`
`On September 21, 2010, they filed their Second Consolidated Amended Complaint.
`
`(D.E. No. 174). In it, they seek class certification and assert state-law antitrust claims, consumer
`
`protection / unfair competition claims, and unjust enrichment claims against all Defendants.
`
`The SCAC describes the nature of the case as follows. This case arises from “a long-
`
`running, world-wide conspiracy” among Defendants “to fix, raise, maintain, and/or stabilize the
`
`prices of, and to allocate customers and markets for, Hermetic Compressors,” thus artificially
`
`raising the prices for Hermetic Compressors and products containing Hermetic Compressors.”
`
`(SCAC at ¶ 1). IP Plaintiffs allege that the conspiracy was effective and that “end-payor
`
`purchasers of Hermetic Compressor Products were among its many victims.” (SCAC at ¶ 2).
`
`“The Hermetic Compressor is the critical engine in refrigeration products.” (SCAC at ¶ 3).
`
`“Defendants sold Hermetic Compressors through a number of channels, including in the
`
`refrigerator and freezer channel (the ‘R&F’ channel or ‘R&F Market’), which is dominated by a
`
`few large Original Equipment Manufacturers (‘OEMs’), including Electrolux and General
`
`Electric.” (SCAC at ¶ 4). “Sales of Hermetic Compressors in the R&F channel involve a yearly
`
`bidding process by which the OEMs invite Defendants to compete for each OEM’s yearly
`
`compressor needs. The OEMs invite all the manufacturers of Hermetic Compressor to
`
`participate in the bidding at a location and time of the OEM’s choosing. These negotiations are
`
`3
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 4 of 14 Pg ID 7376
`
`critical for buyers and sellers alike as the prices at which Hermetic Compressors are sold to the
`
`OEMs for the entire year are determined in the course of a few days. All five Defendants
`
`actively participated in these meetings.” (SCAC at ¶ 5). “Defendants, however, created a sham
`
`bidding system, secretly meeting before the annual contract negotiations, sharing bids with one
`
`another and agreeing upon prices. In addition, Defendants allocated among each other
`
`respective shares of the OEM market.” (SCAC at ¶ 6). As a result, “prices between 1996 and
`
`2009 were artificially inflated. This overcharge was then passed on to end payors in the form of
`
`inflated prices for Hermetic Compressors and products containing them, such as refrigerators and
`
`freezers.” (SCAC at ¶ 7).
`
`The SCAC asserts the following counts: 1) “Violation of State Antitrust Statutes” (Count
`
`I), which asserts antitrust claims under the laws of twenty-five different states; 2) “Violation of
`
`State Consumer Protection and Unfair Competition Statutes” (Count II), which asserts claims
`
`under the consumer protection acts of eleven different states; and 3) “Unjust Enrichment” (Count
`
`III).
`
`There are seventeen named IP Plaintiffs in the SCAC. (See ¶¶ 20-36). These named IP
`
`Plaintiffs consist of four corporate entities and thirteen individuals who reside in various states.
`
`The SCAC alleges that, during the class period, the named IP Plaintiffs “purchased
`
`Hermetic Compressor Products as end payors, and not for resale, manufactured by one or more
`
`Defendants. As a result of the conspiracy alleged, Plaintiffs suffered pecuniary injury.” (SCAC
`
`at ¶ 19). Notably, with the exception of one named IP Plaintiff (Royal W. Leith), the SCAC did
`
`not allege where any of the named IP Plaintiffs made their alleged purchases.
`
`With respect to the all named IP Plaintiffs other than Leith, the SCAC contained
`
`4
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 5 of 14 Pg ID 7377
`
`allegations regarding each one’s state of residence or principal place of business, but contained
`
`no allegations as to where each purchased Compressor Products or where the alleged injury was
`
`incurred.
`
`The SCAC also did not identify who manufactured any of the compressor products that
`
`they purchased. (SCAC at ¶ 19 & ¶¶ 20-36).
`
`The SCAC states that the IP Plaintiff seek to bring a class action on behalf of the
`
`following class:
`
`All persons and entities that purchased Hermetic compressors (“Hermetic
`Compressors”) or products that contained Hermetic Compressors as an end payor,
`and not for resale, in the states of Arizona, Arkansas, California, District of
`Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts,
`Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New
`Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island,
`South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, and Wisconsin at any
`time from January 1, 1996 through December 31, 2009 from any Defendant or
`any current or former subsidiary or affiliate thereof, or any co-conspirator.
`
`Excluded from the Class are Defendants, their parent companies, subsidiaries and
`affiliates, any co-conspirators, federal governmental entities and instrumentalities
`of the federal government, states and their subdivisions, agencies, and
`instrumentalities, person who purchased Hermatic Compressors directly, and
`persons who purchased Hermetic Compressors indirectly for resale.
`
`(SCAC at ¶ 130). The SCAC further stated that “[i]n the alternative, Plaintiffs may seek the
`
`certification of subclasses.” (SCAC at ¶ 131).
`
`The Gaffet And Strong Electric “Tag-Along” Actions
`
`Two “tag-along” actions, one from Rhode Island and one from Maine, were transferred to
`
`this Court on March 16, 2011 – after the IP Plaintiffs had filed their SCAC. (D.E. No. 227).
`
`5
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 6 of 14 Pg ID 7378
`
`Thus, the claims of these two named IP Plaintiffs were not in the IP Plaintiffs’ SCAC.
`
`Defendants filed a joint “Motion to Dismiss the Gaffet and Strong Electric Indirect
`
`Purchaser Plaintiffs’ Tag-Along Complaints” on May 6, 2011. (Docket Entry No. 239). In this
`
`motion, Defendants challenge the claims in this action on the same grounds raised in their joint
`
`Motion to Dismiss the IP Plaintiffs’ operative complaint, including lack of Constitutional
`
`standing.
`
`In addition, the Tecumseh Defendants filed their own “Motion to Dismiss the Gaffet and
`
`Strong Electric Tag-Along Indirect Purchaser Actions” on May 6, 2011. (Docket Entry No.
`
`240). That motion also includes a challenge based on lack of Constitutional standing.
`
`The IP Plaintiffs File Their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint, Which Now Includes
`Gaffet and Strong Electric, On July 6, 2012.
`
`The Court scheduled a hearing to take place on July 10, 2012. Prior to that hearing, the
`
`Court advised counsel for the parties to familiarize themselves with In re Packaged Ice Antitrust
`
`Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d 642, (E.D. Mich. 2011) prior to the hearing.
`
`Thereafter, the IP Plaintiffs sought leave to file an amended complaint. (See Docket
`
`Entry Nos. 307, 311 & 312).
`
`Following a Status Conference, the parties agreed that: 1) Defendants do not oppose the
`
`IP Plaintiffs’ requests to file an amended complaint as requested in Docket Entry Nos. 307, 311
`
`and 312; 2) Defendants reserved all issues raised in their pending motions; and 3) the IP
`
`Plaintiffs would file their amended complaint by July 6, 2012. (See 6/29/12 Order, D.E. No.
`
`313).
`
`The IP Plaintiffs filed their Third Consolidated Amended Complaint (“TCAC”) on July
`
`6
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 7 of 14 Pg ID 7379
`
`6, 2012. The TCAC now includes allegations as to where each of the named IP Plaintiffs
`
`purchased their respective compressor products and where they sustained injury. The TCAC
`
`also added the two “tag-along” IP Plaintiffs (Gaffet and Strong Electric) and two new named IP
`
`Plaintiffs (Peter Jacobus and Steve Larson).
`
`On July 10, 2012, the Court heard oral argument on the Constitutional standing issue.
`
`ANALYSIS
`
`I.
`
`Should This Court Address The Constitutional Standing Issue Now Or Defer Any
`Ruling Until The Class Certification Stage?
`
`“Standing to pursue a claim is a threshold question in every federal case.” McGlone v.
`
`Bell, __ F.3d __, 2012 WL 1403233 at *7 (6th Cir. 2012). The burden of establishing standing
`
`is on the party seeking federal court action. Id.; see also Wuliger v. Mfrs. Life Ins. Co., 567 F.3d
`
`787, 793 (6th Cir. 2009) (“A plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating standing and must plead
`
`its components with specificity.”). “To establish Article III, constitutional standing, a plaintiff
`
`must show: (1) it has suffered an injury in fact that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b)
`
`actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
`
`challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the
`
`injury will be redressed by a favorable decision.” McGlone, supra, at * 8; Wuligar, 567 F.3d at
`
`793.
`
`Defendants contend that the named IP Plaintiffs lack standing to bring claims under the
`
`laws of states/territories where no named IP Plaintiff claims to reside or have been injured.
`
`Defendants contend that a claim cannot be asserted on behalf of a class unless at least one named
`
`plaintiff has suffered the injury that gives rise to that claim and that courts regularly dismiss
`
`7
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 8 of 14 Pg ID 7380
`
`indirect purchasers’ state law claims where, as here, no named plaintiff has standing to pursue
`
`such claims. They direct the Court to decisions from several district courts concerning antitrust
`
`MDL cases.
`
`In response, the IP Plaintiffs do not deny their burden of establishing Article III standing.
`
`They assert, however, that Defendants have raised this issue prematurely. They contend that the
`
`Court should not consider the Constitutional standing issue until the class certification stage.
`
` “In the cases of Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 117 S.Ct. 2231, 138
`
`L.Ed.2d 689 (1997) and Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 119 S.Ct. 2295, 144 L.Ed.2d
`
`715 (1999), the Supreme Court considered the question whether a determination of standing or a
`
`determination of class certification should come first.” Smith v. Lawyers Title Ins. Corp., 2009
`
`WL 514210 (E.D. Mich. 2009, J. Murphy). “In those cases, the Supreme Court found that since
`
`the class certification issue was ‘logically antecedent” to the standing issue, it was appropriate to
`
`consider class certification first, instead of standing.” Smith, supra (citing Amchem and Ortiz).
`
`There is currently a split among federal courts as to the application of the “logical
`
`antecedent” language and the question of whether standing can be considered prior to class
`
`certification in class action lawsuits. Id.
`
`At least two district courts in the Eastern District of Michigan have concluded that
`
`standing can, and should be, considered prior to class certification. Smith, supra; In re Packaged
`
`Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d 642, (E.D. Mich. 2011).
`
`Like this case, In re Packaged Ice was an MDL putative class action and indirect
`
`purchaser plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting antitrust and consumer protection act claims
`
`8
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 9 of 14 Pg ID 7381
`
`under the laws of numerous states. As in this case, the defendants in In re Packaged Ice asserted
`
`that the IP Plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under the law of states where no named Plaintiff
`
`resides. The IP Plaintiffs in that case, like the IP Plaintiffs here, asserted that the standing
`
`challenge was premature and that the court should defer its decision until the class certification
`
`stage. The court noted that the federal courts are split on this issue, that the Sixth Circuit has not
`
`ruled on this issue, and that district courts within this district have issued conflicting opinions on
`
`the subject. In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d at 654.
`
`The court noted that two Supreme Court opinions, Ortiz and Amchem “are at the heart of
`
`the issue.” In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d at 654. The court concluded, as
`
`did the Ninth Circuit in Easter, that “neither Ortiz nor Amchem requires that Article III standing
`
`issues be deferred until a class has been certified.” Id. (emphasis added) The court agreed with
`
`the Easter court that although Ortiz examined class issues before the question of Article III
`
`standing, it did so in the very specific context of a mandatory global settlement class and that the
`
`decision does not require courts to consider class certification before standing. Id. The court
`
`explained:
`
`The IP Plaintiffs cite a string of cases holding that the issue of class certification
`may be addressed prior to the threshold issue of standing. None of these cases is
`from the Sixth Circuit and none is binding on this Court. This Court chooses to
`follow what it finds to be the better-reasoned opinions on this issue which
`recognize and refuse to abandon the fundamental prudential standing
`requirements of Article III. See, e.g., Easter and Wellbutrin. The Court
`concludes that many of those courts that have adopted the “but for” approach, and
`put off for another day this fundamental inquiry, ignore the limited context in
`which Ortiz and Amchem permit the Article III standing analysis to be deferred.
`As in Wellbutrin, “[t]his case does not present an issue that is “logically
`antecedent” to a standing inquiry. The standing issues in Ortiz and Amchem
`related to proposed class members, i.e., persons who were not yet parties to the
`
`9
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 10 of 14 Pg ID 7382
`
`case. It would be illogical to find that a non-party lacks standing to pursue a
`claim precisely because they are not pursuing a claim. Thus, the question of
`whether the proposed class members could become parties to the case was
`logically antecedent to the question of whether they had standing to make claims
`against the defendants in those cases. In this case, however, the Court reviews the
`standing of actual, not proposed, plaintiffs.” Wellbutrin, 260 F.R.D. at 154. In
`cases such as the instant case, where the putative plaintiffs’ injury is in doubt,
`Article III standing issues should be resolved in the first instance.
`
`Id. at 656.
`
`The court found another district court’s discussion of this standing issue, in the context of
`
`a class action in which the named plaintiffs sought to bring claims under the laws of states where
`
`no named plaintiff were located, to be persuasive. Id. (citing In re Wellbrutrin XL Antitrust
`
`Litig., 260 F.R.D. 143 (E.D. Pa. 2009)). It quoted from that decision, a paragraph that concisely
`
`explains why, as a practical matter, the plaintiffs’ position should be rejected in cases like this:
`
`The alternative proposed by the plaintiffs would allow named plaintiffs in a
`proposed class action, with no injuries in relation to the laws of certain states
`referenced in their complaint, to embark on lengthy class discovery with respect
`to injuries in potentially every state in the Union. At the conclusion of discovery,
`the plaintiffs would apply for class certification, proposing to represent the claims
`of parties whose injuries and modes of redress they would not share. That would
`present the precise problem that the limitations of standing seek to avoid. The
`Court will not indulge in the prolonged and expensive implications of the
`plaintiffs’ position only to be faced with the same problem months down the road.
`
`Id. (quoting In re Wellbrutrin XL Antitrust Litig., 260 F.R.D. at 155).
`
`This Court finds In re Packaged Ice and Wellbrutrin XL Antitrust Litig. persuasive and
`
`concludes that the standing issue should be addressed now.
`
`II.
`
`Do The Named IP Plaintiffs Have Constitutional Standing To Assert The Claims In
`The TCAC?
`
`10
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 11 of 14 Pg ID 7383
`
`This Court must now determine whether the named IP Plaintiffs have Constitutional
`
`standing to assert the claims in the TCAC.
`
`After determining that the standing issue does not have to be deferred, the district court in
`
`In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig. then proceeded to address whether the named IP Plaintiffs had
`
`standing. In re Packaged Ice Antitrust Litig., 779 F.Supp.2d at 657. There, the named IP
`
`Plaintiffs resided in five states yet asserted claims in 26 additional states in which admittedly
`
`none of them resided. Id. The court concluded that the named IP Plaintiffs did have standing to
`
`assert claims under the laws of their respective home states, noting that their complaint alleged
`
`that the named IP Plaintiffs suffered injury in their home states. Id. at 659.
`
`The court also concluded, however, that as in many cases in which “courts have chosen
`
`to address the standing issue prior to class certification, named plaintiffs lack standing to assert
`
`claims under the laws of the states in which they do not reside or in which they suffered no jury.”
`
`Id. (citations omitted). The court noted that the “IP Plaintiffs’ claims under the antitrust and
`
`consumer protection act claims of states in which they do not reside do ‘little more than name
`
`the preserve on which they intend to hunt.’” Id. (quoting Cornelius v. Fidelity Nat’l Title Co.,
`
`2009 WL 596585 (D. Wash. 2009)). It concluded that the IP Plaintiffs’ complaint “fails to name
`
`plaintiffs who have suffered the injuries giving rise to claims under the laws of any of the states
`
`in which the named Plaintiffs do not reside. The current Plaintiffs have no standing to bring
`
`those claims.” Id. at 659. Thus, the court dismissed the IP Plaintiffs’ claims under the laws of
`
`26 states.
`
`In this case, the IP Plaintiffs seek to assert state-law antitrust, consumer protection act,
`
`and unjust enrichment claims against Defendants under the laws of Puerto Rico, Washington
`
`11
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 12 of 14 Pg ID 7384
`
`D.C., and 27 different states. The SCAC included twenty-one named IP Plaintiffs who reside in,
`
`or have their principal place of business in, the following states/territories: Arizona; California;
`
`District of Columbia; Kansas; New Hampshire; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina;
`
`Michigan; West Virginia; Wisconsin; Rhode Island; Maine; Nebraska; Minnesota; Florida;
`
`Tennessee; and Massachusetts.
`
`The SCAC alleged that the named IP Plaintiffs “purchased Hermetic Compressor
`
`Products as end payors, and not for resale, manufactured by one or more Defendants. As a result
`
`of the conspiracy alleged, Plaintiffs suffered pecuniary injury.” (SCAC at ¶ 19). Notably,
`
`however, with the exception of one named IP Plaintiff (Royal W. Leith), the SCAC did not
`
`allege where any of the named IP Plaintiffs’ alleged purchases took place or where they claim to
`
`have suffered any injury.
`
`The IP Plaintiffs’ Third Consolidated Amended Complaint (“TCAC”), now alleges where
`
`each of the named IP Plaintiffs purchased their respective Hermetic Compressor Products and
`
`claims to have suffered injury.
`
`It is undisputed that at least one named IP Plaintiff has Constitutional standing to assert
`
`claims under the laws of the followings states/territories: Arizona; California; District of
`
`Columbia; Kansas; New Hampshire; New Mexico; New York; North Carolina; Michigan; West
`
`Virginia; Wisconsin; Rhode Island; Maine; Nebraska; Minnesota; Florida; Tennessee; and
`
`Massachusetts.
`
`Defendants contend that the TCAC’s claims asserted under the laws of all remaining
`
`states and territories, however, must be dismissed for lack of standing.
`
`These remaining claims are akin to the claims that were dismissed in In re Packaged Ice
`
`12
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 13 of 14 Pg ID 7385
`
`and In re Wellbrutrin because no named IP Plaintiff resides in or was injured in those states.
`
`The TCAC contains no factual allegations that connect any injuries by the named IP Plaintiffs to
`
`any causes of action arising in these states. Thus, the TCAC alleges no facts “on which to find a
`
`connection between an alleged injury and some wrongful conduct that would implicate the laws
`
`of” these states in which no named IP Plaintiff resides. In re Wellbrutrin, 260 F.R.D. at 157.
`
`Accordingly, the Court concludes that the claims in the TCAC that are asserted under the laws of
`
`the following states/territories must be DISMISSED for lack of Constitutional standing:
`
`Arkansas; Hawaii1; Iowa; Louisiana; Mississippi; Nevada; North Dakota; Puerto Rico; South
`
`Dakota; Utah; and Vermont.
`
`CONCLUSION & ORDER
`
`For the reasons set forth above, Defendants’ pending motions to dismiss are GRANTED
`
`IN PART. The motions are GRANTED to the extent that the Court ORDERS that the IP
`
`Plaintiffs’ claims in the TCAC, asserted under the laws of the following states/territories, are
`
`DISMISSED: 1) Arkansas; 2) Hawaii; 3) Iowa; 4) Louisiana; 5) Mississippi; 6) Nevada; 7)
`
`North Dakota; 8) Puerto Rico; 9) South Dakota; 10) Utah; and 11) Vermont.
`
`IT IS SO ORDERED.
`
`Dated: July 17, 2012
`
`S/Sean F. Cox
`Sean F. Cox
`United States District Judge
`
`1The IP Plaintiffs’ SCAC included claims asserted under Hawaii law. Their TCAC no
`longer asserts claims under the law of Hawaii but the IP Plaintiffs had not advised the Court that
`they intended to dismiss claims asserted under Hawaii law. The Court therefore includes Hawaii
`here, in the event that claims asserted under Hawaii law were deleted in error.
`
`13
`
`

`
`2:09-md-02042-SFC Doc # 319 Filed 07/17/12 Pg 14 of 14 Pg ID 7386
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
`SOUTHERN DIVISION
`
`In re: Refrigerant Compressors
`Antitrust Litigation
`
`___________________________/
`
`Case No. 2:09-md-02042
`
`Honorable Sean F. Cox
`United States District Court
`
`PROOF OF SERVICE
`
`I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing document was served upon counsel of record
`
`on July 17, 2012, by electronic and/or ordinary mail.
`
`S/Jennifer Hernandez
`Case Manager
`
`14