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`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 1 of 12
`
`Honorable Kymberly K. Evanson
`
`UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
`WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
`AT SEATTLE
`
`STEVEN FLOYD, JOLENE FURDEK, and
`JONATHAN RYAN, individually and on
`behalf of all others similarly situated,
`Plaintiff,
`v.
`AMAZON.COM INC. and APPLE INC.,
` Defendants.
`
`Case No. 2:22-cv-01599 KKE
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY IN
`SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS’
`MOTION TO COMPEL
`PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS
`IMPROPERLY WITHHELD AS
`PRIVILEGED
`Note On Motion Calendar:
`December 23, 2024
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
`+1-206-839-4300
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 2 of 12
`
`TABLE OF CONTENTS
`
`Page(s)
`Introduction ................................................................................................................................. 1
`
`I.
`
`II.
`
`III.
`
`Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Affirmative Representations Placed Communications With Mr.
`Floyd At Issue ............................................................................................................. 1
`
`Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s “Duty” Arguments Are Premature and Flawed ........................ 3
`
`Defendants’ Motion Is Procedurally Proper ............................................................... 5
`
`Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. 6
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`i
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`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
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`TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
`
`Page(s)
`
`Cases
`
`Adams v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co.,
`863 F.3d 1069 (8th Cir. 2017) ...................................................................................................4
`
`Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
`306 F.R.D. 234 (N.D. Cal. 2015) ...............................................................................................2
`
`Bittaker v. Woodford,
`331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 2003) .....................................................................................................5
`
`Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp.,
`150 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) ...............................................................................................2
`
`Castillo v. United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc.,
`2018 WL 3429936 (W.D. Wash. July 16, 2018) .......................................................................4
`
`Cota v. Porven, Ltd.,
`2022 WL 173401 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) ...............................................................................3
`
`Matter of Dependency of G.M.W.,
`24 Wn. App. 2d 96, 124, 519 P.3d 272 (2022) ..........................................................................3
`
`Hearn v. Rhay,
`68 F.R.D. 574 (E.D. Wash. 1975) ..............................................................................................2
`
`In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig.,
`168 F.R.D. 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) ...............................................................................................2
`
`Jacobson v. Krafchick,
`2015 WL 852608 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2015) .........................................................................3
`
`Roberts v. Legacy Meridian Park Hosp., Inc.,
`97 F. Supp. 3d 1245 (D. Or. 2015) ............................................................................................2
`
`Tennenbaum v. Deloitte & Touche,
`77 F.3d 337 (9th Cir. 1996) .......................................................................................................2
`
`United States v. Amlani,
`169 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 1999) ...................................................................................................4
`
`Vue v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union,
`2024 WL 4436814 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2024) ..............................................................................4
`
`Other Authorities
`
`Fed. R. Civ. P. 1 ...............................................................................................................................2
`ii
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 4 of 12
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`Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ........................................................................................................................3
`
`Wash. R.P.C. 1.2 .............................................................................................................................3
`
`Wash. R.P.C. 1.2(f) ..........................................................................................................................3
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`iii
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`INTRODUCTION
`Defendants move to compel the production of eleven communications between
`Plaintiffs’ counsel and Steven Floyd that will establish whether Mr. Floyd indicated a desire to
`withdraw on or before January 16, 2024, prior to counsel filing a Second Amended Complaint
`purportedly on his behalf. Plaintiffs’ counsel put these communications “at issue” by claiming
`in their motion to amend that Mr. Floyd may wish to proceed and affirmatively representing that
`Mr. Floyd’s January 16 communication was “not a withdrawal.” Dkt. 144 at 8 (emphasis added).
`Whether counsel had authority from Mr. Floyd to file the motion to amend and Second Amended
`Complaint—as this Court has recognized—is a potentially case-dispositive question. Dkt. 173
`at 82 (“[D]oesn’t it matter what Floyd said in that last communication in January?”). The
`communications sought will answer that question and possibly reveal a conflict between
`Plaintiffs’ counsel and Mr. Floyd.
`Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a brief that fails to address their own representations about these
`communications. Their hypothesis about undefined duties to an uncertified class is irrelevant if
`Mr. Floyd, then the sole plaintiff, indicated a desire to end the case or not proceed with an
`amendment in January. Any duty to strangers cannot override Plaintiffs’ counsel’s duty to their
`actual client. What matters now is that Plaintiffs’ counsel made express representations
`regarding their communications with Mr. Floyd as a sword to justify amendment, and may not
`now shield those same communications given the serious doubts about their accuracy. The
`requested communications should be produced.1
`I.
`Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s Affirmative Representations Placed Communications With
`Mr. Floyd At Issue
`Plaintiffs’ counsel argue that they did not put their communications with Mr. Floyd “at
`issue.” This ignores the affirmative representations Plaintiffs’ counsel made when moving to
`amend, which the Court explicitly relied on in granting that motion, and when filing the Second
`Amended Complaint. In their motion to amend, counsel represented that Mr. Floyd’s “recent
`
`1 Plaintiffs’ counsel claim they must assert privilege because Mr. Floyd has not responded to
`outreach since August 28. Dkt. 176 at 9. But it may be in Mr. Floyd’s best interests to produce
`these communications so that the Court can determine whether he wished to dismiss this case.
`1
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
`
`

`

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`non-responsiveness” could be due to some “personal emergency,” but reassured the Court and
`Defendants that “Mr. Floyd has never affirmatively withdrawn.” Dkt. 80 at 5, 8. Counsel also
`stated that they were “reluctant to interpret [Mr. Floyd’s] silence as evincing an intent to
`withdraw,” even though they “have not yet been able to renew contact with [him].” Dkt. 80 at
`8. Plaintiffs’ counsel further characterized the events surrounding Mr. Floyd’s January 16
`disappearance, representing that Mr. Floyd’s last communication was “not a withdrawal.” Dkt.
`144 at 8; 10 (“Mr. Floyd has not withdrawn as a class representative.”). Then, in the amended
`complaint, counsel alleged that Mr. Floyd wished to continue with his case and represent the
`proposed class. Dkt. 99 ¶¶ 148, 154. Counsel, therefore, made their communications with Mr.
`Floyd a “substantive issue” in this litigation. Roberts v. Legacy Meridian Park Hosp., Inc., 97
`F. Supp. 3d 1245, 1253-54 (D. Or. 2015) (waiver exists where privilege holder “makes the
`communications with counsel a substantive issue in the litigation” and places “those
`communications ‘at issue’”).
`Plaintiffs’ counsel now claim that whether Mr. Floyd withdrew or not is “immaterial.”
`Dkt. 176 at 11. But by making representations to this Court about what was or was not
`communicated by Mr. Floyd, counsel “injected” the issue of whether they properly executed Mr.
`Floyd’s wishes in this litigation. Roberts, 97 F. Supp. 3d at 1255 (waiver where plaintiff
`“injected” issue of whether his attorney had authority to act in the case); Apple Inc. v. Samsung
`Elecs. Co., 306 F.R.D. 234, 242 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (waiver where Samsung “referenced” and
`“used privileged communications to justify its argument[s]”); In re Kidder Peabody Sec. Litig.,
`168 F.R.D. 459, 470 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (waiver where privilege holder “makes factual assertions
`the truth of which can only be assessed by examination of the privileged communication.”);
`Bowne of N.Y.C., Inc. v. AmBase Corp., 150 F.R.D. 465, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (similar).
`Plaintiffs’ counsel do not (and cannot) dispute that the eleven communications sought by
`Defendants would show what Mr. Floyd actually said about his future participation in the case.
`They cannot affirmatively use those communications unprompted to advance positions in
`litigation and simultaneously claim privilege to bar Defendants from refuting their allegations.
`See Samsung, 306 F.R.D. at 241 (communications cannot be used as “both a shield and a
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`2
`
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
`
`

`

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`sword”). Doing so would be “manifestly unfair” to Defendants who have no access to the
`communications that are being used against them. Hearn v. Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 581 (E.D.
`Wash. 1975); Tennenbaum v. Deloitte & Touche, 77 F.3d 337, 340 (9th Cir. 1996) (doctrine of
`waiver is “rooted in notions of fundamental fairness”). The fair and efficient resolution of this
`case requires producing the eleven communications. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1.2
`II.
`Plaintiffs’ Counsel’s “Duty” Arguments Are Premature and Flawed
`Instead of responding to Defendants’ position that they waived privilege by putting the
`communications “at issue,” Plaintiffs’ counsel (and their “expert”) contend that what they said
`about those communications is irrelevant because of an undefined “duty” to an uncertified
`proposed class.3 This argument fails to address the ethical rule governing the “Scope of
`Representation and Allocation of Authority Between Client and Lawyer.” Wash. R.P.C. 1.2; see
`also 1.2(f) (“A lawyer shall not purport to act as a lawyer for any person . . . if the lawyer knows
`or reasonably should know that the lawyer is acting without the authority of that person . . . ,
`unless the lawyer is authorized or required to so act by law or a court order.”). That rule permits
`counsel to undertake only actions authorized by the client. Jacobson v. Krafchick, 2015 WL
`852608, at *4 (W.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2015) (“[L]awyer must abide by a client’s decisions
`regarding the objectives of representation.”); Matter of Dependency of G.M.W., 24 Wn. App. 2d
`96, 124, 519 P.3d 272, 287 (2022). Counsel’s own expert concedes this point: “[C]ounsel who
`file a proposed class action have an attorney-client relationship with the named plaintiff(s) prior
`to class certification.” Dkt. 176-1 at ¶ 14.
`Even if, doubtfully, a duty to an uncertified class exists, Plaintiffs’ counsel could not have
`put the interests of that contingent class over their client’s. Plaintiffs’ counsel’s obligation to the
`only client who brought this case, Mr. Floyd, exists regardless of (and supersedes) any
`
`2 This motion is narrowly tailored. Defendants seek only eleven entries, out of the 105 on the
`log, all of which relate to this question of authority. The January 11, 16, February 26, and May
`8 entries, in particular, are vital to understanding why Plaintiffs’ counsel filed an amended
`complaint alleging Mr. Floyd’s desire to continue with the case, even as they were apparently
`preparing to withdraw him.
`3 Defendants reserve all rights at the appropriate stage of the litigation to challenge Plaintiffs’
`“expert declaration” both procedurally and substantively, and to depose the proffered “expert.”
`3
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
`
`

`

`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 8 of 12
`
`hypothetical duties owed to others. Courts recognize that counsel’s duty to a proposed class
`does not trump a sole plaintiff’s desire to settle or seek dismissal pre-certification, which can be
`done without court approval. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e); Cota v. Porven, Ltd., 2022 WL 173401,
`at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 2022) (“Crucially, ‘prior to certification’ a named plaintiff may dismiss
`claims on behalf of a putative class under Rule 41(a)(1) []because ‘Rule 23(e) does not provide
`the district court with [any] supervisory authority over such dismissals, nor does it require notice
`to the absent class members.’” (quoting Ripley v. Bridgestone Retail Ops., LLC, 2010 WL
`11684294, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2010)); Adams v. USAA Cas. Ins. Co., 863 F.3d 1069,
`1081–83 (8th Cir. 2017) (collecting cases).4 If there was a conflict between Mr. Floyd’s interests
`and that of the inchoate class (such as Mr. Floyd indicating that he wanted the case dismissed),
`then Plaintiffs’ counsel were required to put his interests first.
`Plaintiff’s counsel’s assertion that they would have authority to add representatives even
`if Mr. Floyd had affirmatively withdrawn fares no better. Dkt. 176 at 13. The cases counsel rely
`on involved named plaintiffs who sought to withdraw and authorized counsel to seek
`substitution. See Castillo v. United Rentals (N. Am.), Inc., 2018 WL 3429936, at *2 (W.D. Wash.
`July 16, 2018) (“[Castillo] agreed for Mr. Powell to substitute in as the representative plaintiff.”);
`Vue v. Pentagon Fed. Credit Union, 2024 WL 4436814, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2024) (plaintiff
`“expressly authorized” substitution). Here, it is unclear whether Mr. Floyd authorized
`substitution. Counsel’s argument also assumes that their version of events (i.e., that Mr. Floyd
`wished to proceed with this case) is true. The communications Defendants move to compel will
`confirm or refute that assumption.
`At bottom, Plaintiffs’ counsel attempt to use their “duty” to an uncertified class to claim
`that Mr. Floyd’s views are not “vital” to the issues. Dkt. 176 at 12. What the sole named plaintiff
`said or did not say about proceeding with his case is vital to Defendants’ challenge to counsel’s
`continued prosecution of the case on Mr. Floyd’s behalf, including the filing of the Second
`
`4 The supposed “authority to act for the proposed class and intervenors” pre-certification that
`Plaintiffs’ counsel invoke (Dkt. 176 at 11) does not acknowledge this recent precedent or the
`relevant amendments to Rule 23(e), which refute the notion that there is a superseding duty to a
`non-certified class.
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
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`Amended Complaint in his name. Disclosure is necessary to the just resolution of this dispute,
`especially here where one party to the communications has disappeared. Defendants should not
`be left to “rely almost exclusively on [Plaintiff’s counsel’s] characterization of events” to defend
`themselves. United States v. Amlani, 169 F.3d 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 1999).5
`III.
`Defendants’ Motion Is Procedurally Proper
`Plaintiffs’ counsel finally argue that Defendants’ motion is procedurally improper,
`suggesting that Defendants delayed asserting waiver until after the motion to amend was
`resolved. Dkt. 176 at 14. Nothing could be further from the truth. Defendants’ motion was filed
`in accordance with the deadline set by this Court’s November 5 Order, and Defendants promptly
`raised their arguments once the necessary information became available through production of
`Plaintiffs’ Communications Log.6
`Plaintiffs’ counsel have repeatedly made representations (often inconsistent and
`contradictory) about Mr. Floyd’s participation, even after seeking amendment. The day after the
`Court granted leave to amend on May 6, Plaintiffs’ counsel stated publicly that Mr. Floyd “no
`longer wishes to serve.” Dkt. 144 at 13. Then, on August 29, Plaintiffs’ counsel filed a
`stipulation to seek additional time for Mr. Floyd to comply with discovery, suggesting that
`counsel and Mr. Floyd were in contact. Dkt. 134. Plaintiffs’ counsel did not advise Defendants
`and this Court until September 13 that there had been a “breakdown” in the attorney-client
`relationship on August 28. Dkt. 144 at ¶ 11. The Log suggests that counsel have not been
`transparent about their interactions with Mr. Floyd and did not have authority for several
`substantive filings. Yet, because the Log leaves many questions unanswered, including what
`Mr. Floyd said in January, Defendants promptly moved to compel production of eleven entries.
`Lastly, Plaintiffs’ counsel assert that Defendants’ timing deprived them of their choice
`
`5 Defendants believe the communications sought will require dismissal of this action. Dkt. 172
`at 14. Defendants reserve the right to challenge the claims asserted by Plaintiffs Furdek and
`Ryan in any new case on timeliness or any other available ground at the appropriate time.
`6 Counsel suggest that the Log can only be used to assess the motion to withdraw. Not so. The
`Court held that the Log is needed to “resolve questions of delay, prejudice, and harm.” Dkt. 168
`at 2.
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
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`to withdraw their arguments. Dkt. 176 at 14 (citing Bittaker v. Woodford, 331 F.3d 715 (9th Cir.
`2003)). But Bittaker does not address the situation here: Plaintiffs’ counsel made arguments
`based on representations about Mr. Floyd’s absence, Defendants have reason to question those
`explanations and promptly raised them, and now Plaintiffs’ counsel are asserting privilege over
`the same communications they used as a sword. Further, Plaintiffs’ counsel’s choice remains.
`If they do not wish to explain their prior representations, Plaintiffs’ counsel can dismiss this
`action, drop their assertions of authority from Mr. Floyd, and proceed to file a new case on behalf
`of Plaintiffs Furdek and Ryan, as they have already represented that they can do. Dkt. 173 at
`105–06.
`
`CONCLUSION
`The motion to compel should be granted.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`6
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`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 11 of 12
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`I certify that this memorandum contains 2,097 words, in compliance with the Local Civil
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`Rules.
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`DATED this 23rd day of December, 2024.
`
`/s/Mark S. Parris
`Mark S. Parris (WSBA No. 18370)
`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
`Seattle, WA 98101
`Phone: (206) 839-4300
`Fax: (206) 839-4301
`mparris@orrick.com
`Mark A. Perry (pro hac vice)
`WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
`2001 M. Street NW, Suite 600
`Washington, DC 20036
`Phone: (202) 682-7000
`mark.perry@weil.com
`
`Eric S. Hochstadt (pro hac vice)
`WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
`767 Fifth Avenue
`New York, NY 10153-0119
`Phone: (212) 310-8000
`eric.hochstadt@weil.com
`Brian G. Liegel (pro hac vice)
`WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
`1395 Brickell Avenue, Suite 1200
`Miami, FL 33131
`Phone: (305) 577-3180
`brian.liegel@weil.com
`Morgan D. MacBride (pro hac vice)
`WEIL GOTSHAL & MANGES, LLP
`201 Redwood Shores Parkway
`Redwood Shores, CA 94065
`Phone: (650) 802-3044
`morgan.macbride@weil.com
`Attorneys for Apple Inc.
`
`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`7
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`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
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`Case 2:22-cv-01599-KKE Document 180 Filed 12/23/24 Page 12 of 12
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`John Goldmark, WSBA #40980
`MaryAnn Almeida, WSBA #49086
`Davis Wright Tremaine, LLP
`920 Fifth Avenue, Suite 3300
`Seattle, Washington, 98104
`Phone: (206) 622-3150
`Fax: (206) 757-7700
`johngoldmark@dwt.com
`maryannalmeida@dwt.com
`Jonathan E. Nuechterlein (pro hac vice)
`Mark D. Hopson (pro hac vice)
`Benjamin M. Mundel (pro hac vice)
`Jacquelyn E. Fradette (pro hac vice)
`Sidley Austin LLP
`1501 K Street, N.W.
`Washington, D.C. 20005
`Phone: (202) 736-8000
`Fax: (202) 736-8711
`jnuechterlein@sidley.com
`Mhopson@sidle.com
`bmundel@sidley.com
`jfradette@sidley.com
`Attorneys for Amazon.com, Inc.
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`DEFENDANTS’ REPLY ISO MOTION TO COMPEL
`CASE NO. 2:22-CV-01599 KKE
`
`8
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`ORRICK, HERRINGTON & SUTCLIFFE LLP
`401 Union Street, Suite 3300
` Seattle, Washington 98101
`+1-206-839-4300
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`