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`IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
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`CENTRAL DIVISION
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`CAMILLIA D. OLSON,
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`Plaintiff,
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`v.
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`ROBERT BENNETT, ORRIN HATCH,
`JON HUNTSMAN, and RON BISHOP,
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`REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
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`Case No. 2:07cv564
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`Chief District Judge Tena Campbell
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`Defendants.
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`Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner
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`This matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Paul M. Warner by Chief District Judge
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`Tena Campbell pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Before the court are Camillia D. Olson’s
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`(“Plaintiff”) two motions for appointment of counsel2 and motion for service of process.3
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`Having carefully reviewed Plaintiff’s complaint, the court recommends dismissal for lack of
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`subject matter jurisdiction.
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`BACKGROUND
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`As an initial matter, because Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the court will “construe [her]
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`pleadings liberally and hold the pleadings to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings
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`drafted by lawyers.” Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 1996).
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`1 See docket no. 9.
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`2 See docket nos. 7 and 10.
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`3 See docket no. 11.
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`Case 2:07-cv-00564-TC Document 13 Filed 02/06/08 Page 2 of 7
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`In Plaintiff’s complaint, she names the following individuals as defendants: United
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`States Senator Robert Bennett, United States Senator Orrin Hatch, United States Representative
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`Rob Bishop, and Utah Governor Jon Huntsman. In subsequent pleadings, Plaintiff’s captions
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`include, in addition to those stated above, United States President George Bush (“President
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`Bush”) and United States Vice President Dick Cheney (“Vice President Cheney”) with the word
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`“add” in parentheses immediately following each name. Presumably, Plaintiff was attempting to
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`add President Bush and Vice President Cheney as defendants. While Plaintiff has failed to
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`properly move to amend her complaint to add them as defendants, the court will nonetheless
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`assume, for purposes of this report and recommendation, that Plaintiff properly named them as
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`defendants. In addition, the court will refer to all defendants collectively as “Defendants.”
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`Upon a thorough review of the complaint, it appears that Plaintiff is asserting that
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`Defendants violated her constitutional rights on the grounds that they have failed to uphold their
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`oaths of office by “allow[ing] the President to go to war with Iraq.” Plaintiff contends that this
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`violates a treaty with the United Nations, which “has caused increasing hostility of other nations
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`as to place our people in danger and possible attack [sic].” It also appears that Plaintiff is asking
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`the court to “establish an independent United States Treasurey [sic], and to withdraw all troops
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`from Iraq . . . and [to] encourage any of those who have made money off this war all the money
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`[sic] to help make restitution.”
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`2
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`Case 2:07-cv-00564-TC Document 13 Filed 02/06/08 Page 3 of 7
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`ANALYSIS
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`This court previously granted Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis under
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`28 U.S.C. § 1915 (the “in forma pauperis statute”).4 Whenever the court authorizes a party to
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`proceed without the prepayment of fees under the in forma pauperis statute, the court is required
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`to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that . . . the action or appeal . . . is
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`frivolous or malicious . . . [or] fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §
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`1915(e)(2)(B)(i), (ii).
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`In addition, Article III of the Constitution limits the federal courts to the adjudication of
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`actual cases and controversies. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). Article III
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`requires that a litigant have “standing” in order to invoke the power of a federal court. See id. In
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`other words, standing “is the threshold question in every federal case, determining the power of
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`the court to entertain the suit.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). “In order to satisfy
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`the jurisdictional prerequisite of standing, [Plaintiff] must do more than allege abstract injury,
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`[s]he must show that [s]he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct
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`injury as the result of the challenged official conduct and the injury or threat of injury must be
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`both real and immediate, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309,
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`1316 (10th Cir. 1997) (quotations and citation omitted). Accordingly, to have standing to pursue
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`her claims against Defendants, Plaintiff must allege a concrete and particularized injury that is
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`fairly traceable to Defendants’ allegedly unlawful conduct and that is likely to be redressed by
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`the requested relief. See Allen, 468 U.S. at 751.
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`4 See docket no. 5.
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`3
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`The court concludes that Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the jurisdiction of this court falls
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`far short of the constitutional requirements for standing. Plaintiff has failed to allege any direct
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`personal injury, actual or imminent, that she has suffered by Defendants’ alleged actions of
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`“allow[ing] the President to go to war with Iraq.” While Plaintiff sets forth generalized harms
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`allegedly caused by Defendants’ actions, Plaintiff has failed to show how Defendants have
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`specifically injured her in a manner apart from the general population. “[S]tanding to sue may
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`not be predicated upon an interest of the kind alleged here which is held in common by all
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`members of the public, because of the necessarily abstract nature of the injury all citizens share.”
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`See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 221 (1974). Merely
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`alleging that by allowing the President to go to war in Iraq, Defendants have placed our country
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`in danger of an attack is not enough to demonstrate that Plaintiff has standing to file this lawsuit.
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`“A federal court does not have jurisdiction over a case if the plaintiff does not have
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`standing.” United States v. Colorado Supreme Court, 87 F.3d 1161, 1166 (10th Cir. 1996). “A
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`court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the
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`proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking.” Basso v. Utah Power &
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`Light Co., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3) (“If the court
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`determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss the
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`action.”). Accordingly, the court recommends dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint for lack of
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`standing.
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`But even assuming Plaintiff did have standing, the court would nevertheless recommend
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`dismissal under the political question doctrine. Courts are prohibited from hearing cases which
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`Case 2:07-cv-00564-TC Document 13 Filed 02/06/08 Page 5 of 7
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`present issues, or political questions, that belong to the decision-making authority of the
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`legislative and executive branches of government. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962).
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`“When deciding whether issues present political questions, courts must make a discriminating
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`inquiry into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, for it resists resolution by any
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`semantic cataloguing.” Schroder v. Bush, 263 F.3d 1169, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations
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`and citations omitted). As such, application of the political question doctrine must be made on a
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`case-by-case basis. See id. at 1174.
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`In Baker v. Carr, the United States Supreme Court set forth several factors for
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`determining whether a case presents a nonjusticiable political question. See Baker, 369 U.S. at
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`217. In particular, the Court stated that
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`[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question [will
`be] found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
`coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and
`manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
`initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the
`impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without expressing
`lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
`unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality
`of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
`one question.
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`Id. at 217.
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`Based on the above factors, it is apparent that Plaintiff seeks judicial resolution of a
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`political question. Plaintiff is requesting that the court order Congress and President Bush to
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`“withdraw all troops from Iraq.” The Constitution, however, gives Congress and the President
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`the power to employ the nation’s armed forces in war. Specifically, Congress has the power to
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`Case 2:07-cv-00564-TC Document 13 Filed 02/06/08 Page 6 of 7
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`declare war, to raise and support armies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules
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`governing these military bodies. See U.S. Const. art I, § 8, cls. 11, 12, 13, 14. The Constitution
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`also names the President as the commander-in-chief of the military forces. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
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`As the Tenth Circuit has stated, “courts afford the political branches of government a particularly
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`high degree of deference in the area of military affairs, because the Constitution expressly
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`confers authority over the military on the executive and legislative branches.” Custer County
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`Action Ass’n v. Garvey, 256 F.3d 1024, 1031 (10th Cir 2001). For these reasons, even if Plainitff
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`did have standing, the court would conclude that Plaintiff’s lawsuit raises a nonjusticiable
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`political question and recommend dismissal on that basis.
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`RECOMMENDATION
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` Because the court concludes that Plaintiff lacks standing or, in the alternative, that
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`Plaintiff’s complaint seeks resolution of a nonjusticiable political question, IT IS HEREBY
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`RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff’s complaint be DISMISSED.
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`Copies of the foregoing report and recommendation are being sent to the parties who are
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`hereby notified of their right to object. The parties are further notified that they must file any
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`objections to the report and recommendation, with the clerk of the district court, pursuant to 28
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`U.S.C. § 636(b), within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure to file objections to both factual
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`Case 2:07-cv-00564-TC Document 13 Filed 02/06/08 Page 7 of 7
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`and legal conclusions may constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent appellate
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`review.
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`IT IS SO ORDERED.
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`DATED this 6th day of February, 2008.
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`BY THE COURT:
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`PAUL M. WARNER
`United States Magistrate Judge
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