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`NOT PRECEDENTIAL
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`UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
`FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
`___________
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`No. 13-2384
`___________
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`IN RE: THOMAS PAUL RICHARD, SR.,
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`Petitioner
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`____________________________________
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`On a Petition for Writ of Mandamus from the
`United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania
`(Related to D.C. Civil No. 2-07-cv-00016)
`____________________________________
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`Submitted Pursuant to Rule 21, Fed. R. App. P.
`July 18, 2013
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`Before: AMBRO, SMITH and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
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`(Opinion filed July 31, 2013)
`_________
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`OPINION
`_________
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`PER CURIAM
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`Petitioner Thomas Richard, a state prisoner, filed a petition for a writ of
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`mandamus requesting that we 1) compel the Magistrate Judge to recuse himself and 2)
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`reverse the denial of his motion pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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`We will issue a writ of mandamus under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) only in
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`“extraordinary circumstances.” See Hahnemann Univ. Hosp. v. Edgar, 74 F.3d 456, 461
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`(3d Cir. 1996). A petitioner seeking mandamus must show that (1) no other adequate
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`means exist to attain the desired relief, (2) his right to issuance of the writ is clear and
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`indisputable, and (3) the writ is appropriate under the circumstances of his case. Cheney
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`v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 367, 380-81 (2004); In re Pressman-Gutman Co., 459 F.3d
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`383, 399 (3d Cir. 2006). “Given its drastic nature, a writ of mandamus should not be
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`issued where relief may be obtained through an ordinary appeal.” Hahnemann, 74 F.3d
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`at 461; see also Pressman-Gutman, 459 F.3d at 398 (holding mandamus is not a substitute
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`for appeal). Even when these elements are met, the decision to issue a writ of mandamus
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`is “largely discretionary.” Hahnemann, 74 F.3d at 461.
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` The Magistrate Judge denied Richard’s 60(b) motion as moot. Denial of a motion
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`pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is a final, appealable order. See, e.g., Pridgen v.
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`Shannon, 380 F.3d 721, 725 (3d Cir. 2004). Because an ordinary appeal is available, we
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`will deny the petition for mandamus to the extent it is an attempt to seek review of the
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`District Court’s order. See United States v. Higdon, 638 F.3d 233, 245 (3d Cir. 2011)
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`(holding power for appellate courts to issue mandamus is limited to “exceptional cases
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`where the traditional bases for jurisdiction do not apply.”) (quoting In re Pasquariello, 16
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`F.3d 525, 528 (3d Cir. 1994)).
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`However, mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to challenge the denial of a motion
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`to recuse under 28 U.S.C. § 455. See In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 977 F.2d 764, 777-78
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`(3d Cir. 1992). Richard’s assertion of bias is solely on the basis that the Magistrate Judge
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`has ruled against him in the past. That is insufficient to establish that the Magistrate
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`Judge’s partiality might reasonably be questioned within the meaning of § 455. Liteky v.
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`2
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`United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings alone almost never constitute
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`a valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.”). Here, the record only shows that the
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`Magistrate Judge denied Richard’s petition for writ of habeas corpus five years ago, and
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`Richard has pointed to no extrajudicial source of bias. See United States v. Bertoli, 40
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`F.3d 1384, 1412 (3d Cir. 1994). We find no evidence in the record of a “deep seated or
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`high degree of favoritism or antagonism that would make fair judgment impossible.”
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`United States v. Wecht, 484 F.3d 194, 213 (3d Cir. 2007) (citation and internal quotation
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`marks omitted).
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`Accordingly, we will deny the petition for writ of mandamus.
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`3