`United States Court of Appeals
`Tenth Circuit
`February 26, 2016
`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`Elisabeth A. Shumaker
`Clerk of Court
`
`TENTH CIRCUIT
`
`UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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`Plaintiff - Appellee,
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`v.
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`MAURICE ALYN MICKLING,
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` Defendant - Appellant.
`
`No. 15-1089
`(D.C. No. 1:14-CR-00016-RM-1)
`(D. Colo.)
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`ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
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`Before BRISCOE, SEYMOUR and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
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`This is a direct appeal by Maurice Mickling following his convictions on three
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`counts: (1) possession of a firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 U.S.C.
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`§§ 922 and 924; (2) possession of a controlled substance (namely, cocaine base) with
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`intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841; and (3) possession of a firearm in
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`furtherance of a drug trafficking offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). He
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`conceded guilt on Count 1. His only defense to Counts 2 and 3 was that he had possessed
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`the cocaine base for personal use, not for distribution. He was found guilty by a jury on
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`* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
`law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
`persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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`
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`all three counts and sentenced to 192 months’ incarceration, although the advisory
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`sentencing guideline range was much higher.
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`Mickling appeals his convictions on two grounds; both are subject to plain error
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`review. First, he argues that the government’s expert witness, Detective Daniel Wiley,
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`violated Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b), which prohibits an expert in a criminal case
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`from opining on the defendant’s mental state when that mental state is an element of the
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`crime charged. Second, Mickling argues that his due process rights were violated under
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`Napue v. Illinois because the government knowingly offered perjured testimony, which
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`was material, through its fact witness, Rhiannon Cheney.
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`Mickling seeks a reversal on all counts or, in the alternative, a reversal on Counts 2
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`and 3 and a remand on Count 1 for a new trial or resentencing.1 We exercise jurisdiction
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`pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
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`A. Factual Background
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`I
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`Law enforcement officers drove to a hotel in Denver to arrest Mickling on an
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`outstanding warrant. Mickling walked out of the hotel and past an unmarked van in
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`which a SWAT team was sitting. Recognizing him, one of the officers opened the door
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`and ordered him to freeze. Mickling fled, removing a handgun from his waistband and
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`1 Although Mickling does not appeal his conviction on Count 1 or the sentence
`imposed on any count, he suggests the sentencing range on Count 3 was the “driver” of
`the sentence imposed on Count 1. If Count 3 is reversed, Mickling argues the district
`court should have the opportunity to reconsider the sentence imposed on Count 1. He
`offers no argument in support of his request for a new trial on Count 1.
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`2
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`
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`throwing it across the street, and dropping a toiletries bag on the ground. He was
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`apprehended, and the officers retrieved the bag and gun. The bag contained
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`approximately 3.6 grams of cocaine base, a small digital scale, some plastic wrapping,
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`and various personal items. The gun was a nine-millimeter handgun loaded with fifteen
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`rounds, with one round in the chamber. Mickling had approximately $750 in his pocket.
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`B. Trial
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`At trial, the government called Detective Wiley to testify as an expert witness
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`about the drug trade in Denver. Wiley testified that he had reviewed the evidence in the
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`case, and that the physical evidence included approximately 3.6 grams of crack cocaine, a
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`small battery-powered scale, a nine-millimeter handgun, and approximately $750. He
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`was then asked:
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`Q:
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`Now, based upon everything that you have read about this
`case, and looked at in this case, based upon your experience
`and training, purchasing drugs, and working narcotic cases as
`an investigator, have you formed an opinion as to whether or
`not the crack cocaine as in Government’s Exhibit 1 is
`consistent with possession with the intent to distribute or—
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`A:
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`Yes—
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`Q: —or consistent with personal use?
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`A:
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`Q:
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`A:
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`It’s consistent with possession with intent to distribute.
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`Now, why do you say that?
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`The fact that someone has 3.5 grams or an eightball of
`crack cocaine indicates that they are a dealer and not a user.
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`Q: What does—you testified the tools of the trade include
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`3
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`
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`guns, scales, money, plastic, what does this case have in it?
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`A:
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`Q:
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`A:
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`Guns, money, plastic, drugs, scale.
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`And does that confirm your opinion?
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`It does. Yes. All of those factors together. Yes.
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`App. III at 256. Finally, he testified that he had never seen a nondistributing user of crack
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`cocaine who possessed 3.6 grams on their person.
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`The government also called a lay witness, Cheney, to testify about her personal
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`relationship with Mickling. She testified that she knew Mickling, and had met him in
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`2010. She then said she did not see him again until 2013, and that in 2013, she saw him
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`about seven or eight times. She said she never witnessed Mickling use crack cocaine, and
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`had never known him to be a user of crack cocaine.
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`A. Standard of Review: Plain Error
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`II
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`Mickling raises two evidentiary challenges on appeal. He did not object when this
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`evidence was presented at trial. Without a contemporaneous objection to alleged
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`improper testimony, we review for plain error. United States v. Hill, 749 F.3d 1250, 1257
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`(10th Cir. 2014) (alleged improper opinion by an expert witness in a criminal case);
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`United States v. Caballero, 277 F.3d 1235, 1243–44 (10th Cir. 2002) (alleged perjury
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`constituting prosecutorial misconduct under Napue).
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`To satisfy the high threshold to achieve a reversal on plain error review, Mickling
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`must show “[1] an ‘error’ [2] that is ‘plain’ and [3] that ‘affect[s] substantial rights.’”
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`4
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`
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`United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993) (fourth alteration in original) (quoting
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`Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b)). If these three prongs are met, then we may exercise discretion to
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`reverse only if we determine that “[4] the error ‘seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity
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`or public reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting
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`United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985)); see also United States v. Story, 635 F.3d
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`1241, 1244 (10th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631–32
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`(2002)).
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`As regards the first and second prongs of plain error, an error is plain “if it is
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`obvious or clear, i.e., if it is contrary to well-settled law.” Hill, 749 F.3d at 1258 (quoting
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`United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867, 871 (10th Cir. 2003)). Under the third prong of
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`plain error, the error must affect the defendant’s substantial rights, prejudicing the
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`defendant “by affect[ing] the outcome of the district court proceedings.” Olano, 507 U.S.
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`at 734. The burden is on the defendant to show this prejudice. Id. at 735. “That is, he
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`must demonstrate ‘a reasonable probability that but for the error claimed, the result of the
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`proceeding would have been different.’” Hill, 749 F.3d at 1263 (quoting United States v.
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`Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d 814, 818 (10th Cir. 2005)). This does not entail a
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`preponderance standard, but rather requires “a probability sufficient to undermine
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`confidence in the outcome.” Id. (quoting United States v. Hasan, 526 F.3d 653, 665 (10th
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`Cir. 2008)). Even if the defendant can satisfy these three prongs, we may only exercise
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`our discretion to reverse under the fourth prong if we are convinced that the error
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`seriously affects the “fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.”
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`5
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`Olano, 507 U.S. at 732. In the present case, we need not reach the fourth prong under
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`Olano because we resolve both issues presented under the third prong of plain error
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`review.
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`B. First Alleged Error: Rule 704(b) Testimony
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`Federal Rule of Evidence 704(b) says, “In a criminal case, an expert witness must
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`not state an opinion about whether the defendant did or did not have a mental state or
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`condition that constitutes an element of the crime charged or of a defense. Those matters
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`are for the trier of fact alone.” Fed. R. Evid. 704(b). We have interpreted Rule 704(b) to
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`“only prevent[] experts from expressly stating the final conclusion or inference as to a
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`defendant’s mental state. The rule does not prevent the expert from testifying to facts or
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`opinions from which the jury could conclude or infer the defendant had the requisite
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`mental state.” United States v. Goodman, 633 F.3d 963, 970 (10th Cir. 2011) (quoting
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`United States v. Richard, 969 F.2d 849, 854–55 (10th Cir. 1992)).
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`For the purposes of our ruling on the Rule 704(b) issue, we will assume error was
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`committed and that it was plain. To determine whether this alleged error prejudiced
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`Mickling by affecting the outcome of his trial, we look to whether he has shown “a
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`reasonable probability that but for the error claimed, the result of the proceeding would
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`have been different,” which is “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Hill,
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`749 F.3d at 1263 (first quoting Trujillo-Terrazas, 405 F.3d at 818; then Hasan, 526 F.3d
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`at 665). In cases involving Rule 704(b) on plain error review, we have affirmed on the
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`basis that there was sufficient evidence to support a conviction even without the improper
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`6
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`testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Archuleta, 737 F.3d 1287, 1298–99 (10th Cir.
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`2013) (“Even if Lujan’s testimony violated Rule 704(b), however, Archuleta cannot
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`demonstrate plain error. . . . [T]hree of his coconspirators testified that Archuleta not
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`only participated in the smuggling scheme but also orchestrated it. . . . Thus, even in the
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`absence of the challenged response by Lujan to the hypothetical question, there was more
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`than sufficient evidence presented to establish [the elements of the crime].”); United
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`States v. Garza, 566 F.3d 1194, 1202 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[T]here was solid admissible
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`evidence of Mr. Garza’s intent.”). This conforms with the plain error standard. If we
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`conclude upon review of all of the evidence presented that there is no reasonable
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`probability that but for the admission of the challenged testimony the outcome of the trial
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`would have been different, we must affirm.
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`Here, the items that Mickling had on his person constituted more than sufficient
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`evidence from which a jury could conclude that he possessed cocaine base with an intent
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`to distribute and that he possessed a firearm in furtherance of that distribution. He
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`admitted that he possessed the loaded nine-millimeter handgun, and he possessed several
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`items that to the jury would likely signal an intent to distribute, even without Wiley’s
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`testimony. And Wiley testified to several facts and opinions from which the jury may
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`have found guilt even without his testimony referring to intent. This evidence, when
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`coupled with the evidence retrieved at the scene, causes us to conclude that Mickling has
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`not demonstrated a reasonable probability that but for the challenged testimony he would
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`not have been convicted on Counts 2 and 3.
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`7
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`C. Second Alleged Error: Napue Claim
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`The Supreme Court in Napue v. Illinois articulated that the defendant’s rights to
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`due process under the Fourteenth Amendment are violated when he is convicted “through
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`use of false evidence, known to be such by representatives of the State” or “when the
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`State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.”
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`Napue, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959); see Caballero, 277 F.3d at 1243. To establish this
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`Napue violation, the defendant must show that the testimony was false, the prosecution
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`knew the testimony was false, and the testimony was material. Caballero, 277 F.3d at
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`1243. Ordinarily, under Napue, “[t]he false testimony is material ‘unless failure to
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`disclose [the perjury] would be harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v.
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`Garcia, 793 F.3d 1194, 1207 (10th Cir. 2015) (second alteration in original) (quoting
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`United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985)), cert. denied, 577 U.S. ----, No. 15-
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`7141, 2016 WL 100762 (Jan. 11, 2016). Because plain error review applies in this case,
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`the burden is on Mickling under the third prong to show that the alleged violation likely
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`affected the outcome of the trial.
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`Mickling argues that Cheney committed perjury when she testified that she first
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`met him in 2010. He argues that this testimony was false because he was incarcerated for
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`the entirety of 2010. He also alleges that the government was aware that Mickling pled
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`guilty to various felonies in late 2009 and was incarcerated for all of 2010. And he argues
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`this was material because the government characterized Ms. Cheney’s testimony as
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`“‘very important’ to the central issue in the case—whether Mickling possessed the
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`8
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`cocaine base in order to use it or distribute it to others.” Aplt. Br. at 20 (quoting App. III
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`at 370 (government’s rebuttal closing argument)).
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`Even if we assume the elements of a Napue violation were satisfied here, Mickling
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`has not met his burden under the third prong of plain error review. He has not shown that
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`the outcome of the trial would likely have been different had Cheney testified to first
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`meeting Mickling in a different year. Mickling primarily argues that Cheney’s testimony
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`was very important to the government’s case, by its own admission. However, we are not
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`convinced that the specific fact that Cheney met Mickling in 2010 was integral to the
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`government’s case. Cheney testified that she met Mickling in 2010 and that she did not
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`see him use crack cocaine at that time. However, the main focus of the government’s
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`questioning was on the subsequent time she spent with Mickling in 2013—during which
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`she also testified she had not seen him use crack cocaine. She said she had seen him
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`seven or eight times in 2013, but was “not exactly sure” how many times she saw him in
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`2010. And where Mickling argues that the government, in its rebuttal closing argument,
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`told the jury that Cheney’s testimony was important, the government in fact referred only
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`to the “seven or eight times” Cheney was with Mickling—that is, in 2013—not the initial
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`time they met.
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`Consider what would have happened if the government had disclosed the perjury.
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`If Cheney was mistaken about the year, and in fact met Mickling in 2009 (for example),
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`then it is extremely unlikely that there would be any change in the jury’s verdict if the
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`government disclosed Cheney’s error. The same is true if Cheney did not actually meet
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`9
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`Mickling until 2013. The jury would still have Cheney’s testimony that she was with
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`Mickling seven or eight times in 2013 and that she had not seen him use crack cocaine
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`during any of those occasions. Both sides focused their examination on the time period in
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`2013, because the events leading to Mickling’s arrest had occurred in 2013—any drug
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`activity or lack thereof that occurred in 2010 would be almost entirely irrelevant to
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`whether Mickling was a drug user or distributor in late 2013. Further, because Cheney
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`did not even remember what time of year in 2010 she met Mickling, the jury very likely
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`did not focus on this part of her testimony. Even if Mickling established a Napue
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`violation, he has not satisfied the more stringent plain error standard that requires a strong
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`showing of prejudice.
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`The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
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`III
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`Entered for the Court
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`Mary Beck Briscoe
`Circuit Judge
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`10