Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39261 Filed 05/07/21 Page 1 of 28
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`EXHIBIT 4
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39262 Filed 05/07/21 Page 2 of 28
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`472 U.S. 797
`
`472 U.S. 797, 86 L.Ed.2d 628
`.J.z.91PHILLIPS PETROLEUM
`COMPANY, Petitioner
`
`2965
`
`PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. SHUTTS
`Cite as 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985)
`2. Federal Civil Procedure €=>103.2
`Generally stated, federal standing re(cid:173)
`quires allegation of present or immediate
`injury in fact, where party requesting
`standing has alleged such personal stake in
`outcome of controversy as to assure that
`concrete adverseness which sharpens pre(cid:173)
`sentation of issues; there must be some
`causal connection between asserted injury
`and challenged action, and injury must be
`of the type likely to be redressed by favor(cid:173)
`able decision.
`
`v.
`Irl SHUTTS, et al.
`No. 84-233.
`
`Argued Feb. 25, 1985.
`Decided June 26, 1985.
`
`Class action was brought by gas com(cid:173)
`pany investors to recover interest on royal(cid:173)
`ties suspended pending final administrative
`approval of gas price increase. The Dis(cid:173)
`trict Court, Seward County, Keaton G.
`Duckworth, J., entered judgment for the
`class, and gas company appealed. The Su(cid:173)
`preme Court of Kansas, 235 Kan. 195, 679
`P.2d 1159, affirmed as modified. Certiora(cid:173)
`ri was granted. The Supreme Court, Jus(cid:173)
`tice Rehnquist, held that: (1) gas company
`had standing to assert that Kansas did not
`possess jurisdiction over investors who
`were not Kansas residents and had no con(cid:173)
`nection to Kansas where gas company
`would suffer injury by being bound by the
`judgment without having non-Kansas in(cid:173)
`vestors also bound; (2) procedure followed
`by Kansas whereby fully descriptive notice
`was sent first-class mail to each member
`with explanation of right to opt out satis(cid:173)
`fied due process; and (3) Kansas law was
`not applicable to claims of all class mem(cid:173)
`bers.
`Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
`remanded.
`Jqstice Stevens filed an opinion concur(cid:173)
`ring in part and dissenting in part.
`Opinion on remand, 240 Kan. 764, 732
`P.2d 1286.
`
`1. Federal Civil Procedure €=>103.1
`Standing to sue in any Article III court
`is federal question which does not depend
`on party's prior standing in state court.
`U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 3, § 1 et seq.
`
`3. Federal Civil Procedure <S=>103.4
`One prudential limit on standing is that
`litigant must normally assert his own legal
`interests rather than those of third parties.
`
`4. Judgment <S=>660½
`Judgment issued without proper per(cid:173)
`sonal jurisdiction over absent party is not
`entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere
`and thus has no res judicata effect as to
`that party.
`
`5. Judgment €=>677
`The only way class action defendant
`can assure itself of binding effect of judg(cid:173)
`ment is to ascertain that forum court has
`jurisdiction over every plaintiff whose
`claim it seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to
`support defense of res judicata in later suit
`for damages by class members.
`
`6. Federal Civil Procedure ¢=>103.7
`Gas company against which class ac(cid:173)
`tion was brought by investors to recover
`interest on royalties suspended pending fi(cid:173)
`nal administrative approval of gas price
`increase had standing to assert claim that
`Kansas did not have jurisdiction over inves(cid:173)
`tors in the class who were not Kansas
`residents and had no connection to Kansas
`where gas company would sustain injury
`by being subjected to res judicata effect of
`the Kansas judgment while non-Kansas in(cid:173)
`vestors would not be so bound.
`
`7. Federal Courts <S=>76.5
`Purpose of minimum contacts test is to
`protect defendant from travail of defending
`in distant forum, unless defendant's con-
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39263 Filed 05/07/21 Page 3 of 28
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`2966
`
`105 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
`
`472 U.S. 797
`
`tacts with forum make it just to force him
`to defend there.
`
`8. Constitutional Law <S=:>309(1.5)
`Because states place fewer burdens
`upon absent class plaintiffs than they do
`upon absent defendants in nonclass suits,
`due process clause need not and does not
`afford former as much protection from
`state court jurisdiction as it does the latter.
`U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
`
`9. Constitutional Law <S=:>309(1.5)
`Forum state may exercise jurisdiction
`over claim of absent plaintiff in class action
`seeking to bind known plaintiffs concerning
`claims wholly or predominantly for money
`judgments, even though that plaintiff may
`not possess minimum contacts with forum
`which would support personal jurisdiction
`over defendant; if forum state wishes to
`bind absent plaintiff concerning claim for
`money damages or similar relief at law, it
`must provide minimal procedural due pro(cid:173)
`cess protection: plaintiff must receive no(cid:173)
`tice plus opportunity to be heard and par(cid:173)
`ticipate in litigation, whether in person or
`through counsel, and notice must be the
`best practicable, reasonably calculated un(cid:173)
`der all the circumstances to apprise inter(cid:173)
`ested parties of pendency of action and
`afford them opportunity to present their
`objections. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
`
`10. Constitutional Law <S=:>309(1.5)
`Due process requires at a minimum
`that an absent plaintiff in class action seek(cid:173)
`ing to bind known plaintiffs concerning
`claims wholly or predominantly for money
`judgments be provided with opportunity to
`remove himself from the class by executing
`and returning "opt out" or "request for
`exclusion" form to the court. U.S.C.A.
`Const.Amend. 14.
`
`11. Federal Courts <S=:>31
`Any plaintiff may consent to jurisdic(cid:173)
`tion.
`* The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion
`of the Court but has been prepared by the Re(cid:173)
`porter of Decisions for the convenience of the
`
`12. Constitutional Law <S=:>309(1.5)
`Kansas' procedure in class action seek(cid:173)
`ing to bind absent but known plaintiffs
`concerning claims wholly or predominantly
`for money judgments whereby fully de(cid:173)
`scriptive notice is sent first-class mail to
`each class member with explanation of
`right to "opt out" satisfied due process.
`Rules Civ.Proc., K.S.A. 60-223 et seq.; U.S.
`C.A. Const.Amend. 14.
`13. Constitutional Law <S=:>305(1)
`States <S=:>5½
`In class action brought by gas compa(cid:173)
`ny investors to recover interest on royalties
`suspended pending final administrative ap(cid:173)
`proval of gas price increase, application of
`Kansas law to all of the investors' claims
`for interest violated due process and full
`faith and credit clauses where Kansas law
`conflicted with Oklahoma and Texas law on
`award of interest and where over 99% of
`gas leases involved and some 97% of inves(cid:173)
`tors had no apparent connection to Kansas.
`U.S.C.A. Const. Art. 4, § 1; Amend. 14.
`
`Syllabus•
`During the 1970's, petitioner produced
`or purchased natural gas from leased land
`located in 11 States. Respondents, royalty
`owners possessing rights to leases from
`which petitioner produced the gas, brought
`a class action against petitioner in a Kan(cid:173)
`sas state court, seeking to recover interest
`on royalty payments that had been delayed
`by petitioner. The trial court certified a
`class consisting of 33,000 royalty owners.
`Respondents provided each class member
`with a notice by first-class mail describing
`the action and informing each member that
`he could appear in person or by counsel,
`that otherwise he would be represented by
`respondents, and that class members would
`be included in the class and bound by the
`judgment unless they "opted out" of the
`action by returning a "request for exclu(cid:173)
`sion." The final class consisted of some
`28,000 members, who reside
`in all 50
`
`reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co.,
`200 U.S. 321, 337, 26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed.
`499.
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39264 Filed 05/07/21 Page 4 of 28
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`472 U.S. 799
`
`2967
`
`PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. SHUTTS
`Cite as 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985)
`procedure followed by Kansas, where a
`States, the District of Columbia, and sever(cid:173)
`al foreign countries. Notwithstanding that
`fully descriptive notice is sent by first-class
`over 99% of the gas leases in question and
`mail to each class member, with an expla(cid:173)
`some 97% of the plaintiff class members
`nation of the right to "opt out," satisfies
`had no apparent connection to Kansas ex(cid:173)
`due process. The interests of the absent
`cept for the lawsuit, the trial court applied
`plaintiff class members are sufficiently
`Kansas contract and equity law to every
`protected by the forum State when those
`claim and found petitioner liable for inter(cid:173)
`plaintiffs are provided with a request for
`est on the suspended royalties to all class
`exclusion that can be returned within a
`members. The Kansas Supreme Court af(cid:173)
`reasonable time to the trial court. Pp.
`firmed over petitioner's contentions that
`2971-2976.
`the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
`3. The Kansas Supreme Court erred
`Amendment prevented Kansas from adjudi(cid:173)
`in deciding that the application of Kansas
`cating the claims of all the class members,
`law to all claims would be constitutional.
`and that that Clause and the Full Faith and
`Kansas must have a "significant contact or
`Credit Clause prohibited application of
`aggregation of contacts" to the claims as(cid:173)
`Kansas law to all of the transactions be(cid:173)
`serted by each plaintiff class member in
`tween petitioner and the class members.
`order to ensure that the choice of Kansas
`Held:
`law was not arbitrary or unfair. Given
`1. Petitioner has standing to assert
`Kansas' lack of "interest" in claims un(cid:173)
`the claim that Kansas did not have jurisdic(cid:173)
`related to that State, and the substantive
`tion over the class members who were not
`conflict between Kansas law and the law of
`Kansas residents and had no connection to
`other States, such as Texas, where some of
`Kansas. Whether it wins or loses on the
`the leased land in question is located, appli(cid:173)
`merits, petitioner has a distinct and person(cid:173)
`cation of Kansas law to every claim in this
`al interest in seeing the entire plaintiff
`case was sufficiently arbitrary and unfair
`class bound by res judicata just as petition(cid:173)
`as to exceed constitutional limits. Pp.
`er is bound. The only way petitioner can
`2976-2980.
`assure itself of this binding effect is to
`235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984)
`ascertain that the forum court has jurisdic(cid:173)
`affirmed in part, reversed in part, and re(cid:173)
`tion over every plaintiff whose claim it
`manded.
`seeks to adjudicate, sufficient to support a
`res judicata defense in a later suit by class
`members. The alleged injury petitioner
`would incur if the class-action judgment
`against it became final without binding the
`plaintiff class is sufficient to give petition(cid:173)
`er standing on its own right to raise the
`jurisdiction claim in this Court. Pp. 2969-
`2971.
`.Ji982. The Kansas trial court properly
`asserted personal jurisdiction over the ab(cid:173)
`sent plaintiff class members and their
`claims against petitioner. The Due Process
`Clause requires notice, an opportunity to
`appear in person or by counsel, an opportu(cid:173)
`nity to "opt out," and adequate representa(cid:173)
`tion. It does not require that absent class
`members affirmatively "opt in" to the
`class, rather than be deemed members of
`the class if they did not "opt out." The
`
`.Jl9gJustice REHNQUIST delivered the
`opinion of the Court.
`Petitioner is a Delaware corporation
`which has its principal place of business in
`Oklahoma. During the 1970's it produced
`or purchased natural gas from leased land
`located in 11 different States, and sold
`most of the gas in interstate commerce.
`Respondents are some 28,000 of the royalty
`owners possessing rights to the leases
`from which petitioner produced the gas;
`they reside in all 50 States, the District of
`Columbia, and several foreign countries.
`
`Arthur R. Miller, for petitioner.
`Joel I. Klein, Washington, D.C., for re(cid:173)
`spondents.
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39265 Filed 05/07/21 Page 5 of 28
`
`2968
`
`105 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
`
`472 U.S. 799
`
`Respondents brought a class action against
`petitioner in the Kansas state court, seek(cid:173)
`ing to recover interest on royalty payments
`which had been delayed by petitioner.
`They recovered judgment in the trial court,
`and the Supreme Court of Kansas affirmed
`the judgment over petitioner's contentions
`that the Due Process Clause of the Four(cid:173)
`teenth Amendment prevented Kansas from
`adjudicating the claims of all the respon(cid:173)
`dents, and that the Due Process Clause and
`the Full Faith and Credit Clause of Article
`IV of the Constitution prohibited the appli(cid:173)
`cation of Kansas law to all of the transac(cid:173)
`tions between petitioner and respondents.
`285 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984). We
`granted certiorari to consider these claims.
`469 U.S. 879, 105 S.Ct. 242, 88 L.Ed.2d 181
`(1984). We reject petitioner's jurisdictional
`claim, but sustain its claim regarding the
`choice of law.
`Because petitioner sold the gas to its
`customers in interstate commerce, it was
`required to secure approval for price in(cid:173)
`creases from what was then the Federal
`Power Commission, and is now the Federal
`Energy Regulatory Commission. Under its
`regulations the Federal Power Commission
`permitted petitioner to propose and collect
`tentative higher gas prices, subject to final
`approval by the Commission.
`If the Com(cid:173)
`mission eventually denied petitioner's pro(cid:173)
`posed price increase or reduced the pro(cid:173)
`posed increase, petitioner woul<!h,00have to
`refund to its customers the difference be(cid:173)
`tween the approved price and the higher
`price charged, plus interest at a rate set by
`statute. See 18 CFR § 154.102 (1984).
`Although petitioner received higher gas
`prices pending review by the Commission,
`petitioner suspended any increase in royal(cid:173)
`ties paid to the royalty owners because the
`higher price could be subject to recoupment
`by petitioner's customers.
`Petitioner
`agreed to pay the higher royalty only if the
`royalty owners would provide petitioner
`with a bond or indemnity for the increase,
`plus interest, in case the price increase was
`not ultimately approved and a refund was
`due to the customers. Petitioner set the
`interest rate on the indemnity agreements
`
`at the same interest rate the Commission
`would have required petitioner to refund to
`its customers. A small percentage of the
`royalty owners provided this indemnity and
`received royalties immediately from the in(cid:173)
`terim price increases; these royalty owners
`are unimportant to this case.
`The remaining royalty owners received
`no royalty on the unapproved portion of the
`prices until the Federal Power Commission
`approval of those prices became final.
`Royalties on the unapproved portion of the
`gas price were suspended three times by
`petitioner, corresponding to its three pro(cid:173)
`posed price increases in the mid-1970's. In
`three written opinions the Commission ap(cid:173)
`proved all of petitioner's tentative price
`increases, so petitioner paid to its royalty
`owners the suspended royalties of $8.7 mil(cid:173)
`lion in 1976, $4.7 million in 1977, and $2.9
`million in 1978. Petitioner paid no interest
`to the royalty owners although it had the
`use of the suspended royalty money for a
`number of years.
`Robert
`Shutts,
`Irl
`Respondents
`Anderson, and Betty Anderson filed suit
`against petitioner in Kansas state court,
`seeking interest payments on their sus(cid:173)
`pended royalties which petitioner had pos(cid:173)
`sessed pending the Commission's approval
`of the price increases. Shutts is a resident
`of Kansas, and the Andersons live in Okla(cid:173)
`homa. Shutts and the AndE:!!_ons801 own
`gas leases in Oklahoma and Texas. Over
`petitioner's objection the Kansas trial court
`granted respondents' motion to certify the
`suit as a class action under Kansas law.
`Kan.Stat.Ann. § 60-228 et seq. (1988). The
`class as certified was comprised of 88,000
`royalty owners who had royalties suspend(cid:173)
`ed by petitioner. The average claim of
`each royalty owner for interest on the sus(cid:173)
`pended royalties was $100.
`After the class was certified respondents
`provided each class member with notice
`through first-class mail. The notice de(cid:173)
`scribed the action and informed each class
`member that he could appear in person or
`by counsel; otherwise each member would
`be
`represented by Shutts
`and
`the
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39266 Filed 05/07/21 Page 6 of 28
`
`2969
`
`472 U.S. 803
`
`PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. SHUTTS
`Cite as 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985)
`Andersons, the named plaintiffs. The no(cid:173)
`The trial court in the present case ap(cid:173)
`tices also stated that class members would
`plied the rule from Shutts, Executor, and
`be included in the class and bound by the
`held petitioner liable for prejudgment and
`judgment unless they "opted out" of the
`postjudgment interest on the suspended
`lawsuit by executing and returning a "re(cid:173)
`royalties, computed at the Commission
`quest for exclusion" that was included with
`rates governing petitioner's three price in(cid:173)
`the notice. The final class as certified con(cid:173)
`creases. See 18 CFR § 154.102 (1984).
`tained 28,100 members; 3,400 had "opted
`The applicable interest rates were: 7% for
`out" of the class by returning the request
`royalties retained until October 197 4; 9%
`for exclusion, and notice could not be deliv(cid:173)
`for royalties retained between October
`ered to another 1,500 members, who were
`197 4 and September 1979; and thereafter
`also excluded. Less than 1,000 of the class
`at the average prime rate. The trial court
`members resided in Kansas. Only a minus(cid:173)
`did not determine whether any difference
`cule amount, approximately one quarter of
`existed between the laws of Kansas and
`one percent, of the gas leases involved in
`other States, or whether another State's
`the lawsuit were on Kansas land.
`laws should be applied to non-Kansas plain(cid:173)
`After petitioner's mandamus petition to
`tiffs or to royalties from leases in States
`decertify the class was denied, Phillips
`other than Kansas. 235 Kan., at 221, 679
`Petroleum v. Duckworth, No. 82-54608
`P.2d, at 1180.
`(Kan., June 28, 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S.
`Petitioner raised two principal claims in
`1103, 103 S.Ct. 725, 74 L.Ed.2d 951 (1983),
`its appeal to the Supreme Court of Kansas.
`the case was tried to the court. The court
`It first asserted that the Kansas trial court
`found petitioner liable under Kansas law
`did not possess personal jurisdiction over
`for interest on the suspended royalties to
`absent plaintiff class members as required
`all class members. The trial court relied
`by International Shoe Co. v. Washington,
`heavily on an earlier, unrelated class action
`326 U.S. 310, 66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95
`involving the same nominal plaintiff and
`(1945), and similar cases. Related to this
`the same defendant, Shutts, Executor v.
`first claim was petitioner's contention that
`Phillips Petroleum Co., 222 Kan. 527, 567
`the "opt-out" notice to absent class mem(cid:173)
`P.2d 1292 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
`bers, which forced them to return the re(cid:173)
`1068, 98 S.Ct. 1246, 55 L.Ed.2d 769 (1978).
`quest for exclusion in order to avoid the
`The Kansas Supreme Court had held in
`suit, was insufficient to bind class members
`Shutts, Executor that a gas company owed
`who were not residents of Kansas or who
`interest to royalty owners for royalties sus(cid:173)
`did not possess "minimum contacts" with
`pended pending final Commission approval
`Kansas. Second, petitioner claimed that
`of a price increase. No federal statutes
`Kansas courts could not apply Kansas law
`...il02touched on the liability for suspended
`to every claim in the dispute. The trial
`royalties, and the court in Shutts, Execu(cid:173)
`court should have looked to the laws of
`tor held as a matter of Kansas equity law
`each State .Jlo3where the leases were located
`that the applicable interest rates for com(cid:173)
`to determine, on the basis of conflict of
`putation of interest on suspended royalties
`laws principles, whether interest on the
`were the interest rates at which the gas
`suspended royalties was recoverable, and
`company would have had to reimburse its
`at what rate.
`customers had its interim price increase
`The Supreme Court of Kansas held that
`been rejected by the Commission. The
`the entire cause of action was maintainable
`court in Shutts, Executor viewed these as
`under the Kansas class-action statute, and
`the fairest interest rates because they were
`the court rejected both of petitioner's
`also the rates that petitioner required the
`royalty owners to meet in their indemnity
`claims. 235 Kan. 195, 679 P.2d 1159 (1984).
`agreements in order to avoid suspended
`First, it held that the absent class members
`royalties.
`were plaintiffs, not defendants, and thus
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39267 Filed 05/07/21 Page 7 of 28
`
`2970
`
`105 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
`
`472 U.S. 803
`
`the traditional minimum contacts test of
`International Shoe did not apply. The
`court held that nonresident class-action
`plaintiffs were only entitled to adequate
`notice, an opportunity to be heard, an op(cid:173)
`portunity to opt out of the case, and ade(cid:173)
`quate representation by the named plain(cid:173)
`tiffs. If these procedural due process mini(cid:173)
`ma were met, according to the court, Kan(cid:173)
`sas could assert jurisdiction over the plain(cid:173)
`tiff class and bind each class member with
`a judgment on his claim. The court sur(cid:173)
`veyed the course of the litigation and con(cid:173)
`cluded that all of these minima had been
`met.
`The court also rejected petitioner's con(cid:173)
`tention that Kansas law could not be ap(cid:173)
`plied to plaintiffs and royalty arrange(cid:173)
`ments having no connection with Kansas.
`The court stated that generally the law of
`the forum controlled all claims unless
`"compelling reasons" existed to apply a
`different law. The court found no compel(cid:173)
`ling reasons, and noted that "[t]he plaintiff
`class members have indicated their desire
`to have this action determined under the
`laws of Kansas." 235 Kan., at 222, 679
`P.2d, at 1181. The court affirmed as a
`matter of Kansas equity law the award of
`interest on the suspended royalties, at the
`rates imposed by the trial court. The court
`set the postjudgment interest rate on all
`claims at the Kansas statutory rate of 15%.
`Id., at 224, 679 P.2d, at 1183.
`
`I
`As a threshold matter we must deter(cid:173)
`mine whether petitioner has standing to
`assert the claim that Kansas did not pos(cid:173)
`sess proper jurisdiction over the many
`plaintiffs in th~class who were not Kan(cid:173)
`sas residents and had no connection to
`Kansas. Respondents claim that a party
`generally may assert only his own rights,
`and that petitioner has no standing to as(cid:173)
`sert the rights of its adversary, the plain(cid:173)
`tiff class, in order to defeat the judgment
`in favor of the class.
`[1, 2] Standing to sue in any Article III
`court is, of course, a federal question which
`
`does not depend on the party's prior stand(cid:173)
`ing in state court. Doremus v. Board of
`Education, 342 U.S. 429, 434, 72 S.Ct. 394,
`397, 96 L.Ed. 475 (1952); Baker v. Carr,
`369 U.S. 186, 204, 82 S.Ct. 691, 703, 7
`L.Ed.2d 663 (1962). Generally stated, fed(cid:173)
`eral standing requires an allegation of a
`present or immediate injury in fact, where
`the party requesting standing has "alleged
`such a personal stake in the outcome of the
`controversy as to assure that concrete ad(cid:173)
`verseness which sharpens the presentation
`of issues."
`Ibid. There must be some
`causal connection between the asserted in(cid:173)
`jury and the challenged action, and the
`injury must be of the type "likely to be
`redressed by a favorable decision." Valley
`Forge Christian College v. Americans
`United for Separation of Church and
`State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472,102 S.Ct. 752,
`758, 70 L.Ed.2d 700 (1982). See Simon v.
`Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org.,
`426 U.S. 26, 41-42, 96 S.Ct. 1917, 1925-
`1926, 48 L.Ed.2d 450 (1976); Arlington
`Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
`Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261, 97 S.Ct. 555, 561,
`50 L.Ed.2d 450 (1977).
`[3] Additional prudential limitations on
`standing may exist even though the Article
`III requirements are met because "the judi(cid:173)
`ciary seeks to avoid deciding questions of
`broad social import where no individual
`rights would be vindicated and to limit ac(cid:173)
`cess to the federal courts to those litigants
`best suited to assert a particular claim."
`Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bell(cid:173)
`wood, 441 U.S. 91, 99-100, 99 S.Ct. 1601,
`1607-1608, 60 L.Ed.2d 66 (1979). One of
`these prudential limits on standing is that a
`litigant must normally assert his own legal
`interests rather than those of third parties.
`See Singleton v. WuljJ, 428 U.S. 106, 96
`S.Ct. 2868, 49 L.Ed.2d 826 (1976); Craig v.
`Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 97 S.Ct. 451, 50
`L.Ed.2d 397 (1976).
`that petitioner is
`Respondents claim
`barred by the rule requiring that a party
`assert only his own rights; they point out
`that respondents and petitioner are adver(cid:173)
`saries and do...1105not have allied interests
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39268 Filed 05/07/21 Page 8 of 28
`
`472 U.S. 806
`
`2971
`
`PHILLIPS PETROLEUM CO. v. SHUTTS
`Cite as 105 S.Ct. 2965 (1985)
`such that petitioner would be a good propo- Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 78 S.Ct. 1228, 2
`nent of class members' interests. They L.Ed.2d 1283 (1958), who we found to have
`further urge that petitioner's interference
`standing to challenge the forum's personal
`is unneeded because the class members _L,soojurisdiction over an out-of-state trust
`have had opportunity to complain about
`company which was an indispensable party
`Kansas' assertion of jurisdiction over their
`under the forum State's law. Because the
`claim, but none have done so. See Single-
`court could not proceed with the action
`ton, supra, 428 U.S., at 113-114, 96 S.Ct., without jurisdiction over the trust compa(cid:173)
`at 2873-2874.
`ny, we observed that "any defendant af-
`[4, 5] Respondents may be correct that
`fected by the court's judgment ha[d] that
`petitioner does not possess standing jus
`'direct and substantial personal interest in
`tertii, but this is not the issue. Petitioner
`the outcome' that is necessary to challenge
`seeks to vindicate its own interests. As a whether that jurisdiction was in fact ac(cid:173)
`Id., at 245, 78 S.Ct., at 1235,
`class-action defendant petitioner is in a
`quired."
`If Kansas does not quoting Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.
`unique predicament.
`possess jurisdiction over this plaintiff class, Co., 357 U.S. 77, 78 S.Ct. 1063, 2 L.Ed.2d
`petitioner will be bound to 28,100 judgment
`1174 (1958).
`holders scattered across the globe, but
`none of these will be bound by the Kansas
`decree. Petitioner could be subject to nu(cid:173)
`merous later individual suits by these class
`members because a judgment issued with(cid:173)
`out proper personal jurisdiction over an
`absent party is not entitled to full faith and
`credit elsewhere and thus has no res judica(cid:173)
`ta effect as to that party. Whether it wins
`or loses on the merits, ~titioner has a
`distinct and personal interest in seeing the
`entire plaintiff class bound by res judicata
`just as petitioner is bound. The only way a
`class action defendant like petitioner can
`assure itself of this binding effect of the
`judgment is to ascertain that the forum
`court has jurisdiction over every plaintiff
`whose claim it seeks to adjudicate, suffi(cid:173)
`cient to support a defense of res judicata in
`a later suit for damages by class members.
`[6] While it is true that a court adjudi(cid:173)
`cating a dispute may not be able to predet(cid:173)
`ermine the res judicata effect of its own
`judgment, petitioner has alleged that it
`would be obviously and immediately in(cid:173)
`jured if this class-action judgment against
`it became final without binding the plaintiff
`class. We think that such an injury is
`sufficient to give petitioner standing on its
`own right to raise the jurisdiction claim in
`this Court.
`Petitioner's posture is somewhat similar
`to the trust settlor defendant in Hanson v.
`
`II
`Reduced to its essentials, petitioner's ar(cid:173)
`gument is that unless out-of-state plaintiffs
`affirmatively consent, the Kansas courts
`may not exert jurisdiction over their claims.
`Petitioner claims that failure to execute
`and return the "request for exclusion" pro(cid:173)
`vided with the class notice cannot consti(cid:173)
`tute consent of the out-of-state plaintiffs;
`thus Kansas courts may exercise jurisdic(cid:173)
`tion over these plaintiffs only if the plain(cid:173)
`tiffs possess the sufficient "minimum con(cid:173)
`tacts" with Kansas as that term is used in
`cases involving personal jurisdiction over
`out-of-state defendants. E.g., Internation(cid:173)
`al Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,
`66 S.Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945); Shaffer v.
`Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 97 S.Ct. 2569, 53
`L.Ed.2d 683 (1977); World-Wide Volks(cid:173)
`wagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 100
`S.Ct. 559, 62 L.Ed.2d 490 (1980). Since
`Kansas had no prelitigation contact with
`many of the plaintiffs and leases involved,
`petitioner claims that Kansas has exceeded
`its jurisdictional reach and thereby violated
`the due process rights of the absent plain(cid:173)
`tiffs.
`In International Shoe we were faced
`with an out-of-state corporation which
`sought to avoid the exercise of personal
`jurisdiction over it as a defendant by a
`Washington state court. We held that the
`
`

`

`Case 2:12-md-02311-SFC-RSW ECF No. 2137-8, PageID.39269 Filed 05/07/21 Page 9 of 28
`
`2972
`
`105 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
`
`472 U.S. 806
`
`extent of the defendant's due process pro(cid:173)
`tection would depend "upon the quality and
`nature of the activity in relation to the fair
`and
`orderly
`administration
`of
`the
`laws .... " 326 U.S., at 319, 66 S.Ct., at
`159. We noted that the Due Process
`Clause did not permit a State to make a
`binding judgment against a person with
`whom the State had no CO,!ElCts,807 ties, or
`Ibid.
`relations.
`If the defendant pos(cid:173)
`sessed certain minimum contacts with the
`State, so that it was "reasonable and just,
`according to our traditional conception of
`fair play and substantial justice" for a
`State to exercise personal jurisdiction, the
`State could force the defendant to defend
`himself in the forum, upon pain of default,
`and could bind him to a judgment. Id., at
`320, 66 S.Ct., at 160.
`[7] The purpose of this test, of course,
`is to protect a defendant from the travail of
`defending in a distant forum, unless the
`defendant's contacts with the forum make
`it just to force him to defend there. As we
`explained in Woodson, supra, the defend(cid:173)
`ant's contacts should be such that "he
`should reasonably anticipate being haled"
`into the forum. 444 U.S., at 297, 100 S.Ct.,
`at 567. In Insurance Corp. of Ireland v.
`Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456
`U.S. 694, 702--703, and n. 10, 102 S.Ct. 2099,
`2104-2105, and n. 10, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982),
`we explained that the requirement that a
`court have personal jurisdiction comes
`from the Due Process Clause's protection
`of the defendant's personal liberty interest,
`and said that the requirement "represents
`a restriction on judicial power not as a
`matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of
`individual liberty." (Footnote omitted.)
`Although the cases like Shaffer and
`Woodson which petitioner relies on for a
`minimum contacts requirement all dealt
`with out-of-state defendants or parties in
`the procedural posture of a defendant, cf.
`New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dunlevy, 241
`U.S. 518, 36 S.Ct. 613, 60 L.Ed. 1140 (1916);
`Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 68 S.Ct. 1213,
`92 L.Ed. 1561 (1948), petitioner claims that
`the same analysis must apply to absent
`
`class-action plaintiffs. In this regard peti(cid:173)
`tioner correctly points out that a chose in
`action is a constitutionally recognized prop(cid:173)
`erty interest possessed by each of the
`plaintiffs. Mullane v. Central Hanover
`Bank & Trust Co., 339